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Japan

Opposition Prepares To Form Coalition

OW0704104889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0842 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Kyoto, April 7 KYODO—Leaders of four opposition parties declared Friday an agreement to demand the resignation of the cabinet of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, which is losing public trust amid the widening Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal.

The heads of the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party [DSP], and the United Social Democratic Party [USDP] also said they will call for a dissolution of the House of Representatives in order to hold a snap general election.

Takako Doi of the JSP, Junya Yano of Komeito, Eiichi Nagasue of the DSP, and Satsuki Eda of the USDP also agreed to set up a forum to pave the way for establishment of an opposition coalition government.

The opposition leaders, who met at the Kyoto International Conference Hall for 90 minutes, told a joint press conference that the four parties would open consultations on basic policies between their respective secretaries general and policy board chiefs.

The four leaders will meet again when the need arises, they added.

Abe Doubts Policy Agreement

OW0604135289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0835 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Shintaro Abe said on Thursday he doubts if four opposition parties could reach agreement on basic policies.

Abe told an evening press conference that the opposition camp is only in a mood toward a coalition, adding policy differences remain, particularly on national security.

Abe was commenting on an opposition agreement, reached Wednesday, to start policy talks with an eye on establishing an opposition coalition government.

Meanwhile, Takeshita's political mentor, Shin Kanemaru, said on Thursday the opposition parties are trying to form a coalition without policy, which he likened to an "assembly of wild monkeys."

Leaders of the Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party and the United Social Democratic Party are to meet in Kyoto on Friday [7 April].

They are expected to discuss establishment of the coalition to replace the cabinet of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who is beleaguered with new disclosures in the Recruit scandal.

Unlike the moderate Komeito and the DSP, the largest opposition party JSP opposes both Japan-United States security arrangements and atomic power plants.

More Recruit Donations to Takeshita Unearthed

OW0704080889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0724 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita received 25 million yen in political donations from the scandal-ridden Recruit Co. in 1986, sources said Friday.

Takeshita had been serving as finance minister up to the summer of that year and then was named to the powerful post of secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

According to earlier confirmed reports, Recruit purchased 50 million yen worth of tickets for 2 parties held in 1987.

The new disclosure indicates that Takeshita received as much as 75 million yen in monetary donations from Recruit prior to his election as the LDP president, which carried with it the prime ministership.

In addition, as already disclosed earlier, a relative and a secretary to Takeshita bought unlisted Recruit Cosmos stocks which brought profits totaling 25 million yen when sold on the open market.

Takeshita, Tazawa Urge Caution on FSX Deal

OW0704065189 Tokyo KYODO in English 0601 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and Defense Agency Director General Kichiro Tazawa on Friday agreed to act cautiously in settling the dispute with the United States over the joint development of a new support fighter code-named FSX for Japan's Air Self-Defense Force.

According to government sources, Tazawa personally met with Takeshita prior to the day's cabinet session to discuss the FSX issue.

During the meeting, the sources said, Tazawa suggested that "undue haste should be avoided" in settling the FSX dispute, and the premier endorsed the idea.

Takeshita and Tazawa consider it necessary to obtain full U.S. agreement to the FSX project, they said.

Japan and the U.S. finished drafting last November an agreement to co-develop the FSX based on General Dynamics' F-16.

However, the new Bush administration decided to review the deal in response to sharp criticism from some members of the U.S. Congress who condemned the proposed agreement as a give-away of U.S. aviation technology to Japan.

Talks held in Washington last week to break the deadlock failed and the dispute is now said likely to drag on for months.

During Friday's meeting, Tazawa told Takeshita that his agency would continue efforts to seek U.S. understanding of the project as agreed on last November, the government sources said.

Tazawa explained that joint aircraft development is an international trend.

The Defense Agency chief emphasized that the joint FSX development would not result in the Japanese aircraft industry—having obtained new technology from the U.S.—eventually posing a threat to U.S. aircraft manufacturers, as feared in the U.S.

Chinese Premier Li Peng To Visit 12 April

OW0704101989 Tokyo KYODO in English 1000 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Chinese Premier Li Peng will meet the Japanese prime minister on April 12, soon after arriving in Tokyo on a 5-day official visit to Japan, Foreign Ministry officials said Friday.

Li will be the highest Chinese official to visit Japan in over 5 years, following the November 1983 visit by Hu Yaobang, then general secretary of the Communist Party.

Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko will host a luncheon for Premier Li at the Imperial Palace on April 12.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who will accompany Li on the visit, will hold talks with his Japanese counterpart Sosuke Uno on April 13.

The Chinese premier is scheduled to give a press conference at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on April 14.

Li and his group will leave Japan from Fukuoka Airport for home on April 16 after visiting the Seto-Ohashi Bridge linking Honshu and Shikoku Islands the previous day.

PRC Vows To Continue Opening To West

OW0604123089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1109 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—The Chinese ambassador to Japan said Thursday that China's policy of opening to the West remains unchanged despite economic difficulties, including the worst ever inflation, in the country.

Ambassador Yang Zhenya made the statement during a 30-minute courtesy call on Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita prior to a visit by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to Japan April 12-16.

Yang said that China welcomes a Japanese move to establish an organization aimed at promoting Japanese investments in China and giving substance to a bilateral pact on the protection of investment.

The agreement was signed by Takeshita and Li when the Japanese prime minister visited China last August.

The ambassador was quoted as telling Takeshita that China expects Li's visit to Japan will help further develop friendly ties between the two countries, especially economic relations.

Takeshita responded by saying that he is determined to further promote bilateral relations based on the 1972 Japan-China joint communique and the 1978 Japan-China peace and friendship treaty.

Takeshita also said that close Japan-China relations will have a favorable effect for peace in Asia and the world.

Joint Venture To Be Set Up With Dalian Firm

OW0604123289 Tokyo KYODO in English 1132 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—Iwatani International Corp. on Thursday announced an agreement with a Dalian municipal corporation for the creation of a joint welding gas equipment production and sales company.

The joint firm will be established in early May. It will have an initial paid-up capital of 498.75 million yen, of which 60 percent will be provided by Iwatani and 40 percent by the Dalian partner.

The chairman of the joint company will be a Chinese, and the vice chairman Yoshio Ito, senior managing director, Iwatani.

Under the present plan, the joint firm will start production of welding gas equipment and related equipment for steelworks and shipyards about a year later for sale in China, Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

Iwatani said the joint firm expects 1.5 billion yen in sales in the third year.

Chinese Students Arrested for Visa Forgery
*OW0604112489 Tokyo KYODO in English 0730 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—Three Chinese students have been arrested for allegedly forging one of the students' visas to extend his stay in Japan, Tokyo police said Thursday.

Lin Jiangming, 35, a student at a Japanese language school in Tokyo, was arrested along with his classmates and alleged accomplices, Lin Xinyu, 21, and Xie Wen-yao, 25.

All three are from Fujian Province in southern China, police said.

Lin entered Japan last July with a visa allowing him to stay here as a student until January 23. He could not renew the visa officially, police said, as he was found to have worked illegally and did not attend school.

Police said a fake stamp on Lin's visa permitted him an extended stay until July 23. He applied for renewal of his stay with the forged visa on January 25 in Tokyo's Toshima Ward Office, police said.

Officials at the ward office said they have found more than ten similar forged permits recently. Police suspect there is an organized forgery group behind the incident.

Foreign Ministry Says Mun's Visit 'Legal'
*OW0704151489 Tokyo KYODO in English 1329 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—The Foreign Ministry considers the activities of dissident South Korean clergyman Mun Ik-hwan in Japan to be legal and within the limits of his visa status, a ministry source said Friday.

The source confirmed South Korean displeasure over the granting of a visa to Mun. Seoul had requested Mun's deportation if he engaged in antigovernment activities while in Japan, the source said.

Mun arrived in Tokyo Wednesday after an unauthorized visit to Pyongyang on a self-styled peace mission. South Korean authorities have said they will arrest Mun when he returns to Seoul.

Mun said Friday he would leave Japan for Seoul on April 13, a day before the expiration of his visa. During his stay, Mun has refrained from criticizing the Seoul Government, confining his remarks to his North Korean trip and prospects for peace.

North Korean leader Kim Il-song dropped plans to send a message to South Korean President No Tae-u, Mun said, in the face of the outcry in Seoul against the visit.

Despite his expected arrest, the clergyman said he would propose a meeting with the three leaders of the South Korean opposition to discuss his trip.

Convicted South Korean 'Spy' Arrives in Tokyo
*OW0604064589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0409 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Narita, Chiba Pref., April 6 KYODO—A 72-year-old South Korean resident in Tokyo, who was sentenced to death in South Korea in 1978 as a spy for North Korea but released on parole last December, returned to Japan on Thursday.

Kang U-kyu was greeted at Narita Airport by his family and supporters.

He was arrested in March 1977 while on a business trip to Seoul. His death sentence was once confirmed in 1978, but a Seoul court commuted the death penalty to a 20-year prison term in February last year.

During his almost 12 years of imprisonment, Kang's family and a group of supporters campaigned for his release, saying the spy charges were groundless.

According to a campaigning group in Japan, there are still 29 South Korean residents of Japan being held in South Korea as political prisoners.

JSP's Tanabe Returns From North Korea
*OW0704081389 Tokyo KYODO in English 0630 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Makoto Tanabe, former secretary general of the major opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP), returned Friday from a trip to North Korea.

Tanabe, who headed a JSP delegation to Pyongyang, met with North Korean President Kim Il-song and other leaders during his stay in the North Korean capital.

Firm Awarded Iran Petrochemical Plant Contract
*OW0704123389 Tokyo KYODO in English 1106 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Nissho Iwai Corp. has been awarded a 20 billion yen petrochemical plant supply contract by Iran's state-run National Petrochemical Company (NPC), company officials said Friday.

This is the largest deal clinched between a Japanese business firm and Iran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War last August, the officials said.

They said the plant on order is intended to produce aromatics like benzene and xylene from naphtha. It will be built in Esfahan, 400 kilometers south of Tehran, they said.

Since Iran is now short of foreign currencies and since Iran has banned foreign loans, a grace period of 2 years or more will be granted to NPC, they added.

Italian Prime Minister Departs for Home

OW0604130089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1130 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 6 KYODO—Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita left for home Thursday concluding a five-day official visit to Japan.

De Mita was the first official government guest since Emperor Akihito ascended the Chrysanthemum Throne on the death of his father, Emperor Showa, on January 7.

During his stay in Japan, De Mita met Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and was received in audience by the emperor.

Government Urges Restraint in Namibia

OW0704110989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0946 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Japan on Friday urged South Africa and the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to exercise self-restraint to avoid further deterioration of the situation in Namibia, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe said in a written statement that "Japan is watching with serious concern the developing situation which has arisen from the armed conflict between SWAPO and the Southwest Africa Police Force."

"Such a situation is clearly at variance with the cooperative spirit of the parties concerned to achieve a smooth and peaceful independence for Namibia," said Watanabe.

The spokesman added, "Japan fully supports the efforts being made by the United Nations for the settlement of the situation."

Fierce fighting between security forces and Namibian nationalist guerrillas may jeopardize the UN-sponsored peace process toward Namibia's independence which started on April 1.

RSA Seeks Cooperation in Fishery Research

OW0604020289 Tokyo KYODO in English 2309 GMT
5 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 5 KYODO—The South African minister of the environment said Wednesday he might increase Japan's fishing quota if the government agrees to conduct joint research on South African fishing resources.

"If the Japanese would assist me to do the necessary research and get proper research results, then I would be in a better position to decide whether quotas could perhaps be increased," Gert Kotze, minister of environment and water affairs, said in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

South Africa reduced its quota for Japanese trawlers from 200,000 tons in 1988 to 100,000 tons this year due to concerns about overfishing.

Kotze said the request for joint research was made via his top administrative officer in charge of fisheries, Bill Visagie, who met his counterpart at the Fisheries Agency.

Kotze said he had planned to make the request in a meeting with Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Vice Minister Yasuo Goto, but that the meeting had been cancelled because "it was not convenient for my colleague."

He said the sudden cancellation may have been due partly to protests against his visit by antiapartheid activists.

Earlier in the day an official at the Fisheries Agency told KYODO that Kotze had not yet requested a meeting, and that it was unlikely the two ministers would meet before Kotze ends his weeklong visit Sunday.

Kotze, who is here at the invitation of the Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Association and the Federation of Japanese Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Associations, also suggested in the interview that he would increase levies on fish taken from South African waters.

On Thursday [6 April] Kotze is scheduled to visit Sumitomo Corp., which he said had earlier extended him an invitation to visit Japan and see products made from wood imported from this country.

Kotze is the first South African minister to visit Japan since 1986, when Japan was subject to criticism from the African diplomatic community following the first meeting between foreign ministers of the two countries.

Japan and South Africa maintain consulates in each other's capitals, but do not have full-fledged diplomatic ties.

Joint Research Considered

OW0704092689 Tokyo KYODO in English 0817 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 7 KYODO—Japan may join an effort to survey the marine resources off the coast of South Africa, but only if such a survey were arranged by an international body, Japanese and South African sources said Friday.

South Africa's Environment Minister Gert Kotze said here on Wednesday [5 April] that Japan could be granted an increase in its annual quota for trawling, which was halved from 20,000 tons to 10,000 tons, if a joint survey showed ample fish resources.

Tomofumi Kume, assistant director of the Fishery Agency's Foreign Affairs Division, acknowledged Friday that the need for conducting a scientific study of South Africa's marine resources had been discussed when two senior officials of the two countries met at a luncheon in Tokyo on Wednesday.

Foreign Ministry and Fisheries Agency officials had repeatedly denied that any Japanese officials had met two visiting South African officials. Kume later confirmed that Bill Visagie, South Africa's top administrative officer in charge of the environment and water resources, met with Japanese Fisheries Agency Chief Hirohisa Tanaka at a luncheon hosted by the Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Association.

Kume said the two discussed the need for a marine survey, but said neither had the South African [as received] requested assistance nor was Japan considering undertaking a joint study.

Kume said Japan was likely to cooperate only if the survey were conducted by an international body such as the 17-member convention on the conservation of living resources of the southeast Atlantic.

The officials from the two countries did not discuss other bilateral fishing issues, he added.

Kume also said that the South African environment minister had requested to meet Yasuo Goto, Japan's vice minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, at the same luncheon, but did not go when Goto cancelled for unknown reasons.

Kotze is here through Sunday at the invitation of the Trawlers Association and the Federation of Japanese Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Associations.

His visit has sparked protests by unionists and human rights groups opposed to apartheid, who say that Kotze's presence here is at odds with the government's policy of restricting trade with Pretoria.

Japan was South Africa's second largest trading partner in 1988 after West Germany.

Experts To Assist Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
OW0504134089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1030 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 5 KYODO—Japan will send an obstetrician-gynecologist and three well-digging experts to Pakistan as part of Tokyo's efforts to aid Afghan refugees, the Foreign Ministry said Wednesday.

Toru Kanzaki, 37, the doctor at the National Cardiovascular Center, will leave Tokyo on Friday for the Afghan Obstetric and Gynecology Hospital in Peshwar, northern Pakistan.

Kanzaki will give technical guidance to doctors and nurses there for three weeks.

The Japanese Government plans to send more doctors or nurses several times over the next year, Foreign Ministry officials said.

The three well experts will depart later this month for a refugee camp in Quetta, Pakistan, to help improve water supplies.

Japan has already dispatched Foreign Ministry Official Kenichi Suganuma to Islamabad as a political officer to the U.N. Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Doctor Etsuko Kita to join the medical staff at the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) office in Peshwar.

2-Billion-Yen Grant Slated for Egypt
OW0504134489 Tokyo KYODO in English 1205 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 5 KYODO—Japan will extend a total of 2.09 billion yen in grant-in-aid to Egypt, the Foreign Ministry said Wednesday.

Of the total aid, 840 million yen will be used to purchase ambulances and 800 million yen will be allocated to buy building materials for housing construction projects.

The remaining 450 million yen will be used to help increase agricultural products.

Mongolia

MONTSAME Views 'Team Spirit-89' Exercise
OW0504002989 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in English 1715 GMT 1 Apr 89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 1 Apr (MONTSAME)—Joint USA-South Korean military manoeuvres "Team Spirit-89" have become part and parcel of the political pressure on the DPRK, writes youth newspaper "DZALUU-CHUUDYN UNEN".

The DPRK repeatedly called upon the USA and South Korea to stop "Team Spirit" military exercises in order to set up favourable conditions leading to a political dialogue between North and South. However the American and the South Korean sides give no response to it and continue to step up military manoeuvres.

Under the present conditions of reducing international tension there is no need to station military bases, troops and [word indistinct] in other countries the current

international life proves that foreign troops and war bases do not promote the ceasing international tension, and strengthening confidence. [sentence as received]

The Soviet proposal to pull back the foreign troops stationed on the territories of other countries by the year on 2000 and dismantle their military bases and strongholds, put forward at the [words indistinct], has been widely supported by many countries. But the U.S. has not responded to this proposal on "Team Spirit 89." ended. [as received] However, 43 thousand U.S. servicemen and almost one thousand units of nuclear weapons have remained on the Korean peninsula.

Spokesman Praises PRC Border Treaty

OW0604202789 Ulaanbaatar NOVOSTI MONGOLII
in Russian 12 Feb 89 p 3

["On the Mongolian-Chinese Treaty"—NOVOSTI MONGOLII headline]

[Text] The ratification by the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] People's Great Hural Presidium of the treaty on the state border and the system of settling border questions concluded last November between the MPR and the PRC is a step directed at strengthening the confidence and good-neighborly relations between Mongolia and China. These were the remarks made by a spokesman of the MPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a NOVOSTI MONGOLII correspondent.

He said that the process of elaborating the treaty text demonstrated the good will and common interest of the two sides in the early conclusion of a mutually acceptable agreement on border questions. We have undoubtedly moved a tangible step toward each other, allowing us to get down to business in considering numerous questions concerning Mongolian-Chinese relations.

Speaking about the practical significance of the Mongolian-Chinese treaty, the spokesman for the MPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it opens broad possibilities for the establishment and development of border trade and the mutual expansion of cultural and other relations, which in turn will lead to the improvement of the general atmosphere in the border zone.

He emphasized that the treaty aims at solving ecological problems, which is a specific feature of the concluded document. It reflects the need for establishing a reserve zone along the state border between the two countries, taking joint measures for preserving and increasing the population of rare animals and plants, and developing regular economic activity in the zone. Our joint activity in this direction will eventually promote the elimination of established and stereotype concepts of each other and help in radically transforming Mongolian-Chinese relations. In other words, our treaty is aimed at strengthening traditional ties between the Mongolian and Chinese peoples, the MPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said.

Envoy Speaks at Bangkok ESCAP Session

OW0604212689 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in English
1715 GMT 4 Apr89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, Apr 4 (MONTSAME)—Y. Sunday, the Mongolian ambassador in Laos, made a speech at the 45th ESCAP [Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific] general discussions in Bangkok (Thailand). He spoke on the positive tendencies taking place in the world, gave an estimation of the social and economic situation in the region, and briefed the session on Mongolia's restructuring and renovation processes and the real socioeconomic state of affairs.

The Mongolian ambassador proposed to set up a regional environmental centre.

Council of Ministers Discusses Employment

OW0604182989 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in Russian
1343 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 5 Apr (MONTSAME)—The MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Council of Ministers has discussed questions of increasing employment and making rational use of labor resources. The topicality of this issue is determined by the fact that presently, according to preliminary data of the population census, 27,500 people in the country are not engaged in socially organized labor activities. Of these, 15,300 do not have a valid reason. The abundance of able-bodied people who are not engaged in production can be explained, on the one hand, by the great rate of growth in population. The population is increasing by 50,000 people annually, while 30,000 reach working age.

Calculations indicate that during the current 5-year plan the country's labor reserves will increase by 140,000 people, of which 66,700 are already on hand. If this rate is maintained, then the planned task of finding work for the population will be fulfilled.

It was noted at the Council of Ministers session that set tasks for rational redistribution of labor resources, development of the cooperative movement, and individual labor activity are not being fulfilled in a satisfactory way. Presently, commissions established by the Council of Ministers to deal with this are operating in some cities and aymags where unemployment is particularly high.

The Council of Ministers noted the expediency of seeing that local organs of power adopt specific measures aimed at increasing employment, taking real opportunities into account. A plan for the foreseeable future was adopted which envisages, in particular, an increase in part-time courses in vocational technical schools to teach various vocations to unemployed youths, and the establishment of job vacancies by expanding the cooperative movement, as well as organization of efficient notification of the population about the availability of job vacancies.

A decision was adopted on annual government-level reviews of the employment issue.

Party Plenum To Discuss Construction Problems
OW0604074189 Ulaanbaatar NOVOSTI MONGOLII
in Russian 12 Feb 89 p 3

[“The MPRP Central Committee Plenum Will Discuss Construction Questions”—NOVOSTI MONGOLII headline]

[Text] The MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Politburo has adopted a resolution to convene the Sixth MPRP Central Committee Plenum in the second half of June 1989. The plenum will discuss the questions of improving capital construction work and increasing the effectiveness of capital investments.

North Korea

Daily Assais South Plans for Rev Mun

‘Monstrous Racket’ Alleged

SK0704023289 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0006 GMT 4 Apr 89

[NODONG SINMUN 4 April commentary: “Splittists’ Anticomunist, Anti-North, and Antireunification Racket”]

[Text] The antireunification forces pursuing division in South Korea have noisily kicked up a monstrous racket over the visit to Pyongyang by Rev Mun Ik-hwan, a renowned South Korean dissident, as though it is a big event. Arguing that Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his group's visit to Pyongyang constitutes an escape and infiltration, crimes stipulated in Item 1, Clause 6 of the notorious National Security Law, they are now kicking up a commotion threatening to take them into custody and punish them upon their return.

In the so-called statement to the North published on 29 March, the puppet minister of the National Unification Board provoked us by saying that our invitation to Rev Mun Ik-hwan had been aimed at bypassing negotiations between the authorities and at rendering a division in the national consensus in South Korea. Following this, holding a so-called meeting of party executive officials on 30 March, No Tae-u himself cried that the case of the pastor and his entourage should be handled sternly according to what the law dictates.

The puppets have also kicked up a racket of having public security offices search the houses of Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage; confiscate their books, writings, and letters; and take their families to police stations.

The South Korean authorities have no right or justification to make an issue of Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang. Rev Mun Ik-hwan came to Pyongyang in

response to our letter of invitation conveyed to him by the South Korean authorities as made clear in his statement upon his arrival in Pyongyang. It was his earnest desire to do away with the tragedy of national division and to have heart-to-heart dialogue over the future of the nation that prompted him to visit the northern half of the republic.

He made no secret of his departure from Seoul on 20 March and went through legal procedures for departure at Kimpo Airport. In his interview given to HANG-YORE SINMUN in Tokyo, Japan, 2 days before his arrival in Pyongyang, he made clear the background of and motives and objective behind his visit to the northern half of the republic.

He has done nothing in secret. He made the trip to Pyongyang openly to discuss the issue of national reunification, the important affair of national magnitude, he carried out his activities openly in Pyongyang, and he will go back to Seoul openly. How can his acts as such constitute a crime of escape or a crime of infiltration?

Moreover, what must not go unnoticed is the fact that even after saying in his so-called 7 July declaration he would open doors so as to reconcile with us, to regard us as part of the national community on the basis of relations between partners, and actively promote mutual exchanges between the compatriots of all walks of life in the South and North, No Tae-u is now threatening to bring the law against Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage upon their return, by applying the articles of the National Security Law in which we are defined as a hostile antistate organization.

According to the National Security Law articles in which we are defined as an antistate organization and as an enemy, the persons in authority in South Korea who babble about dialogue with us are to be caught on charges of violating the law in the first place and even No Tae-u, who expressed his willingness to come over to Pyongyang for summit talks, cannot remain safe and in peace.

Not long ago, puppet Minister of Home Affairs Yi Hantong said in a meeting of the National Assembly Home Affairs Committee that Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang constitutes a violation of the existing law and, therefore, Rev Mun can never avoid being punished under any circumstances. Then he himself should have been punished, as a matter of course, on charges of violating the National Security Law, as he came to the area of our side and shook hands with us and participated in talks as a delegate of the South side to the preliminary contact for the North-South parliamentary talks.

The persons in authority in South Korea are fond of saying that laws should be equal to all. How can they talk about equality or the principle of fair application of law in reference to such a fascist anticommunist evil law that are applied only to civilians and never to the persons in authority?

It is also preposterous for the persons in authority in South Korea to say that Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage should be punished by law because their visit to Pyongyang was made without consulting with them or obtaining their permission in advance.

National reunification, a matter of life and death related to the entire nation, is a pan-national cause that can be achieved through the united strength of the entire nation. Any Korean is entitled to hold mutual contacts and dialogue on the reunification question as those who are directly responsible for reunification.

From the beginning, obtaining or not obtaining somebody else's permission for discussing the reunification question cannot be a problem.

The South Korean rulers are not the sort of men who are entitled to approve discussions of the reunification question even if someone asks them for this in advance. In actuality they are openly suppressing the people and groups of various strata who are seeking contact and dialogue with us under the pretext of maintaining a unified channel of dialogue. Under such a situation, if someone visits the northern half of the republic without approval from the authorities, not anyone else but the South Korean rulers should be held responsible for this. The malicious accusation of the persons in authority of South Korea that we are utilizing civilian-level dialogue as part of our strategy toward South Korea in a bid to split public opinion in the South Korean society is also preposterous.

There is no reason whatsoever for the people in the North and South to regard each other with hostility, to be hostile to each other, or to be jealous of each other. Although there is the Military Demarcation Line in the waist of the land of the country, there is no barrier in the minds of the brethren who urgently desire national reunification.

If and when the brethren in the North and South meet with each other and hold dialogue they can easily come to mutual understanding, pool their will and, thus, resolve the problems that cannot be solved between the authorities. Our efforts to develop multilateral civilian-level dialogue among the people of all walks of life in the North and South are intended not to create division or confusion but to promote reunification by achieving national reconciliation and unity. Proceeding from this desire, we have allowed and welcomed individual figures from South Korea and overseas to visit the northern half of the Republic at any time to discuss matters of common interest of the nation.

If the South Korean rulers really have the will to resolve the reunification question, there will be no reason for them to be afraid of the popular masses, the masters of reunification, and to block dialogue among civilians.

The South Korean rulers' attempt to monopolize North-South dialogue cannot be interpreted otherwise than an antinational political maneuver of attempting to utilize dialogue in fabricating two Koreas and in maintaining the dictatorial regime.

Speaking of social chaos and split in public opinion in South Korea which are becoming serious with each passing day, the creation of such a situation there is not because we have contacted with civilians in South Korea for dialogue but because the puppets are blocking with bayonets debates and dialogue on reunification among the broad masses of people while insisting in so-called government-initiated dialogue only.

The South Korean military fascist elements' kicking up of the commotion of anticommunist confrontation and anticommunist fanaticism while clamoring about split and turmoil is aimed to reduce the significance of the visit to Pyongyang by Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage to block the influence of the visit on the South Korean people, to return the political situation of South Korea to the fascist, dark period of the yusin dictatorship and the Fifth Republic, to maintain the shaken colonial fascist ruling system, and, thus, to patch up the crisis in their rule. However, the anticommunist and fascist maneuvers, the legacy of the old era of confrontation, cannot fool the South Korean people who have been ideologically awakened nor can they stop the trend of the times which is firmly advancing toward reunification.

The South Korean rulers should look straight at today's reality, should renounce the reckless schemes of attempting to punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage who have embarked on the patriotic road of reunifying the country and the nation, and should immediately stop the anticommunist, anti-North, and antireunification maneuvers which run counter to the trend of the times.

Today's reality of South Korea shows that the so-called National Security Law is not only an unprecedented fascist evil law established to suppress the South Korean people's patriotic struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification, but has also become a crossing gate which regards with hostility the northern half of the republic and which legally blocks North-South dialogue and reunification. The persons in authority of South Korea should abolish without delay the National Security Law, an anticommunist and fascist evil law, which is incompatible with the nation and reunification.

Not only our people in the northern half of the republic, but also the people in South Korea will never tolerate the anticommunist, anti-North, and antireunification offensive that the South Korean rulers are waging under the excuse of the visit to Pyongyang of Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage. If the South Korean rulers suppress with the anticommunist fascist evil law Rev Mun Ik-hwan and his entourage who visited Pyongyang to discuss the reunification question with us, this will be

recognized as a declaration that they do not want to hold dialogue nor want reunification with us, and they should bear full responsibility for all serious consequences arising therefrom.

South's Plans for Mun Questioned

*SK0704071889 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0007 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[NODONG SINMUN 6 April commentary: "Is It a Crime for Fellow Countrymen To Meet Each Other?"]

[Text] The broad strata of patriotic people of South Korea highly regard the visit to Pyongyang by Rev Mun Ik-hwan, South Korea's renowned leadership-level personage, as an opportunity that has broken up the barrier of division and that has matured and expanded the reunification movement to an immediately higher level and as a new start in the reunification movement in which the masses will play a major role. However, while stating that the visit to Pyongyang by Rev Mun Ik-hwan constitutes the crime of escape and infiltration stipulated in the National Security Law, the South Korean ruling bunch is taking various measures to arrest and punish him upon his return home. The puppets also committed such violent acts as searching Rev Mun Ik-hwan's residence and taking away to the police station members of his family, his relatives, and his colleagues.

As Rev Mun Ik-hwan has already stated, his Pyongyang visit this time was aimed at deepening trust between the people of the North and South, jointly seeking a reasonable way for reunification, and promoting peace in the country and achieving her peaceful reunification. His Pyongyang visit was a righteous act, and there is no problem at all.

While talking about escape or infiltration, the No Tae-u ring is saying that it would punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan by applying the National Security Law. This is an unreasonable charge. Rev Mun Ik-hwan paid an official visit to Pyongyang at our invitation. It is the South Korean authorities who conveyed our letter of invitation to him. He willingly accepted our invitation, and publicly left Seoul through legal formalities. When in Pyongyang, he opened his activities in Pyongyang to the public and publicly left Pyongyang for Seoul. Describing Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang as an escape, a secret visit to the North, or infiltration, they consider it a crime. This is contradictory fascist logic. This is an illogical assertion that can only be made by villains and traitors who, even though they were invited to get together to discuss the issue of reunification, the nation's earnest desire, are assuming the attitude of rejecting this invitation under this or that pretext.

If it is a crime for him to have visited Pyongyang and to have discussed the reunification issue, there are many people in South Korea who must be arrested before him. First of all, while babbling about summit talks and other issues, No Tae-u himself said many times that he wishes

to sit face to face with us to discuss the reunification issue and other issues. In the 7 July declaration he made it clear that he would positively realize mutual exchanges between the compatriots of the North and South and would open the doors. Then No Tae-u, who called for a visit to Pyongyang and who opened the road to the North, should be summoned to the court first, should he not? If it is a crime for the South Korean people to meet with us, the South Korean minister of home affairs and leaders of the Democratic Justice Party should be arrested first. Nevertheless, these fellows are babbling that only Rev Mun Ik-hwan's Pyongyang visit is a violation of the National Security Law. This is a violence by the dictators in power.

Ridiculous is the fact that the puppets are making an issue out of the fact that Rev Mun Ik-hwan did not have a prior discussion with or approval from them. As has recently been discussed very frequently in South Korea, South Korean law does not stipulate that if one obtains approval from the authorities it is no problem and that if one does not, he will be subject to judiciary procedures. The puppets say that this is a matter decided by the president from a political standpoint. This only clearly discloses the military fascist nature of the No Tae-u regime which reigns over the people. The Yusin dictatorial regime which, while babbling about exercising its right to govern, issued one emergency decree after another, and the Chon Tu-hwan military dictatorial regime, which committed various crimes including the Kwangju situation and the irregularities of the Fifth Republic, by misusing power, did what the No Tae-u regime is doing now.

The No Tae-u ring's scheme to unreasonably punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan, who courageously visited Pyongyang, is an antinational and antireunification criminal act designed to deliberately aggravate the North-South relations and to lay a new obstacle in the way of peaceful reunification, and is a base maneuver to cope with the crisis facing its rule by launching an anticommunist fascist offensive.

In South Korea, it is not only Rev Mun Ik-hwan who wants reunification. There are tens of millions of forces seeking national reunification in South Korea. The No Tae-u ring, clearly knowing what consequences its foolish scheme to arrest and punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan will bring to its destiny, must act with discretion. If the No Tae-u ring tries to punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan to the end, the South Korean popular masses will not sit idly by.

'Brigandish Logic' Alleged

*SK0704055889 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0551 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The No Tae-u group is now crying that the Pyongyang visit of Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, a well-known dissident of South Korea, is illegal and he would be "severely punished" under the "National Security Law" when back home.

If the No Tae-u group suppresses Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, it will exert a grave consequence on North-South relations as a whole including multi-channelled dialogue now on the order of the day because it means a declaration that it will refrain from dialogue and reunification with the North, says NODONG SINMUN today in a signed commentary.

It goes on:

The puppets, clamouring about "approval" and the like, are now taking issue with the just action of Rev. Mun Ik-hwan who discussed the reunification question for the nation. This is an anachronistic and self-righteous way of thinking aimed to monopolize dialogue.

To talk about "approval" while permitting no contact with the North is a brigandish logic of the dictators with power.

Talking about "opening the door" once and crying for "approval" now proves that "exchange," "dialogue" and "national community" on the lips of the puppets are a false propaganda merely to mislead public opinion and that there is nothing changed in their splittist nature.

Their anti-communist, anti-North and anti-reunification campaign is a vicious dastardly move to diminish the significance of Rev. Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang, put down the desire of the people for reunification and bolster up the dictatorial "government" on the verge of ruin.

We will watch the future action of the South Korean rulers.

South Christians Oppose Any Punishment for Mun
SK0704054489 *Pyongyang KCNA in English* 0535
GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—South Korean Christians sent a letter to the traitor No Tae-u on April 4 demanding the withdrawal of the step to arrest and punish Rev. Mun Ik-hwan who paid a visit to the northern half of Korea, according to a report.

Pastor Hong Kun-su of the Christian Presbyterian Church and some 170 laymen in the letter asserted that the decision to detain Rev. Mun Ik-hwan by invoking a fascist law is in contravention of the "July 7 declaration" which said that "North-South exchange of civilian level would be supported."

They urged the "withdrawal of the step to punish Rev. Mun Ik-hwan."

The "National Roman Catholic Priests' Group for the Realization of Justice," a South Korean religious organization, issued a statement on April 5 strongly denouncing the fascist clique's scheme to persecute Rev. Mun on the charge of the violation of the "National Security Law."

The Japan-Korea society for Cultural Interchange published a statement on April 4 in denunciation of the No Tae-u military fascist clique's scheme to persecute Rev. Mun.

Referring to the threat of the No Tae-u "regime" to arrest Rev. Mun when he returns with outcries over the violation of the "National Security Law" and failure to get "prior approval" of the "government," the statement says:

We watch such attitude of the No Tae-u "regime" and strongly protest against it.

Considering the visit to Pyongyang by Rev. Mun Ik-hwan an act urged by the pure conscience of a churchman who is working hard to put an end to the 40 odd years of national division into North and South and achieve national reunification, we sincerely welcome and support it.

If the No Tae-u "regime" committed such an outrage as arresting Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, it would mean a challenge to the Korean people who want peace and reunification of the country and to the world people who support them. Hence, it must never be tolerated.

Report Meeting Marks Cheju Uprising Anniversary
SK0604120189 *Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean*
2300 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Excerpts] A Pyongyang report meeting was held yesterday at the Moranbong Theater to mark the 41st anniversary of the Cheju Island people's 3 April uprising. [passage omitted]

Present at the report meeting were Comrade Ho Chong-suk, secretary of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee; Chong Sin-hyok, first deputy chairman of the Chondoist Chongu Party Central Committee; Kim Yong-chun, deputy chairman of the Korean Social Democratic Party; An Pyong-su, director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Secretariat; and responsible functionaries of administrative and economic institutions and labor unions as well as workers in the city.

The report meeting began with the playing of the national anthem. Secretariat Director An Pyong-su made a commemorative report at the meeting.

The reporter said that the 41st anniversary of the Cheju Island people's 3 April uprising is being marked at an exciting time when all the fellow countrymen unanimously hope that a new phase favorable to peace in the country and her peaceful reunification will be opened. [passage omitted]

He said that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets always aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula and pose a grave obstacle to North-South dialogue. He went on to say: Recently the South Korean

puppets are attempting to punish Rev Mun Ik-hwan, a renowned democratic figure, for a recent visit to Pyongyang by applying the notorious National Security Law. This clearly shows how far the rascals' policy of confrontation and division has gone. As is well known, in support of the proposal for convening a political consultative conference attended by leadership personages of the North and South, which the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song advanced during his New Year's speech this year, Rev Mun Ik-hwan of South Korea came to visit us with a single noble desire for reunification. His visit to Pyongyang is a patriotic act in which he embarked upon a northbound road with the South Korean people's ever-growing earnest desire for reunification and is a righteous act that must be welcomed. Nevertheless, when the news on Rev Mun's visit to Pyongyang became known, while talking about emergency meetings, meetings of ministers in charge of public security, and a statement to the North, the No Tae-u fascist clique began babbling that it would judicially deal with him if he returns home.

He then said that this is a vicious challenge to all Korean people who aspire for reunification and is the nation-sellers' uncouth defilement of patriotism. [passage omitted]

LSWYK Head Issues Statement Denouncing South
SK0704082189 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2300 GMT 2 Apr 89

[Statement by Choe Yong-hae, chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea (LSWYK) Central Committee dated 2 April]

[Text] All the youth and students of the northern half of our republic are now in surging indignation at the anticommunist fascistization maneuvers openly committed by the South Korean ruling bunch. After officially declaring an all-out anticommunist fascistization offensive under the pretext of social turbulence, the No Tae-u fascist clique has completely taken off its mask of democratization which it has advocated so far, under the pretext of the visit to Pyongyang by Reverend Mun Ik-hwan, a noted South Korean off-stage figure, and has revealed its true features as a military fascist element. The South Korean puppets have begun to conduct a horrible all-out fascist offensive, babbling that they intend to cope with the social turbulence by the left-leaning procommunist forces. This is a vicious and brutal fascist violence that nothing can justify.

The South Korean youth and students' struggle is a struggle to correct the wrong South Korean society, in which injustice tries and punishes justice, and to bring forth a new world of independence, democracy, and reunification. This struggle cannot be an object of suppression under any circumstances, even less a factor causing social turbulence.

If traitor No Tae-u had sincerely carried out any of his promises, such as democratization, the liquidation of Fifth Republic irregularities, and the clarification of the truth of the Kwangju incident, the college students, who must study hard, would not have rushed out of the school gate to join in the plaza of struggle.

The ringleader of those causing social turbulence is the No Tae-u fascist clique itself which is trampling down and obliterating elementary democracy and the right to exist, rather than the South Korean youth and students and people. Nevertheless, it openly committed terrorism against them, accusing them of committing a crime of creating social turbulence. By this traitor No Tae-u, the main culprit of the Kwangju massacre and an accomplice of the Fifth Republic irregularities, attempts to prolong as best he can the dictatorial regime whose fate is like a candle flickering in the wind. It is also a premeditated maneuver to intentionally aggravate North-South relations so as to block reconciliation and unity and to stop the South Korean youth and students from participating in the 13th World Festival of Youths and Students.

As everyone knows, the youth and students of the North and South agreed to participate together in the 13th World Festival of Youths and Students which will be held in Pyongyang this July under the ideals of anti-imperialist solidarity, peace, and friendship and tried to hold North-South student talks to discuss this matter. But this goal was not realized because the South Korean fascist clique blocked the talks.

If the fellow students of the South participate in this Pyongyang festival, this itself will open a breakthrough in the frozen walls between the North and South and bring about a new turning point for national unity. However, the South Korean puppets are attempting, taking advantage of Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang, to harshly suppress all who try to contact us and to sternly punish them according to the National Security Law, the fascist evil law. This means that they are attempting to block the North-South student talks and the South Korean youth and students' participation in the Pyongyang festival by all means.

In the name of all Korean youth, I resolutely denounce the criminal maneuvers of the No Tae-u military fascist clique which is attempting to make the entire South Korean land a place rampant with a fascist murderer wielding a sword of suppression running counter to the trend of the times, branding it a coup d'etat with a gunshot.

Those who challenge history make a desperate attempt as they near the end of their doomed fate. No matter how desperately they may try to resort again to anticommunist fascistization maneuvers, the remains of the old era, the South Korean authorities will not be able to reverse their fate which is doomed to destruction. The No Tae-u fascist clique should not wield the bloody guns and

bayonets and frenziedly run wild with fascist suppression, but should squarely view the general trend of the times and act with discretion.

I express my firm conviction that the South Korean youth and students will launch themselves in the patriotic struggle to bring forth a new world of independence, democracy, and reunification with an indomitable will of not submitting even if they have to lay down their lives.

[Dated] 2 April 1989, Pyongyang.

Paper Demands Removal Nuclear of Nuclear Weapons
SK0704060689 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0555 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—All the aggression forces including nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula be converted into a nuclear-free, peace zone in order to remove the most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war in the world.

NODONG SINMUN today says this in a signed article titled "Most Dangerous Hotbed of Nuclear War Should Be Removed First of All."

Noting that South Korea has turned into a most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war first because the U.S. imperialists regard the Korean peninsula as a most favourable region in provoking a nuclear war, the author of the article goes on:

The U.S. imperialists consider that if they ignite a nuclear war in Korea far from the United States, they can rapidly expand its flame to the broad area of Asia and attack even socialist countries without much difficulties, not suffering damages from it.

Vast quantity of nuclear weapons incomparable to any other region in their density have been deployed in South Korea. The U.S. imperialists deployed one nuclear weapon per 400 square kilometres in the NATO region whereas one nuclear weapon per 100 square kilometres in South Korea. This means that South Korea is quadruple the NATO region in the density of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. imperialists have deployed in South Korea all types of nuclear weapons from nuclear shells to neutron bombs they have developed and produced. They have also deployed "F 16" fighter bombers and other means of nuclear delivery.

They plan to ship into South Korea more nuclear weapons and means of nuclear delivery of new type including "B 52" strategic bombers called one of the "three pillars" of strategic nuclear forces and ground-launching cruise missiles and are building special nuclear stores.

They have deployed many nuclear weapons around South Korea and equipped the U.S. seventh fleet in operation in the East Sea of Korea with nuclear weapons.

It is as clear as noonday that the U.S. imperialists would provoke a global nuclear war from the place where their nuclear weapons are deployed most densely and which is favourable to an preemptive offensive. This is another reason why South Korea is a most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war.

The U.S. imperialists have not only deployed many nuclear weapons in South Korea and its surrounding area but also are frantically staging military maneuvers to use them in actuality.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, the largest nuclear war game, staged by them may switch over to a real war any moment.

The danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula can never be unnoticed and accordingly, whether it is removed or not is an important issue related to the destiny not only of the Korean nation but also of the whole mankind.

Liaison Committee Denounces 'Team Spirit'
SK0704122389 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1035 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The International Liaison Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea issued Bulletin No. 2 of March.

In an editorial the bulletin says that the United States and the South Korean authorities have pushed the situation on the Korean peninsula to the extreme pitch of strain and laid a big stumbling block in the way of detente and dialogue by staging the aggressive "Team Spirit 89" joint maneuvers.

The "Team Spirit 89" goes against the international trend towards detente and is an unpardonable challenge to the efforts to remove the root cause of war in Korea, the editorial adds.

Exposing in detail the purpose of the "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres and its aggressive nature and scale, the editorial calls on the world peace forces to put a worldwide pressure upon the United States to stop this war gamble and come out to the place of dialogue for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula. The bulletin edits articles introducing documents published and steps taken in different countries of the world and by international organizations denouncing the "Team Spirit 89."

The bulletin also carries an appeal to the governments, parliaments, political parties and social organizations of all countries and international organizations adopted at

the enlarged meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Liaison Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea which was held in Lisbon in March.

PRC's Zhao Ziyang To Visit in Late April

SK0704110389 *Pyongyang KCNA in English 1059 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—Comrade Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, will pay an official goodwill visit to Korea late in April 1989 upon the invitation of Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

Kim Yong-nam Hosts Banquet for Mongolian Minister

Kim Yong-nam Address

SK0604225389 *Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 4 Apr 89*

[Speech by Foreign Affairs Minister Kim Yong-nam delivered at a banquet arranged by the DPRK Government at Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang on the evening of 4 April in honor of Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) Minister of Foreign Affairs Tserenpiliin Gombosuren—read by announcer]

[Text] On this occasion filled with comradely friendship, I first of all warmly welcome the visit to our country by the comrade minister of foreign affairs.

While sitting together with the comrade minister I recall the impressive days of great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's historic visit to the MPR last July. The great leader's visit to your country, approximately 30 years after his previous visit, and his meaningful meeting with respected Comrade Jambyn Batmonh were significant events that marked an epochal milestone in the history of Korean-Mongolian friendship.

Your current visit to this country is a practical course for developing Korean-Mongolian relations of friendship and cooperation in the spirit of the agreement between the leaders of the two countries.

Today, emerging from the curtain of confrontation and tension, the world situation is gradually developing into detente. Such a worldwide trend is a result of the active efforts of the socialist countries and the world's peace-loving countries.

The Mongolian party and government are actively contributing to the work of peace in Asia and last March decided to markedly reduce its forces. As is well known, the government of our Republic already advanced a proposal for step-by-step large-scale arms reduction and unilaterally took the measure of reducing our troops by tens of thousands. These sincere measures taken out of a

peace-loving stand must be duly welcomed by the other sides, and only then, in reality, can the phase of detente be opened in Asia and the Pacific and, furthermore, in the world in general.

Without abandoning its policy of strength, the United States even today is trying to continuously maintain its forces in the southern half of Korea and in East Asia in general. This is anachronistic.

The U.S. imperialists, who had resorted to hard-line military policies, aggravated tension, and resorted to threats with war under the pretext of detente and negotiations have recently taken off their hypocritical veil of the alleviation of tension and have gradually and openly kicked up their maneuvers to expand their sphere of influence. The United States must discard its policy of strength and act in step with the trend of the times toward detente.

Because of the U.S. policy of military occupation and war, the Korean peninsula is still the largest hotbed of war in the world. The "Team Spirit" joint military exercise is creating a very tense situation that may provoke war any time and is also posing a grave obstacle to North-South dialogue. Such a real danger is represented by the continued division on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, we have consistently demanded that the factor of the aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula be removed and that the Korean question be solved through dialogue and negotiations. The United States and the persons in authority in South Korea must stop maneuvering to provoke a new war, must withdraw the U.S. forces, and must assume a sincere attitude and stand to solve the issue of reunifying Korea through dialogue and negotiations.

Today the imperialists are more vigorously than ever launching vicious and cunning reactionary offensives against socialist countries. This situation urgently demands that unity and cooperation be further strengthened among the socialist countries based upon the revolutionary principle.

We are pleased that Korean-Mongolian relations of friendship and unity are being consolidated and developed. Our people sincerely wish that under the wise leadership of respected Comrade Jambyn Batmonh the fraternal Mongolian people attain great achievements in their struggle to implement the decisions at the 5th Plenary Session of the 19th Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

We highly estimated the efforts of your country to defend peace and security in Asia and the Pacific and to turn these areas into a zone of peace and security and of good neighborhood and cooperation, and expressed firm solidarity with them.

Today in our country the entire party and all the people, being single-mindedly united around the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, are actively struggling to complete the socialist cause and to hasten the fatherland's reunification. The Korean people will achieve the fatherland's independent, peaceful reunification without fail after crushing the enemy's plots of all sorts to fabricate two Koreas.

Just as we did in the past, we will actively strive to further deepen and develop the traditional Korean-Mongolian relations of friendship.

On this occasion filled with friendly sentiment, I propose a toast to eternal and immortal friendship and unity; to the long life and good health of Comrade Jambyn Batmonh, the outstanding leader of the Mongolian people; to the long life and good health of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song; to the long life and good health of dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il; and to the various comrades present here.

Gombosuren Speech

*OW0704062189 Ulaanbaatar International Service
in English 0910 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Text] Mongolian Foreign Minister Gombosuren is on an official visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the invitation of its government.

On April 4th Gombosuren laid a wreath to the Grave of Veterans of the Korean Revolution on the Hill of Tae-song. Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Yong-nam offered a dinner in honor of the visiting Mongolian Foreign Minister. In his speech at the dinner Mr Gombosuren said the Mongolian People's Republic supports the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea directed at abolishing the nuclear threat and the removal the confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

The Mongolian foreign minister and the Korean foreign minister have expressed common opinions on the [word indistinct] of the nuclear disarmament and reduction of tension as possible a great deal [as heard] thanks to the efforts of peaceloving forces of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. Both minister have expressed the willingness to cooperate further in the course of solving the vital issues of tranquil and peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Chongnyon Group Arrives for 15 April Celebrations
*SK0704052889 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0522 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—A congratulatory group of Koreans in Japan for celebrating April 15 headed by Yi Chin-kyu, first vice-chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon), arrived here yesterday by plane.

It was met at the airport by Vice-Premier Chong Chun-ki and other officials concerned.

Medical Science Pact Signed With Bulgaria
*SK0504104189 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1033 GMT
5 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 5 (KCNA)—The 1988-1989 plan for cooperation in the field of health and medical science between the Ministry of Public Health of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Services of the Bulgarian People's Republic was signed in Sofia on March 30.

The plan was signed by Yi Chong-yul, minister of public health of Korea, and Mincho Peychev, minister of public health and social services of Bulgaria.

SPA Session Opens in Pyongyang 7 April
*SK0704101589 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The Fifth Session of the 1,988th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea opened today at the Mansudae Assembly Hall.

The session was attended by deputies to the SPA.

Functionaries of party and power bodies, administrative and economic organs and social organizations and men of science, education, culture and art and health were present there as observers.

Foreign diplomatic envoys here were invited to the session.

The great leader of our party and our people Comrade Kim Il-song, president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, mounted the platform.

The platform was taken by members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, members of the Central People's Committee, vice-premiers of the Administration Council and members of the SPA Standing Committee.

Deputy Yi Chin-kyu, first vice-chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon), was also in the platform party.

The following item on the agenda was adopted at the session:

On the summing up of the fulfilment of the state budget for 1988 and the state budget for 1989 of the DPRK.

Deputy Yun Ki-chong, minister of finance, delivered a report on the item on the agenda.

Deputy Pak Nam-ki, member of the DPRK SPA Budget Deliberation Committee, made a report of the committee on the summing up of the fulfilment of the state budget for 1988 and the state budget for 1989 of the DPRK.

Then followed a debate on the agenda item "on the summing up of the fulfilment of the State Budget for 1988 and the state budget for 1989 of the DPRK".

The speakers said that the correct fulfilment of the state budget for 1988 made contributions to pressing ahead with major construction programmes, increasing the nation's potentials and improving the people's material and cultural wellbeing.

Noting that the state budget for 1989 has been worked out so correctly as to crown the last year of the 1980s with fresh achievements in production and construction and give fuller play to the advantages of our socialist system, they expressed full support and approval for it.

The session continues.

Kim Il-song Attends Session

SK0704052089 *Pyongyang KCNA in English 0515 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The Fifth Session of the Eighth Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea opened here today.

President Kim Il-song of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was present at the session.

The session discusses "On the summing up of the fulfilment of the state budget for 1988 and the state budget for 1989 of the DPRK."

Yang Hyong-sop Gives Opening Address

SK0704071789 *Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0300 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Opening speech by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the SPA, at the 5th Session of the 8th SPA at the Mansudae Assembly Hall on 7 April—recorded]

[Text] Comrade deputies: Today we are holding the 5th Session of the 8th SPA at a time when all working people across the country are effecting ceaseless upsurges in revolution and construction by vigorously carrying out the movement of the great socialist advance by upholding the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song's New Year's address for this year and the decision of the 14th Plenum of the 6th Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee.

Last year, which was full of meaningful events in the glorious history of our Republic, our people further strengthened the country's might and performed shining feats in all areas of socialist construction by victoriously carrying out the historic 200-day campaign, by upholding the letter and slogans of the party Central Committee, and by following the wise leadership of the party and the leader. [applause]

Last year, amid the entire nation's warm congratulations and amid the great interest of the world peoples, our people grandiosely celebrated the 40th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK as the grand festival of victors, thus vigorously displaying the invincible might of the firm unity and cohesion achieved around the party and the leader and once again fully manifesting the honor and prestige of our Republic. [applause]

The national meeting of heroes, which was held last year amid the elevated political zeal of all people, displayed the resolute will of our party and people that would consummate the chuche revolutionary cause to the end by inheriting the tradition of the heroic struggle in our revolution under the revolutionary banner of the chuche idea and provided the historic opportunity of encouraging our working class and all people to a new heroic struggle and feat.

Through the fair and just fatherland reunification proposal of the WPK and the Government of the Republic and through the persistent struggle of the people in the North and South, the overall situation of our country has turned favorable for the reunification of the fatherland; and our people's cooperative and friendly relations with the peoples of fraternal socialist countries, nonaligned countries, and many other countries of the world have been further developed.

The successes won last year in the revolutionary struggle and construction are all the result of the wise leadership of the WPK headed by respected and beloved Comrade Kim Il-song. At the same time, they are the noble fruitions of the vitality of the immortal chuche idea and its embodiment, the line and policy of our party and the government of the Republic, and the shining manifestation of the dedicated labor struggle by all people who are boundlessly loyal to the call of the party and the leader. [applause]

This year is the 3d year in our people's fulfillment of the 3d 7-Year Plan, the far-reaching program of socialist construction, and is the last year of the 1980's during which they have vigorously dashed forward with the spirit of the chollima waging the speed battle.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has put forth an honorable task to fully display the superiority of the socialist system of our country this year by pushing ahead with the three revolutions—ideological, technological, and cultural—even more vigorously by continuing to maintain the elevated revolutionary spirit of our

people, and by effecting great upsurges once again in all areas of revolution and construction by actively stepping up the movement of the great socialist advance; and our party has clearly elucidated the ways to its accomplishment.

At present, by responding to the militant appeal of the party and the leader and by possessing high ambitions and confidence toward the future, all people have turned out in unison and are vigorously carrying out the general assault to victoriously end the new 200-day campaign and are overflowing with high determination to effect ceaseless innovations in socialist construction by firmly gripping the baton of the socialist relay.

This SPA session, which is held under such circumstances, will discuss, through the active participation of all comrade deputies, the matters which are important for socialist construction and the promotion of the people's well-being. Thus, the session will further encourage our people's struggle to accelerate the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the republic as well as the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

This SPA session is attended by 596 out of 639 SPA deputies.

As the session comes into being in accordance with Article 78, Chapter 5 of the socialist Constitution of the DPRK, I declare the 5th Session of the 8th SPA to be open. [applause]

State Budget Discussed

SK0704055489 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0541 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The Fifth Session of the Eighth Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) which opened here today is summing up the fulfilment of the state budget for 1988 of the DPRK and discussing the state budget for 1989.

According to a report submitted to the session, the state budgetary revenue last year stood at 31,905.8 million won and thus the plan was carried out at 100.2 percent. This means a growth of 5.1 percent up on 1987.

The state budgetary expenditure was 31,660.9 million won, 99.4 percent of the plan, which means a 5.2 percent increase above the 1987 figure.

As a result, the state budget last year was successfully summed up with an excess of income over expenditure to the tune of 244.9 million won after financially guaranteeing the grand forward march of socialist construction and the realization of all state measures for the betterment of the people's wellbeing.

The state budget last year increased the outlay of fund for the national economy 6.5 percent up on 1987 in accordance with our party's strategic tasks of pressing ahead with the grand forward march of socialist construction and directed a big portion of it to the productive capital construction of the industrial sector, thus fully guaranteeing in finance the vast construction of major objects including power bases, metallurgical and chemical industrial bases which are of decisive significance in the fulfilment of the Third Seven-Year Plan.

The report said:

The state budget for 1989 has been worked out so correctly as to financially guarantee that the advantages of our socialist system are given fuller play by carrying through our party's line of the three revolutions and pressing ahead with the forward March of socialism in accordance with the important tasks for this year set forth by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song.

The total amount of the state budgetary revenue and expenditure this year is respectively scaled at 33,550.7 million won, or an increase of 5.2 percent in revenue and 6 percent in expenditure as against last year.

The turnover levies will increase 7.4 percent and the interests of the state enterprises by 7 percent up on last year.

The state budget for this year envisages a 6.1 percent increase up on last year in the outlay for the national economy including the capital construction fund for expanded reproduction, the fund for overhaul and industrial working expenses in order to actively promote the grand forward movement of socialism.

First of all, investment in industrial construction this year will be increased by 9 percent up on last year and major construction programmes to reach the goals of the Third Seven-Year Plan be pressed on to consolidate the material and technical foundations of the national economy.

This year, a year of the light industry, investment in this field will rise by 13 percent as compared with last year.

Appropriations for social and cultural measures this year will be augmented by 5.6 percent as against last year to accelerate socialist cultural construction and further promote the people's wellbeing.

This year the government of the republic envisages 12.1 percent of the total state budgetary expenditure for national defence to solidify the country's defence capabilities in face of the ever more malicious aggressive and belligerent moves of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique.

O Chin-u Attends Wreath-Laying Ceremony

*SK0604042189 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0300 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Excerpts] On the morning of 6 April, Hansik Day, party and government cadres, working people, and Korean People's Army [KPA] soldiers laid wreaths before the Taesongsan Mausoleum of the Fallen Revolutionary Martyrs and the Mausoleum of the Fallen Patriotic Martyrs.

Bouquets sent by Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader of our party and people, were placed at the Taesongsan Mausoleum of Fallen Revolutionary Martyrs and the Mausoleum of the Fallen Patriotic Martyrs.

KPA honor guards stood at the Taesongsan mausoleums.

Present at the wreath-laying ceremony at the Taesongsan Mausoleum of the Fallen Revolutionary Martyrs were Comrades O Chin-u, Yon Hyong-muk, Yi Chong-ok, Kim Yong-nam, Kye Ung-tae, Choe Kwang, Hong Song-nam, Kim Pok-sin, Kang Hui-won, So Kwan-hui, and Kim Hwan; responsible functionaries of the party, organs of power, administrative and economic institutions, and central organs; anti-Japanese warriors; KPA generals and officers; responsible functionaries of the education, culture, arts, public health, and press fields; responsible functionaries of the party, organs of power, and administrative and economic organs in Pyongyang City; and working people in the city. [passage omitted]

Participating in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Mausoleum of the Fallen Patriotic Martyrs were Comrades Han Song-yong, Hyon Mu-kwang, Chong Chun-ki, Hwang Chang-yop, Ho Chong-suk, and Kim Chung-nin; Choe Tok-sin, chairman of the Chondoist Chongu Party Central Committee; responsible functionaries of the party, organs of power, administrative and economic institutions, and central organs; responsible functionaries of the party, organs of power, administrative and economic institutions in Pyongyang City; working people of the city; and KPA soldiers. [passage omitted]

Yon Hyong-muk Attends Spring Art Festival

*SK0704122989 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1102 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 7 (KCNA)—The seventh "April spring friendship art festival" opened in Pyongyang Friday.

The festival which has opened in Pyongyang in April every year since 1982 under the slogan "For independence, friendship and peace" is a significant traditional international art festival in strengthening friendship and unity among literary men and artistes of the world and upgrading cultural cooperation and relations among peoples.

The current festival is participated in by 77 noted art and circus troupes from more than 60 countries on the five continents and art organisations of overseas Koreans.

Yon Hyong-muk, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and premier of the Administration Council, delivered a congratulatory speech at the opening ceremony.

To make the "April spring friendship art festival" traditional is a very good thing for the genuine development of human literature and art and an excellent encouragement to the sacred struggle of peoples for freedom, peace and social progress, he said.

The festival is all the more significant as it is held before the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students due in Pyongyang in July this year, the speaker said, and stressed: I am convinced that the art festival will fire the ardent desire of the progressive people, youth and students of the world for peace and friendship and have an inspiring effect on their righteous struggle.

Ritual Commemorates Founding of Chondoism

*SK0504155089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1522 GMT
5 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 5 (KCNA)—A ritual commemorating the 129th anniversary of the foundation of Chondoism was held here today.

The ritual was attended by many Chondoists and Chondoist Chongu Party members in Pyongyang and from local areas.

A report was made by Chairman of the Central Guidance Committee of the Korean Chondoist Association Choe Tok-sin, who is chairman of the Central Committee of the Chondoist Chongu Party and vice-chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland.

He said Chondoism is a religion inherent to Korea which was founded by [word indistinct] Choe Che-u, the founder the first, on April 5, 1860, reflecting the Korean social situation in the middle of the nineteenth century, with "humanity, that is, God" as its tenets, for the purpose of "promotion of national interests and welfare of the people, propagation of virtues all over the world, broad salvation of people, and earthly paradise."

After outlining the course covered by Chondoism, he said:

In the period of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle organised and led by the great leader General Kim Il-song, the peerless patriot, in the 1930s, Pak In-chin, chief of the Chiwonpo, and many Chondoists under him joined the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland founded by the general and rendered support, material and moral, to the anti-Japanese armed struggle, thus contributing to the sacred war for the liberation of

the fatherland and showing a living example of alliance and cooperation with communism, in the realization of Chondoist idea, he said, adding: This is a brilliant patriotic tradition which the Chondoists must steadfastly carry forward.

He recalled that Chondoists energetically organized and mobilised their believers after liberation in the struggle for multi-stage social revolution and the building of a new society, accepting the original line of united front of the great leader President Kim Il-song as a just one.

Through its experience, Chondoism has become convinced that it can achieve the creation of a new world and realise the desire of the Chondoists by applying the idea of "humanity, that is, god," only when it enjoys the correct policy shaped by the great leader President Kim Il-song and dear Mr. Kim Chong-il.

He said that chondoism should, in the future, too, continue to vigorously wage the struggle to thwart and frustrate the "two Koreas" scheme of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges and [word indistinct] the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, under the slogan of "Rejection of West and Japan" and "Promotion of National Interests and Welfare of the People."

Stressing that the fellow Chondoists in the North and the South would jointly wage with one mind the struggle for national reunification, he invited the leadership-level personnel of the Central General Headquarters of Chondoism of South Korea to Pyongyang to discuss the reunification questions including a joint struggle for the realisation of the proposal to convene a political consultative meeting of leadership-level people in the North and the South for the present.

The ritual was held grandly and successfully as required by the religious formalities.

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No 2 Feb 89

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South Korea

Rev Mun Proposes Talks With No, Two Kims

SK0704004289 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Dissident leader Mun Ik-hwan, who is currently staying in Japan, ending his unauthorized visit to North Korea, yesterday proposed holding a four-way talk with President No Tae-u, Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam and himself to brief them on his Pyongyang visit.

"At the meeting, I'd like to explain my activities in Pyongyang and, hopefully talk over the direction of national reunification," said Mun, who arrived in Tokyo on Wednesday via Beijing.

The 71-year dissident pastor said he knew well about the moves by "hardliners in the government and ruling party as well as some portion of the press to depict his Pyongyang visit as being beneficial to enemy."

Mun said he "genuinely accepts" Kim Yong-sam's remarks at his recent news conference that he should be held responsible to the people for his Pyongyang visit back home.

Commentator Denounces Mun Visit to North

SK0604231989 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
4 Apr 89 p 5

[From the "Poetics" column; article by political commentator Yang Hyo-min: "Propagandist for Dictator"]

[Text]

Whose Representative Is He?

On 11 October 1973, when the 7 July North-South joint statement extolling peace was still valid, Kim Il-song officially declared his intention before the soldiers of the People's Army as follows:

"The issue of national reunification can be resolved peacefully only when a revolution breaks out in South Korea and the South Korean people grasp political power with our help. Problems cannot be resolved merely by shouting the slogan 'Let us achieve peaceful reunification!' The decisive revolutionary struggle will break out in South Korea without fail by the South Korean people, youth, and students. When the People's Army strengthens its combat capability in every way and assumes combat readiness at all times, the reunification of the fatherland will be realized at an early date."

This is a remark showing the key point of the Kim Il-song-style camouflage peace-offensive reunification policy. Today, 15 years later, the state of disorder, including the labor-management dispute, campus disturbances, and violence of the extreme leftist faction, is taking place in our society following the course of democratization.

At this point, the Kim Il-song faction is conspiring a great scheme to turn such disorder into "the decisive revolutionary struggle" for which it has maneuvered for a long time toward South Korea. At this very moment, Rev Mun Ik-hwan secretly visited Pyongyang on 25 March.

The statement issued upon his arrival at Pyongyang Airport, the scene of his passionate embrace of Kim Il-song, the joint statement he signed with Ho Tam and which was made public on 2 April before his departure from Pyongyang, and his news conference touched off great shock and indignation in the majority of people and created a great stir in the political sphere.

Up to now, it has not been just one or two people who have visited North Korea; thus, there is no reason why Mr Mun could not go there. However, the issue is how one goes there and how one talks and behaves. It is clear that by visiting the North secretly he intentionally infringed on the legal system of the Republic of Korea while arrogantly ignoring the existence of this nation. One's moral obligations for reunification are not the acquittal that allows one to act as one likes and pleases.

What we want to make an issue of at this point are the political issues put forward as the result of his secret visit and his remarks. He was even moved to tears by the invitation to North Korea extended to him by Kim Il-song on 1 January, which he longed for so ardently, by describing the invitation as a "miracle." He stated excitedly that "he could not repress the sense of joy and deep emotion" even by imagining the meeting with Kim Il-song.

However, the invitation is not a "miracle" and is nothing but part of the stereotypical harassment tactics against the South.

In his first statement Mr Mun said that, "by fighting against dictatorial forces and outside forces, the South Korean masses are now dashing toward the point of destiny which they have to reach in the end." This cannot mean anything except that the decisive time has come to achieve reunification under the banner of Kim Il-song. Treading the streets of Pyongyang, he also stated that "I cannot but sense the ardent eyes of the 40 million South Korean masses concentrated on my back." Thus, he showed self-complacency.

However, our masses have neither selected him as our representative nor entrusted our destiny to him. Indeed, his remarks are endlessly arrogant and self-righteous. The so-called "masses" he referred to are not a concrete, but imaginary, existence; they are not a realistic, but virtual, image.

Mr Mun said that he will meet "Comrade Kim Il-song" prompted by wild fancies that "reunification in any form would be good." What on earth does the word comrade mean? It means a man who shares the same intention and fights on the same front for the same political objectives. When he unhesitatingly called Kim Il-song "comrade," his

political color was clearly revealed. Nevertheless, some political parties and politicians repeatedly put forward unjustifiable excuses and childish sophistry in an attempt to prevent the spread of public opinion.

Recital of Kim Il-song's Propaganda

However, Mr Mun's remarks and actions on 2 April made a laughingstock of their excuses and sophistry. That day, in a joint statement with Ho Tam that was written for him by North Korea, Mr Mun stated that reunification should be resolved based on the three principles declared in the 4 July North-South joint statement, that he is opposed to the two Koreas policy, that the method of a North-South confederal system is an indispensable reunification plan, that the "Team Spirit" exercise cannot be consistent with North-South dialogue, and that he rejects the cross-recognition of the North and the South by foreign countries as well as their cross-contacts. Thus, he totally followed Kim Il-song's propaganda offensive against the South.

In his news conference he repeatedly supported Kim Il-song's Koryo confederal system and made remarks that he believes North Korea is not preparing for war, that he felt relieved knowing that North Korea is not militarized, that he believes that freedom of religion is ensured, and so forth. Thus, he unhesitatingly recited North Korea's political propaganda.

With all of this, Mr Mun openly revealed to the entire world his status of being reduced to a mere propagandist for Kim Il-song. Nevertheless, he is attempting to ridicule our people while praising himself by saying that his visit to the North would play the role of a forerunner in opening the road of exchanges, that he attained more than expected, that he fulfilled so-called missions, and so forth. He even stated that by visiting North Korea, he could open his own eyes and corrected his views about North Korea.

Had he opened his eyes, he should have first seen the meaning of the 30,000-odd small and large statues of Kim Il-song, including a 30-meter-high gold-leaf statue looking down on the streets of Pyongyang; of the 60-meter-high triumphal arch; of the 170-meter-high Chuche Tower; and of the Korean Revolutionary Museum which glorified the pedigree of Kim Il-song's family. He should have sensed the extreme poverty of the material life of the masses and should have realized the stunning fact that people cannot possibly travel even to another province, not to mention Pyongyang, without travel permission.

Mr Mun always claimed that he fought for human rights, democracy, and the masses. However, he entered a modern version of the kingdom of totalitarianism—the worst wasteland of human rights in the world, the city of atheism and of an idol, the totalitarian society where one cannot even raise his voice and where the one-man dictator, not satisfied with his 43-year-long rule, is going

to hand over his power to his eldest son—and shamelessly raved that reunification should be realized based on the method of the dictator. Thus, he clearly showed what objectives he is pursuing for human rights, democratization, and emancipation of the masses.

The Government Also Has Responsibility

Whether or not he claims to be a pastor carrying his cross for reunification and to be a martyr assigned with so-called missions, his reckless and frivolous remarks made him a political idiot.

At this point we should naturally inquire into the responsibility of the government. Since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic, President No pushed ahead with an easy-going and unprincipled northern policy while presenting a series of remarks for reconciliation toward the North without preparing careful and minute judicial and administrative steps. As a result, psychological circumstances have been created wherein one thinks that one can resolve the reunification issue only if one goes to Pyongyang.

The policy toward North Korea is being linked with the northern policy. What criticism is the world making today? Criticism points out that a young presidential assistant who has no experience and who has not gone through research monopolized the northern policy, including the policy toward North Korea, without sufficient consultation with relevant authorities within the government and that he visited various communist nations and, as a result, the present situation has been created. Needless to say, the northern policy is necessary.

However, the ideas, methods, and practice of this policy should be reviewed and reformulated on the basis of a thorough self-examination.

Now, we should clearly settle politically the incident of Mr Mun's entrance into the North and should remain calm about this incident. Whether one is from an opposition party or off-stage opposition organization or is an individual, if he wants the Kim Il-song-style reunification of a so-called liberation of South Korea through a South Korean revolution, may side with Mr Mun; if he hates such a line, may stand on the opposition side to confront Mr Mun. As far as this issue is concerned, an ambiguous middle ground cannot possibly exist.

Mr Mun's entrance into the North and his absurd remarks that blindly followed Kim Il-song are strictly his own personal activities and represent none of the soldiers and the masses. Such individuals can be seen anywhere. Thus, we think the people should put their own attitudes in good order without wavering as if a great thing has happened.

*** Benefits of Import Promotion Examined**
*41070071 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in
Korean 31 Jan 89 p 2*

[Editorial: "Promotion of Imports To Control Trade Surplus: Urgent Priority Is To Establish Consumer Culture Congruous to Self-Regulation"]

[Text] An import promotion measure aimed at reducing our trade surplus has been drawn up and is ready for implementation. As was anticipated, the measure hurriedly made public by the Ministry of Trade and Industry [MTI], while nominally intended as an overall reduction of our trade surpluses, is focused primarily on reducing the surplus with the United States. It is also public knowledge that the measure was prepared in the midst of indications that the Bush administration, as soon as it is installed, would likely pick our country as a negotiating party to a priority entente on trade matters.

Also it is evident that there has been growing public awareness of the need for an import promotion measure as a practical matter.

For quite some time now, it has been argued that for domestic reasons such as price stabilization and currency management the trade surplus should be controlled to keep it at an appropriate level.

Viewed in this context, one can surmise that not only the urgency of the goal involved but also the desirability of generating a sufficient amount of atmospherics must have been taken into consideration by MTI in its decision to hurriedly devise this import promotion measure.

In terms of specific contents, the key elements of the measure are substantial liberalization of imports and sweeping reform of the existing system imposing import restrictions. Included in the provisions are the plans for an early announcement of the liberalization date for the so-called "sensitive items" which have thus far been excluded from the scope of import liberalization and for complete liberalization within 2-3 years of all the manufactured goods that are still under import restrictions.

Additionally, with respect to those import restrictions being imposed under individual laws, the measure promises to revise them by means of a consolidated public notice to be issued in the month of February so as to ensure a more substantial impact on the planned promotion of imports.

More graphic than any of these systemic reforms is a plan, included in the measure, to step up procurement activities from those countries with whom we have trade surpluses. Under this plan, our trade-surplus trends are to be examined each month to decide where and how to expand the policy-guided procurement of equipment and raw materials mainly for our large-scale projects. In effect this plan may be viewed as nothing more than a promise to buy more U.S. goods.

One can understand that the situation, as clearly reflected in the government's planning, leaves us with no choice but to increase imports from the United States as a matter of policy.

One can also understand the plan that calls for dispatching four separate purchasing missions to the United States during the first half of the current year to undertake business negotiations with more than 300 American concerns.

It has reached the point where controlling our trade surplus with the United States has become urgent, and this is clear to anyone who has been watching the changes taking place in the trading environment.

Nevertheless, we are at a point where we now have an import promotion measure put forth by the government which, regardless of the explanations provided, is undeniably a product of a policy that yields to U.S. trade pressure and concessions for buying more U.S. goods. This, in effect, is tantamount to an acknowledgment on our part that we have been unable to free ourselves from the influence of the United States in matters concerning, not just our trade policy, but our financial, foreign exchange, and tariff policies as well.

For many reasons, we have long seen the benefits which accrue from a stable growth policy through promotion of imports. This is based on our recognition that it is desirable to reduce the adverse impact of excessive trade surpluses and achieve a balanced expansion of exports and imports.

Moreover, we have argued that the kind of import promotion measure we support must result in simultaneous rectification of our trade deficit with Japan and trade surplus with the United States.

In contrast, however, the import promotion measure put forth by MTI is nothing more than a policy statement of our intentions to actively increase our imports from the United States under the leadership of the government and the business sector.

Although the measure cites many other objectives such as interagency policy coordination in the interest of import promotion and congruity between the import policy and the industrial policy, the real substance of the measure points toward just one thing—the promotion of imports from the United States. Furthermore, as a consultative mechanism with other pertinent ministries and agencies of the government, MTI reportedly will establish an import promotion countermeasure committee in order not only to encourage but also to ensure increased importation of goods from the United States.

In other words, what it means seems to be that all concerned elements of the government will be tied up in an effort to devise measures necessary to promote imports from the United States.

Should this be the case, the result would be that U.S. trading firms will not need to make any special marketing effort in or toward our markets.

They, the U.S. firms, may very well conclude that they can achieve all they want simply by watching the bilateral trade balances after the fact and exerting pressure on the Korean Government.

In addition to this, yet another matter that concerns us is the coming announcement, in advance of a detailed schedule, for the liberalization of sensitive items. Undoubtedly agricultural and fisheries products as well as communications equipment will be the objects of that liberalization measure. Then, the question one must ask is: If we simply give in unilaterally to U.S. pressures, will there be no bargaining chips left on which our country can set its own policy?

It is unfair to say that thus far no progress has been made in our liberalization policy aimed at controlling our trade surpluses. Our import liberalization rate has exceeded 94 percent; the import supervision system has been nearly abolished; tariff rates have been lowered; and the number of items we import from a single country—this is a matter that concerns primarily Japan—has been reduced significantly. As a result of all this, our trade surplus with the United States is said to have declined sharply since last year.

Moreover, it has been reported—although we are told that the situation is still not bad enough to warrant pessimism—that since the beginning of this year our overall trade balance has been moving into the red.

Viewed against this backdrop, the fact that our government, as if it had surrendered itself to the new U.S. Administration, has come up with this one-sided import promotion measure is bound to arouse a very unfavorable reaction.

At the risk of being repetitious, we wish to point out once again that, although an import promotion measure may be desirable at this point, any measure designed solely to expand our procurement of U.S. goods will be difficult to justify.

At the same time, however, none of us can dispute the recognition that, entering into an era of complete openness, our economy cannot pursue a global strategy while holding back on liberalization. Once we accept this perception, it will behoove us to think about the question of how we should adjust ourselves to increased imports in the days ahead—an era of open markets and self-regulation.

Even if a substantial increase in imports became a reality, it is problematic to assume that it will necessarily facilitate our control of the trade surplus and lead to stabilization of our prices. That it could have a serious effect on domestic industrial reforms and might even throw consumers into confusion is a possibility one can

envisage. For these reasons, until such time when we have established a system of importation and consumer discipline that are congruous with a time of self-regulation without outside interference, the proper roles of government, business, and consumers must continue to be stressed.

Kim Yong-sam Interviewed on Current Issues
SK0704014589 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN
in Korean 1 Apr 89 p 3

[Interview with Kim Yong-sam, president of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), by Kim Myong-su, manager of the KYONGHYANG SINMUN Political Department—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Editor's note] RDP President Kim Yong-sam, who experienced deep frustration about the government's shelving a midterm appraisal of President No's performance, has displayed his political sense by opening a breakthrough to change the political situation, taking advantage of Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang. When Rev Mun's visit to Pyongyang was first reported RDP President Kim Yong-sam postponed the scheduled interview he had promised and held a news conference first to reveal his stand against Mun's visit. Thus, he showed his political style of giving importance to the selection of time and opportunity in politics. In the interview, Kim Yong-sam did not conceal his appearance of being anxious about the people's reaction to his criticism of Mun's visit to Pyongyang. However, in defiance of the big incident of Rev. Mun's Pyongyang visit, Kim Yong-sam did not renounce his strong attention to the issue of calling former Presidents Chon Tu-hwan and Choe Kyu-ha to Assembly public hearings for testimony. [end editor's note]

[Kim Myong-su] In a news conference on 30 March you clarified that your party will reject the reunification-for-reunification principle which runs counter to a reunification under the free, democratic system. What reunification policy and basic policy toward North Korea is the RDP seeking?

[Kim Yong-sam] I think as far as the reunification question is concerned, I am one of those who have adhered to a progressive and open-minded assertion. Since the early seventies I have expressed my will to meet Kim Il-song and to exchange frank and open-minded opinions with him about the reunification question. Even now, this will of mine is unchangeable. However, as far as the reunification question is concerned, I want to emphasize that the country should be reunified under a system in which freedom, democracy, and human rights are guaranteed. Vigorous personnel exchanges between the North and the South, including the reunion of separated families, should be conducted as the first step in achieving reunification. When people from the South visit the North, people from the North also visit the South in response. Thus, the North and the South should make mutual visits.

[Kim Myong-su] President Kim, you have expressed a critical stand toward Rev. Mun's visit to the North because he did not have prior discussions or procedures with the government. However, some people hold that such a criticism may result in daunting people's debates on reunification.

[Kim Yong-sam] When one plans to visit a country that has no diplomatic relations with one's own country, it is natural for him to have prior discussions with his government no matter how good the motive for and purpose of the visit may be. It is his duty as one of the people to do so. Such an act is precisely an act to defend his country.

Various forms of reunification debates should be guaranteed. The RDP will seek democratic debates on reunification so that we can reach a national consensus on the reunification question. Toward this end, our party will discuss the reunification question with other political parties, social organizations, scholars, and people from all walks of life.

The incident of Rev Mun's visit to Pyongyang is also a product of the No Tae-u regime's reckless northern policy. What led Rev Mun to visit the North is precisely the visit to the North by Chong Chu-yong. Chong Chu-yong's visit to the North was an act the present regime, with the midterm appraisal in mind, perpetrated to deceive the people.

[Kim Myong-su] Because you expressed your negative opinion of Rev Mun's trip to the North in a recent news conference, it is feared that you and dissident forces and student activists might begin to feud.

In my opinion, you now face the task of redefining your relations with the dissident groups. What plan do you have in this regard?

[Kim Yong-sam] I do not believe that leading dissident figures are fully sympathetic with Rev. Mun's activity, and I heard that some in the dissident groups have voiced dissenting opinions.

I think it is correct to maintain cooperative ties with the reasonable and peaceful dissidents and draw a clear line against the dissidents who refuse dialogue or with whom we find it impossible to have dialogue.

[Kim Myong-su] The Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] seems to be in a state of flux concerning Rev Mun's trip to the North. The PPD seems to be taking an ambivalent stand: Although it is regrettable that Rev. Mun went to the North without prior consultation with the government, nevertheless his aspirations for reunification cannot be ignored. What do you think about this?

[Kim Yong-sam] I will not talk at all about the PPD. [passage omitted]

[Kim Myong-su] The extreme right-wing forces in our society show ominous signs that they are on the move. Former Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-kap's resignation and the controversy created by Korea Military Academy Superintendent Min Pyong-ton's remarks at a recent commencement ceremony are a clear sign of this. I would like to hear your opinion about this.

[Kim Yong-sam] I do not believe it is such a worrisome development.

Our society has matured so enormously in terms of quality and quantity that the extreme right-wing forces will find it hard to move around as they please.

The problem is that the current regime is so incompetent that it is in no position to settle things. By making an abrupt about face, the government, which had seemed so firm about conducting the midterm evaluation until the last minute, mocked the people. It was so absurd.

The current regime has no rallying point and lacks political skill. Even the Democratic Justice Party does not do what is expected of it. [passage omitted]

[Kim Myong-su] With President No shelving the midterm evaluation, the so-called political situation that has been rushing toward the midterm evaluation since the beginning of the year has come to an abrupt end and now seems to be entering a new phase.

What opinion do you have about the shelved midterm evaluation?

[Kim Yong-sam] By doing that, he has proved that the liquidation of the Fifth Republic's wrongdoings and having the true cause of the movement for democratization in Kwangju unveiled are the biggest pending political issues.

Just as excrement does not stop exuding a foul smell simply because it is covered with something, stability cannot be attained without reform.

The chaotic political situation that was rushing toward the midterm evaluation had also been driven by no other cause than the failure to have the irregularities of the Fifth Republic unveiled and liquidated.

In my judgment, there can be no political stability without the complete liquidation of the Fifth Republic's wrongdoings.

[Kim Myong-su] You opposed an early midterm evaluation, claiming that the legacies and wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic had not been completely liquidated. What is the yardstick for the liquidation of the Fifth Republic? How do you think the issue of testimony in

the National Assembly by former Presidents Chon Tu-hwan and Choe Kyu-ha and the issue of dealing with key figures who played the leading role during the Fifth Republic should be settled?

[Kim Yong-sam] President No promised that he would conduct a midterm evaluation in the form of a confidence vote with his term at stake once the legacies and wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic had been liquidated. However, he planned to conduct a midterm evaluation without liquidating the Fifth Republic. This was why our party waged a no-confidence campaign against him. If the No Tae-u regime had conducted a midterm evaluation against the people's desire for liquidating the legacies and wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic, it would have certainly received a vote of no confidence from the people. In a nutshell, although the midterm evaluation has been postponed indefinitely, the No Tae-u regime has virtually bowed its knee before our party. Former Presidents Chon and Choe have failed to receive the people's respect. The ruling party's assertion that former Presidents Chon and Choe should be treated with respect because former presidents lack persuasive power. The two men who are responsible for the Fifth Republic and the Kwangju incident should come to the National Assembly and testify before the people. There is no reason for Mr Chon Tu-hwan to evade coming to the National Assembly for testimony, because he already apologized to the people before going to Paektam Temple. I know that some political parties believe the two former presidents may tender a written testimony or testify in camera. However, the people will never tolerate this. With regard to the problem of dealing with key figures who played an important role during the Fifth Republic, some figures should be dealt with by law and some other figures should be dealt with politically. In other words, they should be resigned from their present official posts. The midterm evaluation of President No's performance should be conducted in the future because President No himself promised it to the people. It is his duty to keep his promise. [passage omitted]

[Kim Myong-su] Some scholars hold that the present four-party system runs counter to the power structure under a system of direct presidential elections. In a recent interview with us, PPD President Kim Tae-chung expressed the need to revise the Constitution for a parliamentary cabinet system. In particular, prudent moves to discuss a constitutional revision for a parliamentary cabinet system in an effort to eliminate the acute feelings of parochialism among the people have been reported. I understand you were once also interested in a parliamentary cabinet system. What is your comment on this?

[Kim Yong-sam] Many problems have been exposed in the cooperation among the three opposition parties and in the operation of the four-party system. The people know this, too. However, now is not the time to discuss a constitutional revision. The discussions of a constitutional revision, if any, are designed to dilute the pending

political issues, including the problem of liquidating the Fifth Republic. Therefore, we should be sharply vigilant about this. It is not true that I once insisted on a constitutional revision for a parliamentary cabinet system. Even when I waged a hunger strike in the dark period of the early eighties, I insisted on a constitutional revision for a direct presidential election system. [passage omitted]

[Kim Myong-su] You have assumed the post of president of the main opposition party three times in the past; yet you have failed to realize your dream of becoming president. Do you plan to run for president 4 years from now?

[Kim Yong-sam] Let's talk about such a thing in the future.

[Kim Myong-su] How have you pushed ahead with the work of fostering your successor?

[Kim Yong-sam] Of course it is necessary to foster a successor; however, it is more important for the successor to grow up and develop by himself.

Daily Urges Leaders To Show 'Political Potency'
SK0704013689 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
7 Apr 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Time for Suprapartisan Counsel"]

[Text] From many appearances, the nation's present political developments are being triggered one after another, and being influenced, by forces and causes outside the established political turf. In many cases, it seems to be a confrontation between those on the parliamentary track and those outside it. This, if taken for granted, poses a serious challenge to the political establishments.

The nation is being swept by the shocking wave triggered by the Rev. Mun Ik-hwan's secretive and unauthorized trip to north Korea. It is compounded by the worsening labor unrest in Ulsan, often smacking of an anarchy. The Ulsan situation is being tested by discontent laborers, and dissident activists including students as what they call a joint strife. All this has led rightist groups to rally against what they call dangerous leftist attempts to undermine this Republic's liberal democracy and, thus, its survival.

Such latest evolvment has caused, more or less, a schism in national consensus. Even in the established political ranks, they, despite their common awareness of having to safeguard the nation from leftist challenges, differ on how to cope with them: conservative hardliners versus those harboring a more modest approach.

The situation makes the choice available for the political establishments becoming ever narrow. That is to say, they should play the role intrinsic in their representative

obligations to keep the nation saved from being dragged into a critical phase. They should demonstrate to the fullest extent their political influence and capacity to make the parliament a real arena for solving problems and plights confronting the nation.

The leaders of the political parties should start in earnest their counsel. Greater cause should be put before bickerings for partisan interests. Waivering on that urgent task could make all too late to try.

Crackdown by law-enforcement alone will not be enough, though it should be made a pervasive awareness that respecting law and order cannot be compromised, whatever excuse may be produced, in a democratic society. Yet, resorting to rigidity only in enforcing laws, not accompanied by reasonable measures to follow, could result in a vicious cycle if the past experiences could serve as a lesson. Display of political potency, in a genuine sense, is a prerequisite ingredient. This should be the job of political parties awaiting their sagacious and resolute response.

Yet, responding to popular desire to see the situation stabilized should not be mistaken for allowing one to default on one's duties or promises. A patch-up expediency, lacking sincerity and consistency, will be short-lived.

Those engaging in subversive activism should understand that what they may aim at now will never turn out to be so. They will prove themselves to be fantastic and gullible at best. It is the responsibility of the established politicians to save things from going that way at too heavy a cost to bear in the end. It is also their responsibility to get rid of what might present an excuse for naive and idealistic minds to play into the subversive intrigues. All these are what should be made the urgent subject of counsel for political leaders.

Government 'To Crack Down' on Dissidents

SK0704004089 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] The No Tae-u administration is determined to crack down on ever-expanding leftist elements, which are "attempting to touch off a class revolution through violence," by employing stern judicial measures with the help of the people.

The tough policy was confirmed in a high-ranking government officials' meeting, the first of its kind since No took office in February of last year, held at Chongwadae yesterday. No presided over the extraordinary session.

However, the government urged the entire people supporting the free democratic system to act in concert with it to uproot the subversive elements, taking lesson from the bitter left-right confrontation after the 1945 national liberation and the collapse of Vietnam.

During the session which lasted for more than two hours, President No declared that "safeguarding the nation's democratic system against violent revolutionary leftist forces is the most urgent task of the times."

He told the high portfolios of the government, "To counter violent leftists in their face and to overcome them is the very desire of the people and the government's responsibility and duty of top priority," according to presidential spokesman Yi Su-chong.

The spokesman quoted the President as stressing, "The government authorities as well as people from all walks of life must render all their capabilities in crushing the violent leftist forces."

The government's hard-line strategy against the radical forces is based on a serious judgment that the impure elements are gearing up to ignite a full-fledged plot to topple the democratic system by inciting the so-called grass roots such as workers, farmers, small merchants and those in low-income brackets.

The spokesman explained that "such forces, which had disguised themselves as democratic forces, are now openly making no secret of its plan, to overthrow our system by mobilizing all violent, and legal and illegal means available."

President No, in particular, demanded that the government work out fundamental countersteps to prevent "growing students at middle and high schools from being indoctrinated with leftist ideology."

Emphasizing the need for "close cooperation between the government and parents," he said that teachers who are attempting to imbue their students with revolutionary leftist theory should be expelled from school.

The President also instructed relevant ministers to "provide chances for overseas trips, particularly to Socialist countries, to collegians, teachers and workers.

Such trips will help them better understand the real picture in the Socialist countries, according to the President.

He further said underground publications praising Kim Il-song and communism should be rooted out, and instead publications on the sound ideology of free democracy should be encouraged to help the people gain correct understanding of the ulterior motives of violent leftist forces.

The Chongwadae session was attended by 22 top ranking officials, including Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun, Deputy Premier Cho Sun, Pak Se-chik, director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Home Minister Yi Han-tong and Justice Minister Ho Hyong-ku.

Government To Outlaw Dissidents 'College'

SK0704012889 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
7 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] The government will outlaw a "Workers College" militant students and dissidents plan to open near Inchon May 1, the Education Ministry announced yesterday.

The school, if allowed to open, would strive to beef up joint struggles of workers and students against employers and the government, the announcement said.

"It is also feared to spread leftist theory," the ministry said.

According to the ministry, 28 labor leaders and a dissident lawyer have been preparing to set up a "Workers College" in Pupyong near Inchon where a large number of plants operate.

They have already raised 100 million won to lease a building, buy books and other materials, the ministry said.

The school plans to teach laborers about issues related to national unification, farm problems and poverty in urban areas.

"The college, once established, is sure to play up negative aspects of society and north Korea's formula for national unification," one ministry claimed.

He said students have took part in the fund-raising campaign for the special college.

"It will try to set up a university for workers later and initiate exchanges with international labor training bodies," the ministry said.

The dissident workers' group, "Chonnohyop," is planning a series of protests between April 9 and May 1 under the pretext of boosting workers' rights, the ministry said.

On May 1, Chonnohyop plans to sponsor a "Labor Day" program and a general workers' strike.

The government plan to outlaw the Workers College, meanwhile, is expected to invite a flurry of protests from the dissident workers' group and radical students.

Joint Investigation Team To Probe Dissidents

SK0704005489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] The Joint Public Security Investigation Team yesterday made a scrutiny into the Chonminnyon (the National Alliance for Democratic Movement) and 24 other dissident organizations in connection with their proposals of unauthorized South-North exchanges.

"Every individual or organization that once suggested South-North exchanges without a government approval or not through an official channel will be subject to an investigation on the legitimacy of its proposal," senior prosecutor Yi Kon-kae said.

Yi handed down the guideline during a joint meeting of investigators from the prosecution, the National Police Headquarters, the Agency for National Security Planning and the Defense Security Planning and the Defense Security Command. "The probe will center on the legitimacy of South-North exchange proposals put out by some dissident organizations in defiance at the government measure to outlaw all civilian-level dialogues with north Korea," said Yi, chief of the newly-inaugurated joint investigation team.

According to prosecutors, Chonminnyon, the umbrella body of dissident organizations, Chondaehyop, the nationwide student activist group, the Korean Farmers Association, and the Writers Association for National Literature, have offered unauthorized South-North exchanges.

Since President No Tae-u's July 7, 1988 declaration on the peaceful reunification of the nation, 33 dissident and social-reform groups have suggested South-North contacts without resorting to the government's official channel to the North.

Leading members of those organizations will be questioned about their roles in seeking covert or overt contacts with North Korea. But some groups which have asked for the Korean National Red Cross to act as a go-between in the South-North communication will be exempted from legal actions, prosecutors said.

Poet Ko Un and Yi Chae-o, chairman of Chonminnyon's committee for the National Reunification, have been already arrested on suspicion of violating the National Security Law that prohibits civilian-level contacts with North Korea.

According to prosecutors, Yi Pu-yong and Chang Kipyoo, key members of Chonminnyon, will be questioned within this week for their alleged violations of the National Security Law and the Labor Dispute Mediation Law. They are suspected of masterminding militant labor union leaders and radical students's united struggle in the dispute-ridden Hyundai shipyard in Ulsan, Kyongsang-namto.

Monthly Views Two Dissident Groups Interactions

SK0404010589 Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean
1 Mar 89 pp 268-285

[Article by Chon Chin-u: "The Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop"]

[Text]

Formal Independence but Actual Solidarity

The National Democratic Alliance of Korea [Chonminnyon], a group representing dissident social movements, and the National Council of University Student Representatives [Chondaehyop], a group representing university students, are expected to exert enormous influence on Korean politics and society in 1989.

Chonminnyon emerged to unify the dissident activist camp after it fell into total disarray during the period from the "29 June statement" of 1987 until the presidential election the following December. Chondaehyop is the high command of the student activist movement, which has stood continuously at the vanguard of the movement to reform Korean society. Both organizations believe that 1989 is the year in which the Korean "people's democratic movement" will trigger a crucial period of change.

From the larger perspective, the Korean people are divided into those who have high expectations about the common activities of these two groups and those who find them worrisome. Both groups focus on slogans like, "Oppose foreign powers; achieve self-reliance" and "Oppose dictatorship; democratize" and pursue the "Fatherland reunification movement." Some entertain expectations that as offstage players these two groups will boost the pace of democratization, which has been dilatory under the present government. Others, however, fear that the two groups' "struggles" will provoke extreme social disorder, poisoning the hard-won atmosphere of democratization and bringing turmoil to the lives of the Korean people.

Not a single one of the major issues related to purging the Fifth Republic has been satisfactorily solved, not the disposition of Chon Tu-hwan and Yi Sun-cha case, not Fifth Republic scandals, not the "Kwangju massacre," and not the revision or abolition of despotic laws. This has created a wide, internalized band of dissatisfaction among the Korean people, and demands for democratization have spread rapidly through every corner of society. The dissatisfaction and the demands for democracy provide Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop with a strong base of support.

At this stage the relationship between Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop has been described as one in which each is "formally independent" yet in which both maintain "actual solidarity." Although a number of factors have prevented the two groups from unifying, they conduct joint struggles on a case by case basis. This arrangement brings the practical advantages of union, even as each group continues to say that formal unification is a problem they will solve in due course after undergoing a process of thorough debate.

The views of the two groups differ greatly on the basic political situation and on major issues, as do the planks comprising their struggle platforms. Moreover, each

group faces a compelling need to resolve the divergent views within itself. At this point in time, then, it is difficult to estimate when the dissident and student activist camps may accomplish a grand coalition.

Nevertheless, Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop could speedily unite if developments in the political establishment and policies adopted by the government pushed them to it. Even if they do not unite, however, the two groups will clearly be important variables on the Korean scene in 1989.

Mass Rally Their First Activity

On 22 January 1989, just one day after its official inauguration, Chonminnyon sponsored a "rally to condemn the violence and terrorism of the No Tae-u government's suppression of the mass movement" at Taehak-ro in Seoul's Chongno-ku, Tongsung-tong area. More than 10,000 workers, peasants, students, and citizens attended the rally, the first event sponsored by Chonminnyon, including Chonminnyon's Cochairman Yi Chang-pok and the former chairman of Hyundai Motor's labor union, Kwon Yong-mok. A rally speaker criticized the government: "The present government claims to place its highest priority on law and order, but late last year they began to use law and order as an excuse to attack and suppress the workers' and peasants' movements. Their policy is designed to destroy the masses' right to a livelihood while preserving the interests of the monopolistic conglomerates.... We pledge solidarity with Chonminnyon, and joint struggle."

After the speeches, ralliers surged from the site in an attempt to hold a "peace parade" and march to Democratic Justice Party [DJP] headquarters, but they clashed with policemen waiting to restrain them, and the parade ended in a violent demonstration. A large number of college students affiliated with the Sochongnyon [Seoul District Federation of General Student Councils] attended the rally. Since the Sochongnyon is subordinate to Chondaehyop, the presence of the Sochongnyon students tended to substantiate that Chondaehyop will join Chonminnyon on a case-by-case basis to conduct joint struggles.

Chonminnyon's first activity was to host a mass rally attended by representatives from a broad range of society. Then on 28 January Chonminnyon called a "news conference on the political situation" conducted by Chonminnyon's chairmen. The chairmen demanded that, "the government thoroughly investigate the Kwangju massacre and Fifth Republic vestiges, and we demand the arrest and criminal punishment of the prime perpetrators, Chon Tu-hwan and Yi Sun-cha." The chairmen condemned, "Assembly hearings to reveal the truth about Kwangju and expose Fifth Republic scandals that have ignored the central issues. The hearings amount to nothing more than diluting the issues through an official filter. We demand a quick solution to these issues. We cannot forgive this government's attitude on these issues." The chairmen's demands on Kwangju

were clear: "What must be solved are the United State's responsibility for the Kwangju massacre, the identification and punishment of the man responsible for the massacre, and a delineation of President No Tae-u's responsibility in Kwangju."

On the Fifth Republic scandals issue, the chairmen advocated that, "the illegal funds accumulated by the Fifth Republic must be returned to the people. The scale and the uses of these enormous political funds must be revealed. Investigation into the illegal generation of these funds must focus on both foreign and domestic scandals. Scandals related to monopolistic foreign conglomerates must be investigated, including the Northrop case, corrupt foreign financing for Nuclear Generating Plants 11 and 12, and corrupt foreign funds for subway construction. Cases of domestic scandal involving collusion between political leaders and domestic conglomerates, like the rationalization of insolvent enterprises, scandals involving the law on tax exemption, the scandal involving the approval of a second civil airline, and corruption in approving 24 new golf courses."

In regard to opposition parties, Chonminnyon leaders were clear: "The three opposition parties ignore the people's demands. Meanwhile their limited efforts to clarify the responsibility of Chon Tu-hwan, the United States, and the No Tae-u government reveals them to be negligent in their duty, and in the final analysis the actions of the opposition parties suggests to us that they are themselves fellow travelers with the government." They demanded that: "The three opposition parties must clearly reveal their positions on these issues and must join in the grand democratic solidarity struggle to purge Fifth Republic remnants and to guarantee the masses' right to a livelihood."

On 10 February 1989 Chonminnyon issued a statement about the government's "draft law to punish those who throw firebombs." The statement opposed enacting such a law: "The motivating force of this draft legislation is physical suppression of the people's desire for democratization while simultaneously imputing responsibility for the use of violence to the democratic forces and also to restrict the people's freedoms to congregate, to demonstrate, and to freely associate."

Chonminnyon also dispatched an inspection team to Chongju's Security Detention Center, and conducted activities (on 2 February) designed to speed the abolition of the Social Security Law. Chonminnyon plans to conduct a "nationwide speaking tour to condemn the Kwangju massacre and the Fifth Republic" and a "solidarity conference for the struggle for the masses' right to a livelihood" in March, and plans a "masses solidarity rally to commemorate May Day" for 1 May 1989.

Proposes a "Pan-National Conference" in North Korea

Another key event promoted by Chonminnyon are preparatory talks for a pan-national conference. On 15 February 1989 Chonminnyon's Fatherland Reunification Committee, chaired by Yi Chae-o, announced

agenda items and the names of 10 representatives who would attend preparatory talks for a pan-national conference at noon on 1 March 1989 at Panmunjom's House of Peace as initially proposed to North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland [CPRF] on 21 January 1989.

The agenda items Chonminnyon recommended that the delegations discuss at this meeting are as follows: 1) the composition of the delegations to the pan-national conference; 2) the venue and timing for the conference and the events to be held at the conference; 3) personal security guarantees for representatives visiting North and South for both the pan-national conference itself and for those conducting preparatory talks for the conference; 4) future events to be held regularly by civilians not associated with the government; and 5) methods to establish peace and reunification of the fatherland.

The Chonminnyon committee also selected and announced the names of 10 members for its delegation to the preparatory talks: as chairman, O Chung, a Christian minister and a cochairman of Chonminnyon; as guidance committeemen, Kye Hun-che and Pak Hyong-kyu, both advisors to Chonminnyon; as spokesman, Yi Chae-o; as labor representative, Yi So-son, an advisor to the National Council of Labor Movement Organizations; as peasants' representative, Chong Song-hon, secretary general of the Catholic Farmers Association; as a representative of the academic world, Pak Sun-kyong, professor at Mogwon College; as a representative of the world of culture and art, Kim Kyu-tong, a poet; as a representative of Buddhism, Venerable Popsong; and as a regional representative, Han Sang-yol, a cochairman of the North Cholla League of People's Democratic Movements.

Chonminnyon's proposal to meet with the North Koreans was the result of an official announcement made on 28 August 1988 by the "headquarters for a world conference for peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula and to promote a pan-national conference" and of an official proposal made on 22 September 1988 by the Mass Movement for Democracy and Unification [Min-tongnyon] and 20 other dissident organizations to hold the pan-national conference. On 9 December 1988 North Korea's "Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland" [CPRF] responded by welcoming the proposal and suggested that representatives attending working-level contacts at Panmunjom or in a third country be selected from social organizations from the North and South and from among neutral Koreans residing overseas.

Then on 15 February 1989 Chonminnyon received a letter from Ho Tam, chairman of North Korea's CPRF. This letter reportedly expressed agreement with Chonminnyon's proposal to North Korea for working-level contacts for a pan-national conference.

Chonminnyon spokesman Pak Kye-tong clarified Chonminnyon's official position on the North-South issue: "We oppose the monopolization of the reunification issue by governmental agencies. We must hold unrestrained and open exchanges with the North. North-South talks worthy of the name must be held, including political talks and military talks to remove nuclear weapons and to reduce the size of the armed forces of North and South alike."

Chonminnyon's Perceptions of the Situation

At this juncture Chonminnyon has been officially active for only a month, so speculating on the group's future activities may involve a certain rashness. Chonminnyon is composed of 12 regional umbrella organizations and 8 umbrella organizations representing occupations and social disciplines. These 20 groups are themselves composed of more than 200 individual activist organizations. Chonminnyon is the largest alliance of dissident activist umbrella organizations ever created in the ROK. Observers speculate that as a minimum a period of 3 to 6 months of internal adjustment will be required for Chonminnyon to consolidate its position as a unified activist organization by working out differences in the interests of its members, who represent divergent social disciplines, occupations, and regions.

Based on Chonminnyon's 1st month of activities and on its plans for future actions, we may presume that as a "permanent joint struggle body" Chonminnyon will find it difficult for now to pursue much more than the partial solidarity that has prevailed between dissident activist groups and student activists since late 1988. Chonminnyon regards itself as a united body, but the group's relative weakness stems from the fact the practical abilities of Chonminnyon suggest the group is not much more than a deliberative body.

In spite of this limitation, however, Chonminnyon remains the central element of the activist camp and will regulate the content of activism and concentrate the power of the dissident movement, whose members' feelings were hurt and whose aggregate power rendered virtually powerless in late 1987 as the result of the twin blows of philosophical differences and divergent views over the presidential election. Most observers agree that Chonminnyon will play the central role in reunifying and strengthening the dissident movement.

Chonminnyon diagnoses the present domestic political situation as one in which the United States and the No Tae-u regime are responsible for an intensifying structure of confrontation between conservatives and reformists, which in turn raises tension among the people. At the same time, Chonminnyon sees the government as contriving to build a cooperative structure with the opposition by exploiting the conservative opposition parties who form the elements of a National Assembly

where the government party lacks a majority. Chonminnyon sees this relationship as building from cooperation to a kind of policy congruity and proceeding from there to actual political partnership, or a grand conservative alliance.

Chonminnyon perceives the present government darkly. To Chonminnyon the No government has shown a willful disregard of the need to punish Fifth Republic abuses and to discipline the masterminds of the "Kwangju massacre." Chonminnyon points to a series of partial measures to boost its claim: Chon Tu-hwan's deceptive apology followed by President No Tae-u's special statement and release of political prisoners and a transparent reorganization of the DJP along with pardons and restoration of civil rights for political offenders. Chonminnyon believes the No government seeks to exploit the "controlled vote of confidence" (interim assessment) to bolster the government's basic stability. At the same time, Chonminnyon believes the government is guilty of organizing ideological attacks on its enemies, manipulating public opinion, cooking up plots to divide the opposition, and even wielding the police powers of the state to mount terroristic suppression of the masses' movement. Chonminnyon believes the government, however, cleverly fools the masses by maneuvering to improve in some areas and even retreating in certain limited ways as a means to make the masses believe that the government is accommodating the interests and demands of all segments of society.

Chonminnyon perceives that the hidden purpose behind the government's clever policy of progress and suppression is to destroy the solidarity of democratic forces, and is nothing more than a plot to divide them. The Chonminnyon response, then, is to emphasize that democratic forces must join to rise up as one and crush the logic of conservative-reformist confrontation, crush the plot to divide the national democratic powers.

In regard to reunification and the international arena, Chonminnyon believes that the United States and the No regime choose to advocate within South Korea the so-called joint national body idea as one which can serve to gradually improve relations between North and South until a combined North and South structure might emerge. But this policy is deliberately misleading, for internationally the United States and the No government espouse the northern policy which aims at improving relations with socialist countries to advance the position of both the government and the state to the extent that cross recognition will eventuate, followed by South Korea unilaterally joining the United Nations. The United States and the No government want to perpetuate forever the split between North and the South, forever legalizing two separate Koreas.

Chonminnyon believes the No government uses its position as the real main force and responsible party in the reunification movement to limit independent exchanges between social entities in the South and their North

Korean counterparts. Chonminnyon thinks that the government is causing the reunification movement to fail by adhering to the so-called functionalist approach, emphasizing economic exchanges and gradual achievement of a combined North-South structure when the obvious key to improving relations between Seoul and Pyongyang lies in a realistic and comprehensive solution to the political and military confrontation between the two.

Chonminnyon believes that the United States is expanding and strengthening large-scale Korea-U.S. military training exercises like "Team Spirit" even though the international situation now dictates peaceful coexistence and reduced tensions. The dissident group believes that the United States is also pushing Japan to rearm as a means to reinforce a triangular military alliance involving the United States, Japan, and Korea. Chonminnyon also believes the United States seeks to avoid responsibility for the situation in Korea by turning over command authority to the Korean Army and by withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea on a gradual, phased basis.

According to Chonminnyon analysis, the United States is attempting to secure a new division of industrial responsibility favorable to itself. In this analysis, the United States is pressuring the imperialist world's capital in such a manner as to initiate an international trend toward capital-intensive, high-tech military and intelligence industries in the industrial and heavy chemical areas, sectors where the United States has already fallen behind, so that the United States can pick up a free ride through specialization. Chonminnyon also believes that the United States has plotted to reorganize the economic structure of Korean society since the mid-eighties, strongly demanding the complete opening of Korean capital markets, technical markets, and raw materials markets. Chonminnyon believes that the Korean Government is responsible for harsh suffering in the masses' daily lives. Chonminnyon believes that the No Tae-u government has blindly knuckled under to American economic policies, opening Korean markets wide. To redress the resulting disadvantage, Chonminnyon believes the No regime has adopted a policy of increasing exploitation of domestic labor and also turned toward a vigorous pursuit of the northern policy, but chronic real estate speculation and the expansion of unproductive investments have caused the collapse of small and medium industries even as an increased rate of mechanization and automation has boosted unemployment and cut real wages. And to top it off, the opening of the beef and agriculture markets promises an endless rupture in the agricultural sector.

These analyses provide the rationale for the basic areas for action espoused by Chonminnyon: the movement to oppose foreign powers and achieve self-reliance, the movement to oppose dictatorship and achieve democratization, and the movement to struggle for the masses' right to a livelihood. The detailed tasks Chonminnyon has elected to pursue are cleaning up the Fifth Republic; "punishing the perpetrators of the Kwangju massacre;"

abolishing or revising evil, despotic laws; demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea; and struggling for the right of workers, peasants, and the poor to earn a livelihood.

"The Center of the Movement Are the Masses at the Bottom of the Social Scale"

A review of Chonminnyon at its present stage, when it is analyzing the situation and determining directions for struggle, reveals that the group's primary emphasis is on workers and peasants, the fundamental masses.

This orientation is underscored by the fact that of Chonminnyon's 1,103-member Council of Representatives, almost half (480) are workers (250) or peasants (230) and by the fact that the highest priority was given to peasants and workers as candidates to fill Chonminnyon's cochairmen slots and other key positions.

Although this orientation toward workers and peasants defines Chonminnyon's basic character, the fact is that same orientation also serves as a de facto limiting factor as well. The swing in power toward workers and peasants has drastically altered the dissident movement, changing its orientation away from the small group of celebrated dissident figures who led it in the past toward a people's democratic movement with masses at the low end of the social scale as its foundation. Some sources say, however, that because of this new rank consciousness, the composition of Chonminnyon may well prove to be a stumbling block to its goal of consolidating all democratic forces.

A former dissident activist pointed out that "the lower-class masses have been overly emphasized in Chonminnyon, to the point that the views of the middle class are obscured." Moreover, the emphasis on the workers and peasants is one reason why the "Lawyers for a Democratic Society" [Minpyon] and other key supporters of the democratic movement in the past, including certain social movement groups affiliated with churches and the arts, continue to hesitate to join Chonminnyon.

In addition to the "rank-centered" base of Chonminnyon, we must examine the process of its creation if we are to understand it well.

At the very first stage of the creation of Chonminnyon, discussion centered on an entity with a very different name, the Mass Movements League [Minjung Undong Yonhap—Minunnyon]. As a strong "workers' struggle" developed in July and August of 1987 in the wake of the "29 June statement," the worlds of labor and dissident activism began to keenly feel the need to organize and empower the workers. The first idea came from the self-appointed Seoul-Inchon and Seoul-Suwon District Labor Movement, which proposed creation of the Minunnyon.

This proposal immediately triggered arguments and differences of opinion about the nature of the Minunnyon. One camp held that the organization should be a league of people's movements, with membership based on region and on occupation and social disciplines. Another camp wanted the Minunnyon to be based on workers and peasants, with progressive intellectuals and other movement groups also included. The opposing camps clung to their views, but by November 1987 the issue was overwhelmed by the sheer force of the presidential election. As election day neared, one camp espoused the position that it was all right to "support with reservations" one or another of the opposition presidential candidates. The other camp, however, disagreed, espousing the position that the opposition must field a single candidate. Even after the election was over the discussion about creating the Minunnyon led nowhere, as one side wanted to "strengthen and expand the Mintongnyon," while the other side wanted to establish the "Seoul Area Minunnyon Preparation Committee." More than once in this period, the difference in views led to emotional confrontation.

The knot began to unravel in early July 1988 with a proposal to establish the National Council of Labor Movement Groups [Chonguk Nodong Undong Tanche Hyobuihoe—Chonguknounhyop]. Using this proposal as a vehicle, the two sides were able to resolve the ill feelings and misunderstandings that had grown up between them over the months. On 22 July 1988, 18 groups met in Taejon and held a "People's Democratic Representatives Conference" with the purpose of creating a permanent, national joint struggle body. Thereafter the dissident activist camp responded to a given situation by creating a temporary joint struggle group aimed at individual issues, for example, the "Council of Democratic Organizations for Independent and Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland," the "Pan-National Truth Investigation Committee To Punish Those Responsible for the Kwangju Massacre," and the "Struggle Headquarters to Arrest Chon and Yi." This approach continued until the end of 1988.

Generational Change in the Activist Camp

The Committee To Promote the National Council of People's Democratic Movements [Chonguk Minjok Minju Undong Hyobuihoe Chujin Uiwonhoe] was created on 2 September 1988. The group's Council of Representatives officially changed its name from National Council of People's Democratic Movements to the National Democratic Alliance of Korea, or Chonminnyon, on 5 January 1989. The following elements combined to trigger this unification of the activist camp: Dissidents increasingly grew to realize the limits imposed on the activist camp's ability to focus its activism by a system of fragmented struggle groups. The dissidents also underwent a growing realization that the opposition majority in the Assembly gained in the legislative elections of April 1988 served to cut the ground out from under the dissident community. A

third element was the danger of isolation of the dissident activist camp if the government were successful in its design for a grand conservative alliance with any part of the opposition.

Sources say that with sensitive philosophical issues to settle Chonminnyon underwent a painful birthing process. The activist camp was broadly divided into a so-called NLPDR (National Liberation People's Democratic Revolution) line and a so-called ND (National Democracy) line. The philosophical differences of these camps caused long, burdensome discussions on issues like the composition of Chonminnyon's top leadership and the distribution of the right to vote. What finally emerged was an organization with masses from the lower end of the social scale at its center, a movement based on organization rather than on prominent figures.

Thus, prominent dissident figures Mun Ik-hwan, Paek Ki-wan, and Kye Hun-che were not made cochairmen of Chonminnyon. These jobs went instead to younger people in their 40's and 50's who had gained activist experience by serving in regional dissident organizations or in dissident occupational groups. The cochairperson lineup: Yi Pu-yong (47, dissidents' representative); Yun Chong-sok (51, peasants' representative); Yi Yong-sun (42, workers' representative); Pae Chong-yol (56, regional representative); O Chung (50, religious representative); and Yi Chang-pok (50, dissidents' representative). Other key officers: Chang Ki-pyo (44, Chonminnyon secretary general); and Kim Kun-tae (42, director of Chonminnyon's Office of Plans and Policy). The generations had changed in the activist camp.

Meeting 15 times over a 5-month span, the Council of Representatives managed to hammer out Chonminnyon's directions only with great difficulty. Ironically enough, a major reason for this was the workers and peasants' new-found right of expression. However, another major reason was the residual philosophical fissure which had dogged the dissident activist camp since the 1987 presidential election, and a further complicating element was that discussants wanted someone to be held responsible for that split.

Chonminnyon Cochairman Yi Pu-yong addressed the issue of the class-based nature of the Chonminnyon, acknowledging that "we are aware that certain segments of society either misunderstand it or have deficient understanding it." However, Yi added his conviction that "the key reason for the misunderstanding was that virtually all of the present government and the ruling party, as well as some voices in the establishment media, took it as established fact that Chonminnyon was merely a disguised political party and wanted to trap us as a player in the conservative-reformist confrontation."

Cochairman Yi Pu-yong says: "We believe that workers and peasants must comprise Chonminnyon's heart. Those who have suffered most in our society are the democratic and progressive intellectuals and students.

But our duty is to contribute to the healthy and organized growth of the workers and peasants who are the actual nucleus of the reform movement." Yi explained that the reason Chonminnyon emphasizes the lower-class masses is "because establishing the masses' right to a livelihood is the basic precondition for a national independence movement and for the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland."

In a recent interview, Chonminnyon Secretary General Chang Ki-pyo discussed the concept of "masses": "The masses are composed largely of workers, peasants, and the common people in the cities. And the masses also includes those whose interests are one with the masses, for example intellectuals of conscience are numbered among the masses. The only people who can't be included are the ruling privileged class. I think that overall about 70 percent of the people are included in the masses."

Speaking about the so-called masses' line, Chang said: "These are the organized masses who establish struggle tasks for the masses and who are the major players who execute those tasks. Their method is the awakened struggle of the masses."

What was the reaction of the government, the ruling party, and the three opposition parties to Chonminnyon's establishment?

Although the DJP did not issue a formal statement about Chonminnyon's creation, sources say that in its heart of hearts the DJP does not completely dislike Chonminnyon. DJP Chairman Pak Chun-kyu observed: "The organization of the dissident activist camp is a natural social trend....And although we don't warmly welcome the creation of Chonminnyon, we do consider it a desirable phenomenon." Emphasizing that he was expressing a private opinion, party Spokesman Pak Hui-tae said, "A political power which disregards elections is in danger of being seen to regard the people's support as inconsequential." After commenting on Chonminnyon's future possible scope of activities, Pak is reported to have added that, "All political powers must participate on the up-and-up in the system and compete there with good intentions."

Political sources say a mixture of "hope and concern" lies behind these DJP reactions. One hope is the hidden DJP intention to take the lead in politics with Chonminnyon as antagonist in a conservative-reformist confrontational structure, assuming Chonminnyon eventually joins the established political scene as a bona fide political party. One concern that can't be overestimated, of course, is that the dissident activist camp which split in the wake of 1987's "June struggle" has now reunited and emerged speaking with a single voice.

Although the opposition Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] and the Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] both outwardly "welcomed" Chonminnyon's creation, the PPD believes that it represents the interests of those masses at the lower end of the social scale and

embraces liberal intellectuals as well. Thus, the PPD perceives the establishment of Chonminnyon as a clear challenge. Moreover, the PPD is very concerned that to the delight of the ruling camp, this new group may take a big bite out of the PPD's support base, reducing the PPD's scope of movement.

A PPD source noted, "We warrant that the devotion of Chonminnyon's leadership and the quality of its members are superior to what one might expect in a mass political party. We believe Chonminnyon must maintain balance in its reasoning and prudence in its political judgment in respect to the activities it undertakes."

In the so-called "dispute over ideological hues," the RPD has adopted a less serious position than the PPD. The RPD defines Chonminnyon as "a liberal group of conscience which does not disavow parliamentary democracy." Chonminnyon probably estimates that establishing relations with the RDP without rejecting the legislature will do no great harm to its position.

The New Democratic Republic Party [NDRP] reacted with silence to Chonminnyon's creation. The NDRP judged from the outset that the nature of the NDRP and Chonminnyon were diametrically opposed, and that the two organizations had virtually nothing in common from their foundations up. So the NDRP adopted and maintained a very tough attitude toward Chonminnyon. President Kim Chong-pil's reply to a reporter's question about Chonminnyon on 21 January 1989 probably accurately reflected the NDRP's appraisal of the Chonminnyon, "Right now I really can't find anything much to say about those folks."

Skepticism About the Legislature

What does the public at large think about Chonminnyon? Public interest centers on three broad concerns: Will Chonminnyon respect the National Assembly and confine itself to legal struggle? Will Chonminnyon emerge as a political party? What relationship will Chonminnyon forge with the existing opposition parties? We will consider Chonminnyon's position on each of these questions.

A good deal of skepticism exists within Chonminnyon on the issue of whether the group will accept the National Assembly.

Chonminnyon Cochairman Yi Pu-yong noted: "So long as military dictatorship continues in power, basically we can't accept what they claim to be parliamentary democracy." Yi means that the government can destroy the existing parliamentary democracy at any moment. Yi also stressed that, "they camouflage themselves as conservatives and scream for firm solidarity among the conservative parties, but we don't impute any significance to the existence of these kind of conservatives. Thus, we regard it as a pressing, time-sensitive task to get on with implanting a firm democratic system based on the people's will for democracy."

The director of Chonminnyon's Office of Policy, Kim Kun-tae, stressed that: "The present representative system saddles us with an inadequate legislature.... Obliging us to recognize the authority of this disfigured Assembly amounts to a form of compulsion or coercion." These statements stop short of an outright repudiation of the Korean legislature, but Chonminnyon leaders say the inadequacies of the present legislative system were blatantly exposed by the limitations that surfaced during hearings conducted by special committees of a National Assembly dominated after all not by the government but by the opposition. Kim Kun-tae says the present Assembly, "plays a positive if limited role in restraining fascism, but on the other hand the clear inadequacies of the Assembly serve to attenuate and burden the process of the people's political awakening."

Chonminnyon's Secretary General Chang Ki-pyo goes a step further in rejecting the role of the National Assembly. Chang believes, simply put, that the 13th National Assembly has accomplished exactly nothing. Chang refuses to credit actions taken by the National Assembly for the release of prisoners of conscience or for the apology and internal exile of Mr Chon Tu-hwan. Chang says, "The struggles of the awakened masses gained these things for us." Chang adds that the shortcomings of the hearings have one meaning and one meaning only: that the opposition parties and the National Assembly itself are essentially flawed.

Not a Political Party but a Political Force

Cochairman Yi Pu-yong spoke on the issue of Chonminnyon becoming a political party: "To confuse a political force with a political party is to reveal an extremely limited understanding." It is a natural phenomenon for the masses to gain political power, and Chonminnyon is an organization dedicated to bringing that about in a concrete way. However, Chonminnyon sources say that what they mean by the masses "gaining political power" is the masses obtaining the right to a livelihood and the right to politically express their wishes, including their ardent wishes for independent reunification.

Policy Office Director Kim Kun-tae defines Chonminnyon's nature in the phrase, "a noninstitutional political power." Secretary General Chang Ki-pyo was clearer: "We must form a political party if we are to successfully prosecute a mass movement, but making Chonminnyon over into a political party is not an urgent task just now because we judge that we can effectively promote democratization and remain a social movement."

Article 29 of Chonminnyon's by-laws (Seceding) says: "Member groups and officers must secede from this federation 5 months before election day in the event they desire to participate in or run for election at any level of assembly or administrative elections in disregard of the stated will of this alliance." The following elements combine to explain why Chonminnyon expresses a strong intention not to become a political party.

The first point is simply that there is no agreement within Chonminnyon on the issue. Although some Chonminnyon members wanted the group to become a political party, more than 70 percent of the membership wanted Chonminnyon to preserve a purely activist orientation. In the end the majority view prevailed, and a conscious decision was taken not to create Chonminnyon as a political party. However, Cochairman Yi Pu-yong declined to rule out the possibility that Chonminnyon might become a political party at some point in the future. Yi said, "What it amounts to is that we have not decided to become a party. The prospect is that a proposal to do so will just naturally be put forth at some future date."

A second point is that if Chonminnyon were to press to become a political party, the group would be in real danger of damaging its own position by bringing about precisely the kind of conservative-reformist confrontation that the government already posits. A third point is something the 26 April Assembly election results revealed: As a practical matter, there is no direct correlation between the people's recognition of their need for a reformist political party and the way they cast their ballots.

Whatever the reasons, seen from the vantage point of the present it appears almost certain that Chonminnyon will remain a pure social-activist organization over the next year or 2. In view of Chonminnyon's relative strong political clout, especially on key political issues like the interim assessment and local autonomy, I will say, however, that the public will be intensely interested in Chonminnyon's position on key issues as well as on the nature of the relationship Chonminnyon forges with the opposition parties. Chonminnyon has not yet clarified its position on the interim assessment or on implementing local autonomy. Chonminnyon does believe that if the interim assessment is conducted in the form of a confidence vote in President No, the opposition camp will fissure, making it difficult to mount a substantial counterattack. At this moment, when Chonminnyon has yet to extend itself to establish relations with the opposition parties, the plain fact is that Chonminnyon has not yet reached the stage where it is possible for them to establish official positions on the issues. The timing and details of the implementation of local autonomy remain unclear, so Chonminnyon is not yet to the point where it can enunciate a clear policy on that issue either.

Chonminnyon has made it clear that if an opposition party were to espouse the principles of the people's democratic movement, Chonminnyon would not refuse to cooperate with or forge links to that party.

However, at present Chonminnyon harbors basic suspicions and misgivings about the "institutional political parties." These are closely linked with Chonminnyon's perception of the flawed nature of the National Assembly and also stem from the past experiences of the activist camp. One Chonminnyon source confided the following on the issue of linking up with the opposition parties: "The

painful wounds visited on the activist camp during the 1987 election campaign at the hands of the opposition parties have caused us to remain suspicious about the opposition. It is not that we would hesitate to agree on principles or to work together with them if that is what is expected, yet ultimately when it came to taking their hands it is difficult to see that we could completely rid ourselves of a certain reluctance or hesitation."

A different Chonminnyon source spoke to the issue of distrust of the opposition parties. Basically, "today's opposition political parties are in fact merely regional parties.... In the present political situation Chonminnyon will continue to raise the point that they are regional factions." This source believes the present opposition political parties are so entangled in regionalism that it is difficult to expect them to play a role in national-level people's democracy. The source added that, "Chonminnyon is not courted by any single region of the country, so the prospect is that the national democratic movement of Chonminnyon will be able to conquer regionalism."

Internal Tasks of Chonminnyon

"In the process of creating Chonminnyon, we deliberately refrained from passing judgment on the political tactics we encountered during the 1987 presidential election campaign. But at some point we plan to draw a few lessons for the movement from a thorough and scientific review of those tactics."

Chonminnyon's Policy Office Director Kim Kun-tae notes that, although the present philosophical differences within Chonminnyon have not yet been eradicated, at least they are not a serious obstacle. In the future, he says, "I am optimistic that we can narrow and overcome these differences in the course of a process of practical and dynamic activism."

In addition to the problem of internal philosophical differences, Chonminnyon faces a set of diverging interests among its members. These competing interests stem from the divergent social classes, varied regional alliances, and varied occupations of its membership. Still another problem derives from the other two, impaired internal cohesiveness. Another problem demanding an urgent solution is Chonminnyon's need to broaden its appeal so as to attract membership from the middle class while at the same time bolstering the real influence of its constituent groups which represent occupations and social disciplines rather than specific regions of the country.

Chonminnyon has clearly stated that "at this stage, we acknowledge that our activities do not significantly exceed those which are characteristic of a consultative body. But our selection of the term 'alliance' in our name expresses our intent to strengthen our activities to the point where they justify that term." Thus they believe that the problem of low internal cohesion that goes along with being a consultative body can be solved without too

much trouble as part of the process of maturing into an "alliance." Chonminnyon Cochairman Yi Pu-yong noted: "Our level of consensus is low, so it will take us a little time, but we should encounter no real difficulties in achieving agreement on goals for joint activism."

A high wall of distrust and hostility divides the establishment world of pragmatic politics from the "people's democratic movement." Chonminnyon leaders warn that the government's intent is to seize control of Korea's political situation by stressing the ideology of stability and then openly oppressing Chonminnyon. Only in a climate in which this kind of doubt can be assuaged can a conservative-progressive structure in the true sense develop. I believe this is the point on which the Korean people need to pay close heed to the merits and shortcomings of Chonminnyon and to the response of the government and ruling party to this dissident organization.

Sochongnyon's 1989 Struggle Goals

On the morning of 2 February 1989 an extraordinary plenary representatives session was held at Yonsei University's Centennial Commemorative Hall to inaugurate Sochongnyon's second term. Student body presidents, vice presidents, and other student representatives from the 38 colleges and universities in the Seoul area attended the session. This meeting deserves our attention because Sochongnyon is subordinate to Chondaeh-yop, which boasts daunting mobilization power and serves as the leader of Korea's student movement today. The purpose of this February representatives' convocation was to put forth and approve struggle themes and targets for the student movement in 1989.

At the 2 February Sochongnyon convention student leaders decided that the struggle targets for the masses' movement and the student movement during the 1st half of 1989 should be: "To prevent the U.S.-No government from stabilizing military dictatorship and to oppose machinations to perpetuate two Koreas, machinations like the specious northern policy and the policy of mutual recognition."

Sochongnyon perceives the current domestic political situation to be one in which the government "fakes reform as it speeds up oppression.... The government is preparing to use the interim assessment for an all-out, frontal breakthrough. To prepare for this, they pretend to respond to the people's demands to extirpate Fifth Republic scandals by arresting and prosecuting a few Fifth Republic figures, seeking indirect National Assembly testimony from Chon Tu-hwan and Choe Kyu-ha, and actively pursuing a reunification policy of northern diplomacy to which patriotic, democratic forces are unable to clearly react. Their purpose in all these moves is to remove the issues of Kwangju and the Fifth Republic as targets for struggle." To block this plan, "We must redouble the struggle to determine the truth about and punish the perpetrators of both the Kwangju massacre and Fifth Republic corruption. We must also respond to

the No Tae-u military dictatorship's oppression of the masses' movement and the labor movement, and we must also struggle against No Tae-u by actively attacking the interim assessment issue."

Sochongnyon described the student movement in the last half of 1988 in these terms: "Our struggle to reveal the truth about the Kwangju massacre and sweep away Fifth Republic scandals...was limited to only a few individual issues. We failed to energize the people during the Assembly hearings, and we were unable to successfully broaden our struggles to abolish the despotic laws or to dismantle evil organizations. Moreover, we were unable to unite with others who struggle for democracy and human rights." The goals Sochongnyon set for 1989 are listed below:

1. The antifascist democratization struggle. In the event that the "truth about the Kwangju massacre is not made known and Fifth Republic scandals are not rooted out," seize the opportunity of the first anniversary of the Sixth Republic on 25 February 1989 to mount scattered demonstrations simultaneously all over the country and work with Chonminnyon to stage large-scale rallies on the interim assessment issue, stealing a march on the government.

2. The anti-American democratization struggle. In 1988 the anti-American movement focused on a campaign to expose the United States as the "behind-the-scenes power of the Kwangju massacre," but this year it will be more detailed, encompassing opposition to "Team Spirit" and to the installation of Gregg as the new U.S. ambassador to Korea.

3. The fatherland reunification acceleration struggle. Mount a struggle aimed at allowing South Korean students to attend the 13th World Festival of Youths and Students in Pyongyang in July 1989. Improve the public relations effort by forming an advisory board of prominent older citizens representing every strata of society and by sponsoring a marathon. Use the process of preparing to attend the Pyongyang festival as a means to pursue the reunification issue from every possible angle, to expose the spurious nature of the northern policy—the Sixth Republic's favorite policy—to "crush the government's program of stabilization," and to bring home to the people the antireunification nature of both the United States and the No government.

4. Support the struggle to guarantee the masses' right to a livelihood. Work in concert with other groups to provide massive support to the period of salary struggle beginning in March.

5. The campus democratization struggle. Expand 1988's struggle to freeze tuition to demands for student participation in the selection of university presidents, in budgeting, and in accounting, until students are included in all facets of university operation. Grab the attention

of the broad mass of university students by demands for the creation of "university self-governing councils" and "student and professor councils."

A Question and Answer Session with Chondaehyop's Acting Chairman

A consultative body composed of student representatives from all over the nation, Chondaehyop was formed in August 1987, immediately after the "June struggle." Sochongnyon was not created until 9 months later, in May 1988. Thus the first term of Sochongnyon corresponds roughly to the second term of Chondaehyop. Chondaehyop has planned its 1989 annual convention for the end of March or early April, and Sochongnyon plans to inaugurate its second term in early April as well. Until these conferences meet and choose new slates of officers, the present leadership of the student movement can be characterized as transitional.

Chondaehyop has been reluctant to join Chonminnyon. Part of the reason for this is that the annual administrative cycles of the two organizations do not coincide, so the transitional leadership of Chondaehyop is reluctant to make decisions that may commit permanent officers who are not yet elected. Below is a record of a question and answer session held with Im Chong-chol, 22, student body president of Hanyang University, who was elected temporary chairman of Chondaehyop's third term at a meeting of Chondaehyop regional representatives on 30 January 1989.

Chon: What relationship will emerge between Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop?

Im: "I think Chondaehyop deserves some criticism for not independently joining Chonminnyon at an early date. Even so, Chondaehyop's failure to officially join Chonminnyon is strictly a formality. The two organizations agree on substantive issues and will work together."

Chon: What is the reason Chondaehyop did not join Chonminnyon?

Im: "We were so busy in the 1st half of 1988 with the struggle to rejuvenate fatherland reunification, and in the 2d half of the year we were occupied with the struggle against dictatorship and for democratization, as well as with the struggle for campus democratization. We simply didn't have the time to work on narrowing differences of opinion among our student comrades on the issue of joining Chonminnyon. Our plan now is to converge the views of Chondaehyop and Sochongnyon and decide whether to join Chonminnyon, even though joining will be only a formality at that point."

Chon: Chondaehyop has been invited to attend the 13th World Festival of Youths and Students in Pyongyang in July. How are you going to pull this off?

Im: We formed a preparatory committee in February, and we'll make all the details of our preparation to attend the festival public beforehand so that the people can share in the process. We'll use a number of public relations approaches in a bid to gain the people's confidence."

Chon: When you say you will share details of your preparation with the people, was the decision to do that based on an analysis that you failed to gain the people's support in promoting 1988's "10 June North-South student meeting" and the "15 August grand march from one end of the nation to the other"?

Im: That was an element all right. But I think our promotion of 1988's student exchanges with the North contributed greatly to opening independent relations between the North and South and to opening a new era in fatherland reunification, even though we failed to earn the sympathy of every last one of the Korean people. This time we will try to use the process of participating in the festival to cause the people to boost their hopes for reunification by not repeating last year's error of focussing strictly on the benefits of the talks or the contacts themselves."

Chon: How will the government react to this?

Im: We can't be swayed by how they might react. We might be willing to accept government cooperation in our preparations, at least at the administrative level. As the invitee, however, Chondaehyop itself must play the main role."

Chon: Many people are concerned about hurtling fire-bombs and flying rocks, about the increased violence of demonstrations. What do you think about the violence issue?

Im: We feel genuinely sorry for those urban citizens who incur damage during demonstrations. But it is unacceptable to denounce as violence the violence used to respond to government violence. Doesn't the Constitution itself guarantee the right to peacefully demonstrate?"

Chon: What do you think about the position that problems should be worked out in the National Assembly?

Im: "I think that both the opposition and the government parties must deeply reflect on the fact that although Korea has parliamentary politics that contending views are gushing explosively from every recess of society. As far as Chondaehyop is concerned, we would especially like to press the opposition parties to open their eyes on this matter."

Struggle for Campus Democratization Evokes Public Criticism

In 1988 the student movement espoused the following general themes: the struggle to reinvigorate fatherland reunification, centered on the 10 June and 15 August struggles for talks between students from the North and

South and on the struggle to hold a joint North-South Olympics; the struggle against dictatorship and for democratization, centering on the demand for the arrest of Chon and Yi; and the struggle to reveal the truth and punish those responsible for corruption and irregularities in the Fifth Republic and for the Kwangju massacre. Especially noteworthy is that although the student movement had generally found its main expression in political struggles, in the last half of 1988 it changed orientation to focus on the so-called "struggle for campus autonomy and campus democratization." More recently, the students' "struggle to freeze tuition" and their demands for student participation in the process of selecting university presidents and even in the process of university administration has evoked a wave of public criticism. Emerging only in the last few months, these issues are typical examples of the "struggle for campus democratization."

This year, Chondaehyop will probably meld the significant impetus of the "campus democratization struggle" with the growing impetus of the issue of attending the "Pyongyang festival" and then turn toward the interim assessment with a full head of steam already built up. In the 1st weeks of the new school year the "campus democratization struggle" will remain at center stage, if only because a recent convocation of Sochongnyon's Interim Representatives' Council voted to pursue the "struggle to freeze tuition" and because the student body governments of 35 national and public universities met on 9 February 1989 and approved a measure calling for solidarity in the struggle to freeze tuition.

The "freeze tuition struggle" has degenerated to the point that students are paying their tuition to student body governments rather than to the universities. The schools complain that this amounts to a form of financial blackmail, and public concern appears to be intense: such actions amount to a "deviation from the role of the student." The students, however, claim that they cannot connive at the universities' unilateral boosts in tuition, something the students label as an "educational policy that is antidemocratic and antimasses."

The student activist camp, of course, also regards the "freeze tuition struggle" as a tool that strikes to the very heart of the issue of campus autonomy, that the tuition issue can be used as a foundation on which to consolidate student support, and that this solidified support can be used as a springboard from which to launch a new, expanded, national confederation of student organizations. Since the tuition freeze demand is a real, concrete issue touching every student, it is an ideal foundation from which to boost the influence of the student masses and from which to launch a total organization of all college and university students.

Chondaehyop's basic strategy on the issue of attending Pyongyang's World Festival of Youth and Students is: "The process of preparing to attend the festival will itself provide significant opportunities to raise the consciousness of the masses and organize them, and this with very

little regard to whether or not we actually succeed at attending the festival." Chondaehyop believes that the Pyongyang festival must not become the student movement's central struggle issue in the 1st half of the year. And even in the latter half of 1989, Chondaehyop's position is that: "We do not want to narrow the struggle to the issue of whether or not we will attend the festival. We want to use the festival issue as an means to force open the flood gates on the larger issue of reunification itself." This philosophy underlies Chondaehyop's conviction that preparation to attend the festival must proceed on the basis of the "maximum possible mobilization of the masses' power and wisdom."

Even so, since the Pyongyang festival serves to focus the resolve of Korean youths and students in both North and South to advance the time when peace and reunification may come to the Korean peninsula, Chondaehyop will not accept any recommendation or suggestion from the government which the students view as contrary to the "firm principle of rejecting any method for settling the issue that leaves two distinct Koreas intact." Chondaehyop set aside the period from March to June as the time to prepare to attend the Pyongyang festival, organized a Festival Preparation Committee, formed a team of representatives drawn from the group's regional representatives, and established sections to supervise public relations and propaganda, policies and plans, and preparations for academic discussion meeting.

Their Position on the Pyongyang Festival

The Pyongyang festival became an issue after Chondaehyop received a letter on 26 December 1988 from the Korean Student Committee in North Korea. The letter said in part that: "In early July 1988 the 13th World Festival of Youths and Students will be held in Pyongyang. This organization respectfully informs your organization that the South's patriotic youth and students are invited to this festival." This letter guaranteed that attendance at the festival would become a key issue in the student activist camp in the 1st half of 1989. The following is an abbreviated version of significant events in this process.

26 December 1988. Letter of invitation from North Korea's Korean Student Committee sent to Chondaehyop.

12 January 1989. Minister of Education Chong Won-sik announces a plan to form a "North-South students exchange promotion council." Chondaehyop rejects the government's suggestion that it join the council.

20 January 1989. Chondaehyop delivers its written response to the invitation to attend the Pyongyang Festival to the Korean National Red Cross and requests that it be delivered to North Korea.

31 January 1989. The North-South student exchange promotion council holds its first meeting. The council chairman is Tanguk University professor, Chong Yong-sok. Chondaehyop does not attend, and announces its

intention to decide on its own whether to attend the Pyongyang festival and via what procedures. North Korea's Student Committee urges Chondaehyop to reply.

1 February 1989. Chondaehyop decides not to join the North-South Student Exchange Promotion Council. It proposes formation of an "advisory body to Chondaehyop's preparation committee to attend the World Festival of Youths and Students."

11 February 1989. The North-South Student Exchange Promotion Council agrees to send a delegation centered around Chondaehyop representatives to the Pyongyang festival. It also decides to deliver Chondaehyop's reply to the North Korean side.

An analysis of the above process reveals that the government's policy from the outset was to move from a position of disallowing Chondaehyop to attend the Pyongyang festival to a position of allowing Chondaehyop to attend, albeit under government guidance. The government's switch toward approval was probably based on its appraisal that if the government prevented Chondaehyop from attending, the result would be a reversal of the recent mood of North-South exchange and to provide Chondaehyop with an issue which obligated them to respond with vehement demonstrations.

In any event, Chondaehyop's response to the government's 11 February proposal was positive enough: "We expect to closely cooperate and conduct discussions with the North-South student exchange promotion council on the issue of attending the Pyongyang festival. However, our consultations will be limited to practical matters such as transportation and exchanging letters. We will decide on our own such matters as the details and directions related to the festival." General observers must be content to wait and see how this process unfolds.

On the issue of the details and directions related to the festival, the basic Chondaehyop position is that it must propose to the North a "grand discussion by the Korean people to develop strategies for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula" and a "grand discussion by youth and students of the world to develop strategies for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula." Chondaehyop will decide whether discussion meetings or a mass rally would be the most appropriate forum for formal contacts with North Korean students during the festival, and this decision will be determined by the amount of preparation required, intended purposes, and the agenda. However, Chondaehyop proposes that the contact with Northern counterparts will result in the announcement of a "Korean people's youth and students' statement for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula" and of a "world youths and students statement for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula."

Should Chondaehyop's proposal to issue these statements be accepted, the organization will first publicly announce their contents in a move to determine public

reaction before going ahead with their formal announcement. Chondaehyop is also working under the principle that it will seek agreement on the question of what to include on the agenda to discuss with North Korean students by conducting discussions at each university in the South prior to attending the festival.

As I said above, however, Chondaehyop has not designated attending the Pyongyang festival as a 1989 struggle goal.

Chondaehyop is clearly tackling the Pyongyang festival issue, but just as clearly the organization has its priorities: "In the event that we judge that the interim assessment issues comes to a decisive point, then we can elect to give up attending the festival."

Outlook for Chondaehyop as an Alliance

After the mid-eighties the center of Korean student activism was the General Federation of Korean Students [Chonguk Haksaeng Chongyonhap—Chonhangnyon] and the Struggle Committee for Reunifying the Nation, Achieving Democracy, and Liberating the Masses [Minjok Tongil Minju Chaengchui Minjung Haebang Tujaeng Uiwonhoe—Sammintu] organized in April 1985, which in March and April 1986 evolved into the the Struggle Committee for Anti-American Independence and Anti-fascist Democratization [Chamintu] and the Peoples Democratic Struggle Committee Against Imperialism and Fascism [Minmintu], which in May 1987 evolved into the Seoul Area Council of University Student Representatives [Sodaehyop], which evolved into the Chondaehyop in August 1987.

These groups were at the center of the Korean student movement, which stood at the vanguard of Korea's movement for social reform. These groups also trod a path leading through a series of theoretic struggles. The so-called CNP [Citizens, National, Peoples; preceding initials in Roman letters] dispute led some of them from the CDR, or the Citizens Democratic Revolutionary theory, to the NDR, or National Democratic Revolution theory, and from there some continued to the PDR, or Peoples Democratic Revolution theory, and on to the NLPDR, or National Liberation Peoples Democratic Revolution theory, and finally to the CA, or Constitutional Assembly theory.

As of the end of January 1989, groups subordinate to the Chondaehyop included Sochongnyon, the South Cholla District Council of University Student Representatives [Namdaehyop (Chonnam Chiyok Taehaksaeng Taepyoja Hyobuihoe—Namdaehyop)], the Pusan District General Council of Student Representatives [Pusan Chiyok Chonghaksaeng Hyobuihoe—Puchonghyop], and the Taegu District Council of University Student Representatives [Taegu Chiyok Taehaksaeng Taepyoja Hyobuihoe—Taedaehyop]. Chondaehyop represents 140 universities in 19 branches and six districts throughout the nation. Although Chondaehyop now amounts to only

a consultative body, one Chondaehyop source said that "the outlook is that in name and in fact we will succeed within 1989 in representing the 1,000,000 Korean students via creation of the National League of University Student Councils [Chonguk Chonghaksaenghoe Yonhap—Chonchongnyon]."

It is clear that two main activist groups—the dissident activists and the student activists—have spearheaded democratization and social reform movements in this country for some time. A changed society, however, demands change. The future roles of Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop will be determined by how well these two groups adjust to history and the changing times, and by how well they adjust to practical demands of the day.

Role of 'Outsiders' in Hyundai Strike Alleged

SK0704010489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Ulsan, Kyongsangnam-to—Police will intervene to block people from assembling for protest rallies as part of last-ditch efforts to deter the prolonged labor violence from disrupting law and order in this strike-torn industrial city and paralyzing its economy.

Repeated clashes between police and the militant workers in street violence rocked the city to its bottom, the violence's intensity showing no signs of alleviation.

The labor violence, aftermath of the disputed police intervention in the shipyard walkout, continues to escalate largely because "people from outside"—radical students, outspoken dissidents and hardcore labor activists—are stealing into the city in an apparent bid to join the protesting workers and to instigate them to mount the street demonstrations.

Trade union leaders of eight subsidiaries of the Hyundai Group slipped into the city to back up their colleagues.

Laborers sustained injuries in clashes as the radical workers fought to stop non-striking workers from entering the huge shipyard for work.

Hyundai Heavy Industries, which controls the shipyard, said that those who returned to the workplace reached 61.8 percent of the total work-force yesterday, up about 5 percent from the figure of Tuesday.

However, work reports of the blue collar laborers hovered at no more than 50 percent of the shipyard's aggregate payrolls.

The company virtually closed down the eight apartment units at the Ojwabal residential complex near the shipyard, the stronghold of diehard striking workers, completely cutting off all utility lines such as piped water and electricity.

The management explained that it could not help taking such drastic measures because the apartment houses are the very "epicenter" of the continued labor violence.

But, the management said that it will pay the non-striking workers who reside in the apartment units 7,000 won each daily in lodging expenses.

Yi Kyu-kong, acting chairman of the Hyundai Heavy Industries' trade union, said in an announcement yesterday morning that the shipyard union members would hold a general meeting on Monday to select new representatives.

Those new union leaders, he announced, will be empowered to have negotiations with the management to settle the dispute.

Police arrested Yi Tong-kon, 30, chief of the union organization at the Hyundai shipyard, at his house at Pango-tong, Ulsan early yesterday morning for his involvement in the labor violence.

In related developments, 200 crack detectives, picked from police stations throughout the country, were ordered to apprehend about 70 strike leaders as early as possible.

The law-enforcement authorities believe that they stand behind the continued labor violence in the city.

Police blocked 21 members of the Professors Consultation Council for Democratic Reforms from going to a rally site Wednesday afternoon.

Militant Students Firebomb Hyundai Offices
SK0704011089 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Groups of militant students, dissidents and workers joined to attack subsidiaries of the Hyundai conglomerate with petrol bombs and rocks in protest against the police crackdown on the striking workers at the shipyard in major cities yesterday.

Police made no reports of injuries and arrests in the assaults.

About 40 students firebombed and stoned the modern main office building of the Hyundai Group in Kyedong, Chongro-ku, Seoul about 11:35 p.m. Wednesday, shouting the slogan "Down with President No Tae-u's government and the Hyundai Group."

The attackers fled back to the alleys in groups after smashing 10 windowpanes.

Roughly 30 students attacked the outlet of the Hyundai Motor Co. in Songnam south of Seoul at around 5:45 a.m. yesterday.

An eyewitness said that they hurled about 20 firebombs in the sales office of the car-maker, yelling, "We denounce the business monopoly by the Hyundai tycoon."

Eight windows were shattered in the surprise attack.

About 500 workers and students also raided two outlets of Hyundai Motors and one police substation in Pusan Wednesday afternoon.

RDP Deplores Firebomb Attack on Judge's Home
SK0704005089 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] The opposition Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] yesterday deplored the firebombing attack by unidentified men on Tuesday at the house of a senior judge who last month ruled against the expulsion of two Seoul University activists by school authorities.

"The terrorist attack against judge Kim Yong-chin, who has ruled against the university action, challenges the independence of the judiciary branch," party spokesman Yi In-che said in a statement.

Yi urged the government to search for the "terrorism sponsors" and take measures to head off such attacks.

Unidentified men, apparently disgruntled with judge Kim's ruling, hurled firebombs and feces-containing bottles into his house on Tuesday, breaking some windows. Kim is also said to have been threatened with harassing calls at home.

RDP Criticizes 'Illegal Campaigning' in Tonghae
SK0704012689 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
7 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] The reunification Democratic Party [RDP] yesterday issued a statement denouncing the government and the ruling party for their illegal campaigning activities in Tonghae, Kangwon-to where a by-election is scheduled for April 14.

Rep. Yi In-che, party spokesman, said that the government and the ruling party are mobilizing the state administrative machinery and funds of questionable nature to help support the ruling party's candidate.

"Presidents and executives of state-run corporations, not to mention high-ranking central government officials, have been engaging in illegal election campaigning in Tonghae to rig the by-election," Yi argued.

Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore

Malaysia

Foreign Minister on SRV Pullout From Cambodia
BK0704063289 Kuala Lumpur International Service
in English 0600 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Foreign Minister Datuk Abu Hassan Omar said any solution to the Kampuchean problem must be well within the Jakarta informal meeting [JIM] process initiated by ASEAN. He also said the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, as announced on Wednesday [5 April], must be in the context of the overall solution to the decade-old conflict.

Datuk Abu Hassan was speaking to reporters after Pakistani special envoy Iqbal Akhund called on him at his office in Kuala Lumpur today. He said the internal settlement must involve discussions among the four warring Kampuchean factions to find a practical formula. The minister said Malaysia will be consulting its ASEAN partners on the latest development.

On his discussions with Mr Iqbal, he said Pakistan had expressed its intention to rejoin the Commonwealth. The Pakistani special envoy arrived in Malaysia yesterday for a 3-day visit.

Singapore

Police Contingent To Be Sent To Namibia
BK0604114489 Hong Kong AFP in English
1114 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] Singapore, April 6 (AFP)—Singapore is sending a 21-man police contingent to join the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, a government statement announced Thursday.

It is the first time Singapore has taken part in a U.N. peacekeeping mission, the joint statement from the Ministries of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs said.

Singapore would also contribute 89,457 U.S. dollars to UNTAG's operating costs, it added.

The Singapore policemen are expected to arrive in Namibia on April 29 for a one-year tour of duty aboard a U.N.-chartered aircraft with contingents from New Zealand, Fiji and Bangladesh.

They will join policemen from 11 other nations—Austria, Barbados, Egypt, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden and Tunisia—who are also due to arrive before the end of the month.

UNTAG comprises 4,650 troops, 500 policemen and 2,000 civilian officials from 24 countries.

Jeyaretnam Files Petition for President's Pardon
BK0504121189 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES
in English 5 Apr 89 p 32

[Text] Singapore, April 5—Lawyer J.B. Jeyaretnam has formally petitioned the President for a pardon on his conviction for four criminal offences, thus reversing his previous position that the government should seek one for him without his "having to beg for it".

The Workers' Party leader said yesterday in a statement issued only to the foreign press that he submitted his petition to President Wee Kim Wee on Monday [3 April].

However, an aide to President Wee said yesterday afternoon that his office had not received it.

Mr Jeyaretnam refused to speak to THE STRAITS TIMES but told REUTER that his lawyers had advised him to file the petition before challenging in court the government's decision not to seek a pardon on his behalf.

"We've decided that we should go through this as a formal thing. There's no question of my going on bended knee," REUTER quoted him as saying.

First elected to Parliament in 1981, Mr Jeyaretnam lost his seat in December 1986 after he was convicted on four charges—three of fraudulently transferring cheques out of his party's account and one of making a false declaration about the accounts.

He was subsequently disbarred from practising as a lawyer because of the convictions.

Mr Jeyaretnam's application to the Privy Council in London to appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed. But he was successful in his appeal against his disbarment.

In its written judgement restoring Mr Jeyaretnam to the roll of lawyers, the Council went behind his convictions, saying he was not guilty of the offences.

In a press conference afterwards, Mr Jeyaretnam said he expected the government to take the initiative to seek a pardon on his behalf "without having to beg for it".

The government's position, first stated in early December, is that the Privy Council's comments did not invalidate Mr Jeyaretnam's convictions because its ruling against disbarment was binding only on him and not the Law Society here, the other party involved in the appeal.

"The question of a pardon does not arise as Mr Jeyaretnam has not asked for one. If he does so, the government will consider its merits," it said then in a statement.

Cambodia

Pullout, Control Commission 'Final Concessions'

*BK0604150789 Hong Kong AFP in English 1346 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[By Jean-Claude Chapon]

[Text] Phnom Penh, April 6 (AFP)—Vietnam's decision to unilaterally withdraw its troops from Cambodia and permit international supervision of the pullout are the final concessions to the resistance coalition Hanoi and its allies are prepared to make, a government source said here.

Cambodian Premier Hun Sen on Wednesday announced the unilateral withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by the end of September.

Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, in a joint communique Wednesday, also proposed the reactivation of an international commission to supervise the pullout.

Until now, Hanoi and Phnom Penh had linked a September pullout with a political solution to the Cambodian situation. They had also refused international supervision of the pullout.

The tripartite Cambodian resistance alliance had made the departure of Vietnamese troops and the establishment of an international commission to supervise their leaving pre-conditions to any political solution.

But a third condition of the resistance, the dismantling of the Hanoi-installed Phnom Penh regime known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was not included.

"The dissolving of the PRK would be a condition for the return of the Pol Potists to power," Mr. Hun Sen said, referring to the former Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot whose government was held responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians before it was toppled by the Vietnamese in 1979.

According to an official source in Phnom Penh, the two proposals are the last concessions the PRK will make towards reaching a negotiated settlement.

Khieu Kanharith, the editor-in-chief of the weekly "KAMPUCHEA" and a confidante of Mr. Hun Sen, said the two proposals "were the last compromise, the ultimate concessions," that the Phnom Penh government could make.

Mr. Hun Sen, who is expected to meet resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Jakarta on May 2, has "put the ball" back into the resistance's court, observers here say.

(In Beijing, Prince Sihanouk said in a press statement that the resistance "rejected all the decisions taken in the past few days and the days and months to come" by Vietnam, Laos and the Phnom Penh government.)

Mr. Hun Sen's announcement Wednesday called for the renewal of the International Control Commission on Indochina (ICCI) set up in Geneva in 1954. The commission is made up of India, Poland, and Canada, although the latter is the only one of the three not to recognize the PRK government.

India is the only non-socialist country to recognize Mr. Hun Sen's government, while the resistance coalition holds the country's seat in the United Nations.

The coalition groups two anti-communist factions led by Prince Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son Sann as well as the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge, the strongest military faction of the three.

With the possibility of an eventual return to power of the Khmer Rouge, or at the very least a civil war in the country, Mr. Hun Sen must make conditions as favorable as possible for the prince, with whom he has had three inconclusive meetings since late 1987, observers say.

Commentaries on Troop Withdrawal Decision

Announcement Hailed

*BK0704095189 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Station commentary: "The Realistic Stand of the Three Indochinese Countries"]

[Text] Once again, honoring the agreements reached at JIM 1 and JIM 2 [first and second Jakarta informal meeting], the three Indochinese countries unilaterally announced that they would completely withdraw Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia by the end of September 1989. It is known that the presence of the Vietnamese volunteer troops in Cambodia is in response to the sacred request of the Cambodian people to liberate them from the danger of genocide of the criminal Pol Pot clique. Over the past 10 years, thanks to the effective assistance of Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and friends the world over, together with the personal efforts of the Cambodian people, the country has been reborn and developed in all fields, especially in the military and security fields. This has prompted Vietnam to annually withdraw parts of its volunteer troops since 1982, and so far three-quarters of the troops have already been withdrawn from Cambodia.

Besides, during the partial withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer troops, the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] together with Vietnam and Laos have put forward several proposals aimed at finding a genuine political solution for the Cambodia problem. However, whatever we have endeavored to do has been evaded and distorted

by a number of international reactionary forces and Cambodian opposition groups. They have blown out of proportion the presence of the Vietnamese volunteer troops in Cambodia and created endless pretexts in an attempt to obstruct a solution to the Cambodian problem. They have demanded that Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia but they continue to support the genocidal Pol Pot gang.

Public opinion has unanimously held that the two key issues of the Cambodian solution agreed upon at JIM 2 are the most important and urgent issues to advance toward a comprehensive solution to the problem. Therefore, the unilateral decision of the three Indochinese countries to pull all Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia by the end of September 1989 is the final step on that part of the road toward the Cambodian solution. Nevertheless, what must be considered at present is to join hands in seeking measures to prevent the eventual return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime, prevent a civil war, end aid to all warring Cambodian parties, and stop foreign interference in Cambodia's internal affairs. This is the major and most important question that must not be neglected.

Public opinion in general regards the five-point measures regarding the prevention of the return to power by the genocidal Pol Pot clique put forward by Comrade Chairman Hun Sen at JIM 2 are the most effective steps. Moreover, the prevention of a civil war also needs joint efforts. Therefore, all countries that made the pledge at JIM 2 and afterward must also strictly honor their commitment. The PRK has solemnly declared its clear stand that if after the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by the end of September 1989, foreign countries do not respect their commitment to completely cease military aid to all Cambodian parties, especially the Pol Pot group, and to end all interference and violations of Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in order to undermine the peaceful and happy life of the Cambodian people and peace in Southeast Asia, the PRK reserves its legitimate right as an independent and sovereign state to appeal for assistance from other countries in self-defense against the reestablishment of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in conformity with the spirit of the UN Charter and principles of the Nonaligned Movement.

In fulfillment of the agreements reached at JIM 2 on international control, we invite the International control and supervision commission for the implementation of the 1954 agreements to resume its activities with the participation of the JIM chairman and personal representative of the UN secretary general, and this international commission may increase its staff as appropriate and be allowed to carry such weapons as necessary for self-defense.

The time is ripe for a reasonable solution to the Cambodian problem. Time should not be wasted and this occasion should not be taken advantage of in order to shed the

blood of the Cambodian people. The withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia by the end of September 1989 is a realistic goodwill act of the three Indochinese countries in bringing success to the search for a solution to the Cambodian problem. It also clearly reflects the correct policy of the SRV which has given disinterested aid to Cambodia and strictly respected its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Withdrawal Statement Praised

BK0704074789 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodia 2300 GMT 6 Apr 89

[PRACHEACHON editorial: "Only the Unswerving Goodwill of the Three Countries—Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos"; date not given]

[Text] Only of a desire to achieve a quick political solution to the Cambodian problem in accordance with the aspirations and the vital interests of the Cambodian people and the genuine interests of countries in Southeast Asia, Comrade Chairman of the Council of Ministers Hun Sen solemnly announced at a news conference in Phnom Penh on 5 April the statement of the Governments of the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], the SRV, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia at the end of September 1989.

This four-point statement reflects the resolute determination of the three countries—Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—to push for the implementation of the essential agreements of JIM 1 and JIM 2, on the significance of a solution to the international aspect of the Cambodian problem: the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia, the end of foreign interference, and the end of military assistance to all opposing Cambodian parties by the end of September 1989. This most important statement once again clearly shows a position full of goodwill and the sole unswerving realistic attitude of the three countries, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, who have constantly been making efforts to create the possibility and a basis for a political solution to the Cambodian problem to end the bloody conflict, to end the Cambodian people's suffering, and to contribute to the struggle to change Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation.

The statement also reflects the development and genuine consolidation of the Cambodian revolution's own forces, particularly the development and strengthening of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Armed Forces, which have developed both qualitatively and quantitatively from day to day and have all the strength and capability to assume the task of defending the country themselves. In accordance with the development and strengthening of the Cambodian revolution, and from a spirit of lofty responsibility for the destiny of the nation, country, and people, during the past 10 years, particularly in the recent period, due to the increased advantage of the Cambodian revolution on the battlefield and in every

field, the PRK, in cooperation with the SRV and the LPDR, has put forward successive good-willed positions, coupled with many concrete deeds. These have created the possibility and a basis for finding a political solution to the Cambodian problem through peaceful negotiations. A new and unprecedented positive factor has emerged, namely the change from military confrontation to negotiations to find a political solution to the Cambodian problem and that of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The opposing Cambodian parties, the Indochinese countries, and ASEAN have met many times. Despite facing obstacles and destructive maneuvers to defeat this tendency, JIM 1 and JIM 2 reached essential agreements on the significance of a solution to the international aspect of the Cambodian problem through closely linking the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer forces with the prevention of the genocidal Pol Pot regime's reemergence, the end of foreign interference, the end of military assistance to all Cambodian parties, the setting up of an effective international control organization, and the convening of an international conference to ensure Cambodia's independence, neutrality, and nonaligned status as well as all the agreements which have been reached.

It is worth recalling that in the past the PRK and the SRV had unilaterally carried out seven partial withdrawals of Vietnamese volunteer troops. This certainly is a brilliant fact; no force can falsify the proletarian internationalist spirit of the Vietnamese party, government, Army, and people, and the correct policy of the SRV, which has strictly respected Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The statement on the Vietnamese troop pullout from Cambodia at the end of September 1989 clearly shows the goodwill and a brilliant example of the PRK and the SRV. It has opened ample possibilities for the parties concerned to successfully implement all the agreements and promises already agreed upon. However, we resolutely affirm that if other countries do not honor their promises to completely end military assistance to all Cambodian parties, particularly to the Pol Pot clique, and end interference and violation of Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—which infringe upon the peaceful lives of the Cambodian people—the PRK will use its legitimate right to appeal for assistance from other countries to defend itself against the reemergence of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter and the principles of the Nonaligned Movement.

It is not very long from now to September 1989 when all Vietnamese volunteer troops will withdraw from Cambodia. Therefore, more than ever, our people should constantly increase and heighten to the highest degree their revolutionary vigilance and the spirit of self-reliance by resolutely pledging to constantly strengthen and expand the Cambodian revolution's own forces and relying on the Cambodia-Vietnam-Laos militant solidarity, solidarity and cooperation with the Soviet Union

and other socialist countries, and with friends near and far the world over to win the decisive and final advantage for the Cambodian revolution.

Heng Samrin Greets Laos' Phoumi Vongvichit

BK0604063589 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0446 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] Phnom Penh, 6 Apr (SPK)—Heng Samrin, chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, addressed his warm congratulations to Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on his 80th birthday.

The Cambodian leader expressed his satisfaction at the happy development of the relations of friendship, special militant solidarity, and multiform cooperation between the two countries in particular, and among the three Indochinese countries in general, as an active contribution to the defense and building of socialism and to changing Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation.

KRC Receives Khmer Refugees From Thailand

BK3103121989 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1104 GMT 31 Mar 89

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK March 31—The Kampuchean Red Cross (KRC) has received three Kampuchean refugees who wished to repatriate from Thailand-based refugee camps.

The returnees include Lonh Chhoeu, 61, who left Kampuchea in May 1979; Seng Son, 36, who went to Thailand in August 1986 for medical treatment for leprosy; and Ung On, 28, who was evacuated in 1988 to Thailand for medical care after he had stepped on a landmine and had one leg amputated.

The repatriation was carried out in furtherance of a memorandum signed on January 23, 1989 in Phnom Penh by the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in which the latter would provide facilities for the repatriation of Khmer refugees from Thailand.

World Islamic Council Delegation Arrives

BK3103075589 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 31 Mar 89

[Text] A delegation of the World Islamic Council led by 'Izz-al-Din Nasir bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, member of the Executive Committee of the World Islamic Council, arrived in the People's Republic of Kampuchea on the afternoon of 30 March for a visit.

Greeting the delegation at Pochentong Airport were Comrade Min Khin, permanent member of the National Council of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense [KUFNCD], and many cadres from the office of the KUFNCD National Council.

Chea Sim Receives Delegation

BK0404023589 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] On the morning of 3 April at the Chamka Mon State Palace, Comrade Chea Sim, member of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee and chairman of both the National Assembly and the National Council of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense, held cordial talks with the delegation from the World Islamic Organization led by 'Izz-al-Din Nasir bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, member of the Executive Committee of the World Islamic Council.

Speaking on the occasion, 'Izz-al-Din Nasir pointed out that through his visit, he saw not only the Cambodian people's rebirth, but also the all-round achievements and progress of the Cambodian revolution, including in the field of religion. Izz-al-Din Nasir also talked about the thousand-year-old friendly relations between the Arab countries and Cambodia. He also affirmed that he will strive to expand and improve these relations and to support and assist the Cambodian people in the cause of quickly building a developed Cambodia.

Replying, Comrade Chea Sim warmly welcomed the visit by the delegation from the World Islamic Council and told the delegation that Cambodians have the right to believe or not believe any religion and also enjoy the right to take part in revolutionary movements to consolidate the Cambodian revolution. Comrade Chea Sim also pointed out the national reconciliation policy and the results of many meetings with the other Cambodian side aimed at solving the Cambodian problem peacefully.

On the same morning, Comrade Chairman Chea Sim also granted an interview to a Bulgarian television team on the results of the second Jakarta informal meeting and the amendment of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Third Day of Conference of Cadres Reported

BK0704055589 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] On the morning of 7 April from 0730, the second national conference of party cadres continued in an atmosphere of lofty unity and democracy.

On the morning of this third day, the meeting listened to addresses by the paper KAMPUCHEA, Phnom Penh City, Kandal and Svay Rieng Provinces, the Agriculture Ministry, and the address of Comrade Phang Saret, deputy trade minister. As in yesterday's reports, the

addresses agreed on the report on the Cambodian revolution's situation during the past 10 years and the targets for 1989-90 and for the coming years as well as the five policies. Furthermore, delegates voiced a number of views to supplement the above documents in order to improve them so that they are in keeping with the tendency of the era.

At 1100, the meeting adjourned and will resume its work this evening.

Session Resumes in Afternoon

BK0704114689 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1100 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] From 1500 in the afternoon of 7 April the second national conference of party cadres continued its work as scheduled by resuming the general debate in the conference hall.

This afternoon, all conference participants listened to the views contributed by Comrade Chheng Phon, minister of information and culture; Comrade Tang Saroem, minister of trade; Comrade Cheam Yiep, deputy cabinet minister; Comrade So Khun, deputy minister of agriculture; and Comrade Ros Chuun, secretary general of the front National Council, concerning the draft report and various documents of the conference.

The conference adjourned at 1700 and will resume its work tomorrow morning.

Bou Thang Chairs Proselytizing Committee

BK0404024989 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] On the morning of 3 April at the 26 August Hotel, the Central Proselytizing Committee held a meeting to review the results of the 1988 proselytizing work and to set targets for 1989 under the chairmanship of Comrade General Bou Thang, member of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and chairman of the Central Proselytizing Committee.

After Comrade General Bou Thang read a speech opening the meeting, Comrade Un Dara, standing vice chairman of the Central Proselytizing Committee, read a report pointing out that in 1988, 5,944 compatriots misled by enemy propaganda came out and surrendered to our revolutionary state authorities throughout the country and brought along over 4,000 assorted weapons. Among these compatriots were 3,447 Pol Pot soldiers, 1,274 Son Sann soldiers, and 1,223 Sihanouk soldiers. The returnees surrendered in 158 groups and individually, including 157 officers.

The provinces which were outstanding in this task are Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey, Kompong Thom, Banteay Meanchey, Kompong Cham, and Battambang.

Returns of 'Misled' Persons Reported

Kompong Thom Province

BK0404083789 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Text] People in Kompong Thom Province are actively taking part in the task to persuade misled persons to return to the revolution and state revolutionary authorities.

As a result, in the first quarter of 1989, Kompong Thom Province received 240 misled persons, including 159 Pol Pot soldiers, 26 Son Sann soldiers, and 55 Sihanouk soldiers, who brought along 105 assorted weapons, all types of ammunition, and a large quantity of war material. Of the seven districts and the provincial seat of Kompong Thom Province, Stoung District achieved the best results.

March Returnees in Battambang

BK0604071189 Phnom Penh SPK in English 0448 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK April 6—In March this year, 82 members of the opposition factions deserted their rank and reported themselves to the revolutionary authorities in Battambang Province (300 km northwest of Phnom Penh).

The returnees, who brought along 50 assorted guns and a quantity of war means, included 59 ex-Son Sannians, 16 ex-Pol Potists, and seven ex-Sihanoukists. The biggest number was recorded in Ek Phnum District with 34 ralliers.

All the returnees have been granted full rights of citizenship and given facilities to embark on a new life with their families.

1988 Provincial Tally of Youths Joining Army

BK0604072989 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] In 1988, over 1,700 youths in Kompong Chhnang Province volunteered to serve in the Army and thousands of others became militiamen and defense workers to defend the motherland and build defense networks along the Cambodian-Thai border.

At present, many youths in the province successively enlist in the Army, contributing to further building up and strengthening the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces with quantity and quality. This is to effectively assume the task of defending the homeland and revolutionary gains in place of the repatriated Vietnamese volunteer troops.

Sihanouk's Issues Statement on SRV Withdrawal

BK0704022689 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic
Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 6 Apr 89

["Statement specifying the position of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea"; dated 5 April—read by announcer]

[Text] The position of Cambodia's national resistance forces is as follows:

1. If the so-called withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia does take place in September 1989, this troop pullout should be supervised by the United Nations and not by countries unilaterally selected by the SRV.
2. Cambodia's national resistance forces know that China will not cut off its assistance to the three forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] until the day when the United Nations sees that all Vietnamese troops have been genuinely withdrawn from Cambodia.
3. The SRV does not have any legitimate privileges in Cambodia; only the Cambodian people do. The SRV has no rights to decide Cambodia's destiny without the consent of Cambodia's legitimate government—namely, the CGDK.

Cambodian Working Group Meeting Postponed

BK0604070489 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] The Voice of the Khmer has learned that the meeting of the working group of the four Cambodian factions scheduled to be held in Paris on 10 April has been postponed. It is not known when and where it will be held.

The postponement of this working group meeting was caused by the change of situation concerning the new attitude of Hanoi, as well as the possibility of a summit between Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Indonesia on 2 May.

According to a source, the meeting of this working group might take place following the 2 May summit and be held in Indonesia.

Hor Nam Hong of the Heng Samrin regime, who was the first to arrive in Paris for this meeting, left France for Moscow and then Hanoi before the Vietnamese announcement on 5 April that all Vietnamese troops would be pulled out of Cambodia by September.

Front 'Divided' on Delegate

BK0704124089 Hong Kong AFP in English 1203 GMT
7 Apr 89

[Excerpt] Bangkok, April 7 (AFP)—Talks that were to take place shortly in Paris between Cambodia's warring factions have been postponed indefinitely, Cambodian resistance sources said here Friday.

The talks had been planned for Monday in the French capital and were to have brought together representatives of the Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh Government and the tripartite resistance coalition.

The sources said the gathering, within the framework of a Cambodian "working group" that has assembled once in December in Paris, had been considered redundant in the light of the Jakarta meeting on May 2 between resistance Chairman Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Phnom Penh Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Another consideration for the cancellation was that one of the coalition factions, the Khmer People's Liberation National Front (KPLNF) headed by former Prime Minister Son Sann, was deeply divided as to who would have represented it at the Paris meeting, the sources said. [passage omitted]

Khieu Samphan Criticizes Withdrawal Statement
BK0704015589 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 6 Apr 89

["Statement by His Excellency Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs, exposing the maneuver of unilateral troop pullout of the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors"—read by announcer]

[Text] On 5 April, the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors carried out another deceitful propaganda on the outdated maneuver of unilateral withdrawal of Vietnamese aggressor troops from Cambodia. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, leader of Cambodia's national resistance forces and president of Democratic Kampuchea, has already denounced this maneuver. All Cambodia's national resistance forces, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK], and the entire Cambodian people absolutely cannot accept the announcement of unilateral troop pullout of the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors.

Without genuine supervision by the United Nations, there would be no genuine withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The world is well aware and clearly realizes that the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors have carried out this deceitful maneuver of unilateral withdrawal of their aggressor troops from Cambodia in order:

1. To avoid the Cambodian problem.
2. To avoid genuine UN supervision so that they can maintain their forces in Cambodia and continue their war to occupy Cambodia by attempting to dupe the world that this is a civil war.
3. To avoid dissolving the puppet regime along with the dissolution of the Democratic Kampuchea state and to oppose the establishment of a provisional four-party Cambodian Government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk.

We would like to appeal to the entire world to continue to expose and denounce this maneuver of the Hanoi Vietnamese of unilateral troop pullout, continue to firmly demand that the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors withdraw all their troops from Cambodia under genuine UN supervision, and to call for the establishment of a provisional four-party Cambodian government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. We appeal to the world to continue providing assistance and support to the five-point peace plan of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the modalities for implementing this five-point peace plan of the CGDK.

Only by solving the Cambodian problem on the basis of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point peace plan and the CGDK's modalities for implementing this five-point peace plan, dated 9 February 1989, can the issue of the Vietnamese aggressor troop pullout from Cambodia be genuinely solved and real national reconciliation of all Cambodians be achieved. Only in this way can Cambodia enjoy peace and security as an independent, neutral, and unified Cambodia with territorial integrity, and can peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region be ensured.

[Dated] Democratic Kampuchea, 6 April 1989

[Signed] Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs

SRV Pullout Under UN Supervision Urged
BK0504023289 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 4 Apr 89

["Short commentary": "The World Demands Vietnam Really Withdraw Its Troops Under a Thorough and Effective International Supervision"]

[Text] Vietnam has spread rumors that it will soon publicize an important statement announcing the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia in September 1989.

What the Cambodian people and the world community want is the total and genuine withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia under a thorough and effective international supervision. It is useless for Vietnam to make just a verbal announcement on its troop withdrawal without having a thorough and effective international supervision, because this will be similar to its previous deceitful troop withdrawal announcements.

The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has proposed the formation of a UN international supervision commission with a sufficient number of personnel and measures to observe the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. If the Hanoi authorities really want to withdraw their aggressor troops from Cambodia, they should announce their willingness to let such a commission be stationed in Cambodia.

If the Hanoi authorities refuse to accept the commission, the world community will not believe in their announcements and will continue to put all kinds of pressure on them until they agree to really withdraw their troops from Cambodia under a correct and effective international supervision.

Vietnam's Sincerity in Troop Pullout Questioned
BK0704080589 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0430 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Political commentary: "The Withdrawal of Vietnamese Troops by September 1989"]

[Text] Wednesday [5 April] Vietnam announced that it would withdraw all its troops from Cambodia by September 1989—that is, less than 5 months from now. After living over the past 10 years under the control of the communist Vietnamese aggressors, who have invaded Cambodia for whatever reason, this announcement should be welcomed if it can be really implemented without deception. This is the sincere feeling of the Cambodian people. However, the question is whether Vietnam merely gives lip service about the withdrawal of its troops just for the sake of publicity or will it really withdraw them.

We have learned all along that Vietnam has disguised some of its troops as Heng Samrin soldiers, that it has hidden many others in the woods, that it has stashed away considerable amounts of arms, and moreover, that in the past Vietnam withdrew only disabled, useless troops which were later replaced by fresh ones. Now, Vietnam has announced that it will pull out all of them. But this Vietnamese troop withdrawal pledge is the result of no agreement. It is called a unilateral withdrawal. What then can guarantee that it is a genuine troop withdrawal?

Vietnam stated that it would permit international supervision—that is, control by a commission which the Cambodian people doubt could function effectively at all.

On the same day, Hun Sen of the Vietnamese-installed regime showed great concern over the possible return of the Khmer Rouge, but he had yet to talk about letting an international peacekeeping force of the United Nations come. On the contrary, he said he would call the Vietnamese back to Cambodia in the event of a Khmer Rouge return to power.

We wonder why Hun Sen is so keen about having the Vietnamese troops and not a UN force intervene in Cambodia if he is so afraid of the Khmer Rouge. This question should be answered by the Cambodian people and its answer forwarded to Hun Sen and his Vietnamese boss.

We hold that it is suitable that, were Vietnam sincere, it should really withdraw all its troops by September according to its announcement and that there should be

thorough UN supervision and the presence of a UN force to prevent the return to power of the Khmer Rouge or the return to Cambodia by the Vietnamese.

Laos

Drought-Induced Food Shortage Predicted
BK0704012189 Bangkok THE NATION in English 7 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] Persistent drought in Laos has reduced the country's rice supply, causing concern that it could give rise to an acute food shortage in the next six months, according to a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report.

In the January report obtained by THE NATION this week, FAO appealed to the international donor community to send 61,617 tonnes of milled glutinous rice in emergency food aid to prevent the "pending calamity".

Three provinces that normally produce 41 per cent of Laos' food supply—Champassak, Savanakheth and Khammouane—harvested only one-third of their normal production last year, the report states.

Over 700,000 people living in 12 districts of these provinces will be affected by the shortage of food, it said. The total population of Laos is 3,940,000.

Japan and the World Food Programme have donated 9,000 tonnes of rice, said Peyton Johnson, FAO's Information Officer Wednesday [5 April].

But 53,000 tonnes are still required to mitigate the affects of the country's worst drought in nine years, which FAO called "an exceptional occurrence".

Last Friday [31 March] at the FAO headquarters in Rome, Director General Edouard Saouma expressed "deep concern that acute food shortages could arise as early as April" and urged that immediate food aid be sent to Laos, Johnson said.

The current supply of rice, estimated at 518,000 tonnes, is insufficient to meet consumption needs of the country, which is experiencing an overall 176,500 tonne drought-induced deficit. The report noted that the 60,000 tonnes of rice are needed to carry over the people in affected areas, during the six-month dry period between April and October. It states that because of the lack of infrastructure and low production capacity in other regions, extra rice cannot be supplied from within Laos.

U.S. Donates Rice

BK0704100589 Vientiane KPL in English 0904 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Vientiane, April 7 (OANA-KPL)—The Government of the United States of America has decided to give Laos 5,000 [metric] tons of rice through the World Food

Programme, said Mr Charles Twining, director of the Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Office of the U.S. State Department, when he met here with the Lao deputy foreign minister, Souban Salitthilat, on March 31.

The aid costing [U.S.\$] 2.5 million was granted to relieve the drought effects in some southern provinces in 1988.

Mr Souban Salitthilat expressed his gratitude to the government and people of the U.S.A. for their understanding gesture in this difficult time, adding that this would help strengthen the relations between the two countries.

Election Results Received From Nine Zones

*BK0604142189 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Text] Today, the National Electoral Committee has informed our correspondents that they have just received reports on the results of the central-level election of people's representatives only from nine electoral zones—Vientiane municipality, Champassak, Khammouane, Bolikhamsai, Oudomsai, Bokeo, Sekong, Saravane, and Vientiane Provinces—in addition to reports from certain districts in Savannakhet and Luang Prabang Provinces. No reports on the election results have been received from the rest of the electoral zones.

On this occasion, the National Electoral Committee has called on those provinces that have not yet reported the election results to the committee to focus on this task and report the results without delay so that an announcement on the election results can be made within a reasonable period of time.

Phoumi Vongvichit Awarded USSR, GDR Medals

*BK0704055989 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] A ceremony was held at the presidential office yesterday afternoon in which the USSR Supreme Soviet and the GDR bestowed the October Revolution and the Karl Marx medals, respectively, upon Phoumi Vongvichit, Political Bureau member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Central Committee and acting president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] on the occasion of his 80th birthday. Yuriy Mikheyev and Dietrich Jarck, ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union and the GDR to Laos, respectively, conferred, on behalf of their respective parties and governments, the said high-level medals of victory on Phoumi Vongvichit.

Attending the medal presentation ceremony on this occasion were Sali Vongkhamsao, Political Bureau member of the LPRP Central Committee, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of economy, planning, and finance, along with a number of Lao party and state leaders.

In his speech at the ceremony, Phoumi Vongvichit expressed gratitude to the parties, states, and peoples of the two fraternal countries for their lofty commendations and appraisals on this occasion. He reiterated his determination to continue to do his best in striving to more vigorously promote the cause of effecting new changes in the development work to serve the party, the nation, and people and to contribute to the cause of opposing the arms race in the interests of national construction and for the safeguarding of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the rest of the world. He particularly pledged to endeavor to more fruitfully contribute to further strengthening the friendly relations and vigorously consolidating the firm solidarity and all-round cooperation between the LPDR and the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Envoys Call on UN Head on Joint Statement

*BK0704100189 Vientiane KPL in English 0902 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Vientiane, April 7 (KPL)—UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar met on Thursday [6 April] with the ambassadors of Vietnam and Laos at the United Nations, who informed him about the joint statement made on April 5 by the governments of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam, reported TASS.

The statement, which was released at the UN as an official document of the United Nations, outlines steps aimed at removing obstacles in the way of Indochinese settlement. [sentence as received]

Hotel, Store To Be Built With Vietnamese Help

*BK0704024589 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Text] The construction of an 80-bed hotel and a department store in Khammouane Province began in late March. The hotel is being built with the assistance and cooperation of the sister province of Binh Tri Thien, the SRV, in accordance with the cooperation agreement signed on 26 February between Inpong Khai-gnavong, secretary of the party committee and chairman of the administration of Khammouane Province, and Le Thanh, secretary of the party committee and chairman of the administration of Binh Tri Thien Province. The construction of this hotel is expected to be completed within 6 months.

As for the construction of the department store, it is also expected to be completed during the same period. This department store is being contractually built by Vietnamese engineers and workers from Ho Chi Minh City.

Savannakhet Province Delegation Visits Thailand

*BK0704024389 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 5 Apr 89*

[Text] On 4 April, a delegation of Savannakhet Province led by Boun-ngang Volachit, chairman of the provincial administration, left for a visit to Thailand's Sakon Nakhon Province at the invitation of the Thais.

The purpose of the visit is, in general, to improve the relations between the two neighboring provinces on the basis of the Lao-Thai joint statement of 25 November 1988 and, in particular, to strengthen the cooperation in the economic and trade field on the basis of mutual benefits between Savannakhet and Sakon Nakhon.

Talks on Nationalities Held With Soviets

BK0604122489 Vientiane KPL in English 0938 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Vientiane, April 6 (KPL)—Talk relating to the questions of nationalities was held here on April 5 between officials of Laos and the USSR.

The sides focused their attention to the study of the way of life, tradition and population growth rate of each nationality in their respective countries.

Taking part in the discussion were: on the Lao side Mrs Boun-gna Phitsavat, Standing Committee member of the Lao Front for National Construction, and the Soviet side, Mr Dzhaniybekov Uzbekaliy, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the Kazakh SSR.

PASASON Delegation Leaves for Havana

BK0704055789 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] A delegation of PASASON newspaper, organ of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, led by Bouaban Volakhoun, editor-in-chief of the paper, left Vientiane for the Republic of Cuba on 6 April to attend an annual conference of editors-in-chief of party papers from various fraternal socialist countries. The conference is scheduled to be held in Havana from 12-13 April 1989.

During its stay in Cuba on this occasion, the delegation will also sign a protocol on mutual assistance and cooperation between PASASON and GRANMA—organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Session on Australian Cooperation Held

BK0604124189 Vientiane KPL in English 0942 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Vientiane, April 6 (OANA-KPL)—The annual session on Lao-Australian cooperation was held here on April 5.

The meeting made an assessment on the execution of the cooperation plan between the two countries.

Ways and means to improve the cooperation were also discussed at the meeting.

The Lao side was led by Mr Sompadit, deputy minister of trade and foreign economic relations and the Australian side was led by Dr Robert Dun [name as received], general director of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau.

Today, Dr Dun and his delegation attended the opening ceremony of the Lao-Australian port project in Sayaboury.

The Australian delegation arrived here on April 3, 1989.

Philippines

CIA 'Involvement' in Visa Issue To Be Probed

HK0704014789 Manila Manila Broadcasting
Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Text] The lower house will probe the alleged involvement of the CIA in issuing visas to foreigners from socialist and communist bloc countries. The House Committee on West-East European Affairs decided this in this morning's hearing. Representative Bonifacio Guillego said it is strange that before issuing visas to these foreigners the Department of Foreign Affairs still has to consult with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and a foreign organization linked to the CIA. Foreign Under Secretary Jose Ingles said that all matters concerning security are within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President and the Defense Department. Representative Jaime Lopez said that the subcommittee will request National Intelligence Coordinating Agency Director Jose Canieso's presence to further probe the matter.

Manglapus Views Multilateral Nature of Aid Plan

HK0404045189 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in English
4 Apr 89 pp 1, 7

[By Jose G. Ebro]

[Text] Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus, while expressing optimism over an early pledging session for the Philippine Assistance Program [PAP], yesterday supposed that if nothing firms up by July, President Corason Aquino would take that up in France at the Group of Seven meet.

Mr. Manglapus, in reference to recent statements by U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz indicating that the U.S. would hold off disbursements to the aid plan unless the participation of other donors were assured, said he in fact welcomed such statements.

"Not only are we not concerned, but we welcome and are happy for the multilateral character being stressed for the program," he told reporters.

Strong Role

With a strong role seen for Japan in that program, the PAP would obviously be a priority issue in the heavily economic agenda of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita when he visits (next month), Mr. Manglapus said.

While "there are no agreements being contemplated, there will be occasion for important clarifications on certain other points," he said.

Also to be discussed will be the Philippine share in the \$2 billion ASEAN-Japan Development Fund and the 16th yen loan package now being contemplated.

Compromise

The "no-year" disbursement clause being attached to the \$200-million U.S. appropriation for the PAP "is designed to meet halfway those members of the U.S. Congress that have expressed the desire to be sure that the U.S. does not lose control of the timing" of such disbursements, the foreign secretary pointed out.

"It's a compromise that, apparently, the House subcommittee (headed by Rep. Solarz) is willing to undertake to ensure the passage of the appropriation. Legislation is the art of compromise," Mr. Manglapus explained.

Leverage for Bases?

Asked whether he found such a clause acceptable, Mr. Manglapus refused comment.

DFA officials have voiced fears that such a mechanism would serve as leverage on the bases issue.

Donors To Receive Proposals

HK0404052189 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] President Aquino said that the government's project proposals for the multilateral Philippine Aid Plan [PAP] will be submitted to donor countries. More on this from Art Pabellon:

[Begin recording] [Pabellon] President Corazon Aquino yesterday said all the projects that the Philippine Government will propose for funding through the American-initiated Multilateral Aid Initiative will be reviewed and approved, not only by the United States, but by all other nations who wish to participate. The United States has initially pledged \$200 million for a possible \$10 billion economic assistance from countries like Japan, Taiwan and others. The United States Congress reportedly will want to review the project proposals by the Philippine Government for the Philippine Aid Plan.

[Aquino] Actually, what will happen now will really be the presenting of projects. In fact, I have already been advised that not only the United States but embassies

from all the other countries who we hope will be part of the PAP will also want to know what the projects are about. So I think it is only fair that they have a look at these projects that we are presenting to them and they can decide which projects they would like to be part of. Of course, we will have our priority projects as a part of these. We also hope that the World Bank will participate, particularly in the latter part. After all, all of these conditions that you are telling me are not yet really the conditions because first of all, we have to really start it. While it is true that \$200 million is already being discussed in the U.S. Congress, we will have to find out during the pledging ceremony—which hopefully will take place in June in Tokyo—that is the time for us to find out exactly the extent of the participation of the countries with regards to the PAP. At the moment, well, in fact, Saturday, Mr. Bert Villanueva, chairman of the PAP council, left for the United States because he will be presenting the PAP to members of Congress and to other American organizations. He will also be visiting Tokyo so that he can also present these programs there. [Pabellon] That was President Aquino. [end recording]

Aid Plan Link With Bases Issue Called 'Trap'

HK0704041589 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 7 Apr 89 p 4

[Editorial: "We Don't Need That Kind of Aid"]

[Text] Ever since the idea of a \$10 billion multilateral aid package for the Philippines was articulated by U.S. Rep. Stephen Solarz in 1987, the expectations of Filipinos about it have grown. Why, \$10 billion could go a long way in setting up industries, the creation of jobs, building infrastructure, procuring all the things the Philippines would need to become a newly industrialized country (NIC).

The cash-strapped Aquino Government enthusiastically endorsed Solarz's idea of a worldwide program of concessional lendings and grants which would rescue this new and much-admired democracy from economic failure and a communist takeover. The business sector and some politicians responded positively to the promise of new money to be generated by the United States from its own resources and those of other developed countries around the world.

The common man, however, is worried only about how the country, already \$28 billion in debt to international lending institutions, would be able to pay all of that back plus an additional \$10 billion in grants and loans. Then there were those, including some politicians, who complain that the PAP [Philippine Assistance Program] is making us look like mendicants, helpless as we are before the conditionalities imposed by the donors and lenders. Cynically, they have reserved their enthusiasm for the time when the promised \$10 billion becomes a reality and they get a straight answer to the question: what's the catch?

When the text of the LOI [Letter of Intent] was released last month, it became obvious that the entry of any more new money into the country was premised on our acceptance of the IMF's stringent program for our economic development. Then, last week, during the Solarz visit, it became clear what the main catch was.

As many have suspected all along, the approval of U.S. funds for the PAP would depend on the continued stay of the American military bases in the country after the bases agreement expires in 1991. This was recently confirmed by a member of Solarz's staff.

Yesterday, we learned that those behind the PAP would not hesitate to dangle the billions that they could raise as a bait to get our Government to agree to the donors' conditionalities. According to a news report carried in this paper, donor countries have indicated that they are inclined to shell out only \$1 billion, not \$10 billion, over the five years for the PAP. There are even reports that the U.S. Congress has tried to slash the already meager \$200 million pledged by the Reagan government as that country's contribution to the PAP.

Now that the real interests of the donors, especially the U.S. are emerging, it is time for the Philippine Government to re-examine the wisdom of falling for the lure of the PAP. It is beginning to look like this program which was originally billed as a means to preserve this newly restored democracy is a trap meant to make us so grateful to certain countries that we would heed their threats and willingly accede to their demands.

Before the groundwork on the PAP goes any further, the Government should make it known to the donors that the only help it will accept from them is the kind that will bring about growth and not curtail it. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the PAP, or any kind of foreign aid for that matter should consider our sovereignty and leave the Filipinos' self-esteem intact. Anything less than that would be a form of bribery and/or intimidation. That kind of aid we can—and must—do without.

Airport on Alert Against Asian Criminal Gangs

*HK0704044989 Baguio City Mountain Province
Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] Immigration agents at the Aquino International Airport have been placed on red alert status amid reports that Japanese Yakuza gang members are arriving this summer to set up a base in Manila. Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago, who ordered the red alert, said intelligence sources reported that several Asian organized syndicates—and mainly the Japanese Yakuza—are planning to step up their illegal operations to the Philippines. Among the Asian, organized crime groups are the Hong Kong triads, the Australian Mafia, the Taiwan Bamboo Gang, the Japanese Red Army and the Yakuza. The commissioner added that these syndicates are engaged in gun running, drug pushing, prostitution, pedophilia and other illegal

but financially lucrative activities. The immigration chief also disclosed that last March 22, airport immigration agents refused entry to [words indistinct] Japanese males who were suspected to be Yakuza members.

Congress Seeks Overhaul of Government, Military

*HK0704035189 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
GLOBE in English 7 Apr 89 pp 1, 9*

[By staff writer Ros Manglangit]

[Text] Congress is calling for a major overhaul of the government, including the military, in its proposal for budgetary cuts next year.

Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. told newsmen after meeting with President Aquino in Malacanang yesterday that he has submitted to the Chief Executive a list of government agencies which some congressmen want abolished or merged to curb government spending in 1990.

Mrs. Aquino, he said, has assured him of support. He also denied that the planned reorganization has something to do with the recent agreement the Philippine government has forged with the International Monetary Fund which, among other things, calls for austerity measures.

"She assured me of her support for the efforts of the House at getting the government off the back of the people," Mitra said, stressing the need for "deregulating" the government.

Mitra said certain agencies will be asked during budget consultations to state their objectives and justify the need for their continued existence, especially those offices considered "useless."

He cited the Department of Agriculture which, he said, is maintaining two fishery agencies—the Bureau of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and Fisheries Development Authority. He said the two bureaus have overlapping functions.

In the case of the defense department, Mitra said the existence of several layers of commands pose questions on the department's ability to provide immediate help when needed.

Mitra said some congressmen think the Armed Forces could function better with learner [as published] and better-trained men rather than maintaining an "ill-equipped" force of about 250,000 troops.

He said he favors a small professional Armed Forces supported by a big citizens army to be funded adequately.

Another structure which Mitra and the congressmen want trimmed is the executive department, which gets "generous" allocations in the budget.

Mitra said the House committees on appropriations and on reorganization headed respectively by Rep. Rolando Andaya (LDP [Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino—Struggle of Philippine Democrats], Camarines Sur) and Rep. Bienvenido Marquez (LDP, Quezon) are looking into the issue of reducing the number of agencies.

Mitra said the House intends to set the example of "operational austerity" by trimming its own budget next year.

Mitra assured Mrs. Aquino that the House will scrutinize the 1990 budget "seriously, comprehensively and equitably" without adversely affecting basic services like health and education and without jeopardizing public investments.

Ordonez Refutes Court Decision on Marcos Return
HK0504094189 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0920 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Text] Justice Secretary Sedfrey Ordonez has issued a statement about the alleged decision made by the Antigraft Court to allow former President Marcos to return in June to enable him to face one of his cronies, former Public Works and Highways Minister Baltazar Aquino when he testifies against the former president at the Antigraft Court.

According to Secretary Ordonez, Mr Marcos' presence is not required since his lawyer could represent him during Aquino's testimony on the issue of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.

Military Divided on Handling of Renegade Soldiers
HK0604055389 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 6 Apr 89 p 7

[By staffmember Johanna Son]

[Text] The Armed Forces was split yesterday over the wisdom and acceptability of amnesty for rebel soldiers like former Lt Col Gregorio Honasan, with members of his Class'71 saying the program should leave intact the military men's "dignity."

After a hearing on the subject however, Sen Ernesto Maceda batted for the withdrawal of charges lodged against enlisted men supposedly involved in past coup attempts because they were only following orders and have been "punished enough."

He suggested instead that these men be retrained, "rehabilitated" and sent to the war front "to prove themselves." Maceda said he would make the suggestion to President Aquino because the issue of amnesty could no longer "be left hanging."

However, he also said the Government would have "some problems" in accepting the unconditional amnesty he said Class'71 appeared to favor.

During the hearing, the committee sought the views of area commanders, enlisted men and Class'71, to which many of the Reform the Armed Forces (RAM) movement members like Edsa [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] figures Honasan and Col Red Kapunan belonged.

The executive branch has drawn up guidelines for amnesty for left rebels, but is still studying amnesty for rebel soldiers following some military men's statements that offering the program only to rebels was unfair. President Aquino can declare amnesty through an executive order, to be concurred in by Congress.

Maceda estimated that any amnesty program for rebel soldiers would affect some 500 men, including about 30 officers.

Brig Gen Alejandro Galido, Southern Luzon Commander, said amnesty would "invigorate the image of Government and help remove the suspicion that factions are weakening and (causing) disunity" in the military.

But Brig Gen Orlando Antonio, Visayas Command chief, said a grant of amnesty to coup plotters would set a "very bad precedent" because future offenders might ask for the same treatment.

Southern Command chief Brig Gen Manuel Cacanando cautioned against any subsequent grant of amnesty, because it would give a "soft" image of the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] and in the long run "destroy" the organization. "Masyadong malambot [Too soft]."

The enlisted men, represented by the six AFP sergeant majors, were more cautious in endorsing the amnesty suggestion, adding that it could wreak havoc on the military's justice system.

Sgt Maj Alfredo Fabros said the government's effort was "laudable" and that "we will support whatever the political leadership tells us." However, he warned that it could set a "very serious precedent."

Sgt Maj Carlos Baldomero raised questions about amnesty that he said were nagging enlisted men: Will it be helpful to an attainment of an ideal AFP? Wouldn't it mock the military justice system? Will it deter future coups?"

NPA 'Shadow Governments' Reported in 100 Towns
HK0704034989 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
GLOBE in English 7 Apr 89 p 7

[By GLOBE staff writer Dionisio Pelayo]

[Text] Communist rebels have formed shadow governments in close to 100 towns in 25 provinces, military intelligence reports said. In these areas, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) implements its own agrarian reform, economic, political and cultural programs.

Documents shown to the GLOBE said each provisional revolutionary government has five functional organs to take care of the organizational, educational, economic, defense and health needs of the people.

Militias are also organized to prevent the entry of government forces and Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).

The documents said communist rebels have formed shadow governments in 17 towns plus 20 percent of the barangays in Isabela; 42 towns in Central Luzon; two towns in Negros island; 10 towns in Samar; 50 barangays in Bicol; and 25 towns in eight Mindanao provinces.

Earlier, the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] said the CPP will try to capture the leadership in least 20 percent of all the barangays during the March 28 elections. The AFP, however, has not said how many communist-backed candidates won.

President Aquino had said communists who are elected to barangay posts will be allowed to hold office so long as they won in a fair contest.

Further on Misuari's Spying Allegation

Israel Denies Charge

HK0604122189 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER in English 5 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] The Israeli Foreign Ministry has denied an allegation by Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF] leader Nur Misuari that hundreds of Filipinos in the Arab countries are being utilized as spies of Israel.

The denial was relayed yesterday to diplomatic reporters by Ambassador Pacifico Castro, head of the Middle East and African affairs desk of the foreign office.

"The allegation is not true. It has absolutely no factual basis. And an official of the foreign ministry of Israel has already denied this several times," said the ambassador.

But the head of the international affairs of the MNLF's reformist bloc, lawyer Macapanton Abbas, believed otherwise.

Envoy in Kuwait Holds News Conference

JN0604205789 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic
5 Apr 89 p 5

[By 'Ali Tahir]

[Excerpt] Philippine Ambassador to Kuwait Alunan Glang has denied reports in local newspapers over the past 2 days that Israel has recruited 10,000 Filipinos to carry out acts of espionage for it.

He told a news conference at the embassy yesterday that the remarks by Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF, in an interview with AP a few days ago, "were allegations that may seriously and gravely harm relations between Filipinos and their Arab brothers."

The Philippine ambassador described Misuari's move as one "within the MNLF's effort to make the Manila government fail to abide by the Tripoli Agreement and rally support and sympathy for its efforts to secure membership for the rebel Bangsa [name as published] Moro group in the Islamic Conference Organization."

He announced during the conference that he was awaiting his government's instructions to begin official contacts with concerned quarters in Kuwait to acquaint them with details of the Philippine Government's stand. He expressed his strong astonishment with Misuari's claim that 2,000 Philippine passports were reported missing between May and June of 1988.

A press release distributed by the ambassador at the conference acknowledged that Philippine newspapers recently reported that many passports were missing during that period, but he pointed out two facts:

—The number of the missing passports is much less than 2,000, the figure given by Misuari; and

—Investigations in this regard indicate that the passports were missing from the property of an officer at the Passports Department at the Philippine Foreign Affairs Administration, and that these passports were detected at travel agencies and employment offices.

When the issue of these passports was discovered, orders were issued to all Philippine foreign service establishments—such as embassies and consulates—to disregard and refuse to acknowledge these passports when they are shown. This automatically nullifies them and terminates their validity for any purpose.

In his statement, the ambassador cited Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Alon Lil [name as published] as rejecting Misuari's statements that the Israeli intelligence organ, Mosad, had recruited 10,000 Filipinos to work for it in Arab states.

Ambassador Galang challenged the Moro leader to offer proof of his accusations of Philippine workers being spies for other states.

The statement urged the news media to ignore Misuari's statements, especially since they are desperate attempts to drive a wedge between the Philippine and Arab peoples at the expense of the expatriate Philippine communities, whose objective is to participate in achieving the objectives of development in the Arab world. The statement dealt with the Philippine stand in general, saying that the state and people in the Philippines are deeply grateful to the Arab governments and peoples who host hundreds of thousands of Philippine workers.

Therefore, the statement added that the Philippine Government could not take the risk of raising the suspicion of the Arab world through sending workers to work as spies for a foreign government. Consequently, saying that 10,000 workers are deployed in several Arab states to work as spies undermines the Arab host states that received the Philippine workers because of their confidence in the current administration in Manila. [passage omitted]

Misuari Protests Government 'Repression'

PM0404172589 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
31 Mar 89 p 37

[Unattributed report: "Praising Fahd's Support, Moro Islamic Front Leader Misuari: We Will Declare Interim Government Early Next Year"]

[Excerpts] Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF] leader Nur Misuari has expressed his appreciation for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and its efforts in serving the Islamic world and enhancing Islamic common action. [passage omitted]

Misuari added: We sons of the Moro people received from him every support and backing for our just cause. As a result, the Islamic ministerial conference expressed its deep regret about the Philippine Government's failure to implement the Tripoli agreement concluded in 1976. He also urged the member states to provide humanitarian, financial, and material aid to the MNLF. The conference asked the four-man committee—headed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and including the Libyan Jamahiriyah, Senegal, and Somalia—as well as the ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] secretary general to enhance efforts and contacts with the Philippine Government to induce it to implement the Tripoli agreement fully and quickly.

Misuari told AL-HAWADITH that the Philippine Government urged the 17th Islamic ministerial conference to freeze the decision about admitting the front to the ICO as a full member, officially promising to implement the Tripoli agreement. A year has now elapsed, but it still has not fulfilled its promise. On the contrary, it has strengthened its military presence in the province, violated the cease-fire decision, and engaged in fierce and violent confrontations which we have never witnessed before. This is in addition to the increase in the measures of repression and annihilation against the Moro people. Despite this, we once again offer Manila a just peace to avoid a major and terrible war, whose dimensions no one but Almighty God knows.

Misauri added that the front's leadership has found all roads to Manila blocked. It does not want to listen to the legitimate rights of the Moro people. That is why we will, regrettably, resume the fighting against the government forces which are carrying out acts of murder, plunder, expulsion, and torture against us.

We will also declare the province's interim government. We call on the world's states to back our just cause in order to realize the aspirations of 4 million Moro people seeking to achieve independence and freedom and enjoy the human rights endowed by the creator and cited in international organizations' charters. Misauri affirmed that the front is not seeking any military aid, as "praise to God, we have the men, the plans, the tactics, and the arms. All we need is genuine political backing that would enable us to recover our legitimate rights."

Thailand

Trade Talks With U.S. To Resume in Geneva

BK0704040489 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
6 Apr 89 p 4

[Text] Thailand and the United States will resume consultations in Geneva on bilateral trade problems in mid-month, the director general of the Economics Department said yesterday.

Commerce Permanent Secretary Phat Itsarasena, currently attending the GATT talks in Geneva, will head the Thai team at the bilateral talks.

The decision to resume consultations was announced yesterday after the meeting of the International Economic Relations Policy Committee (IERP), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Phong Sarasin.

IERP will work out the framework of the talks and present it to Prime Minister Chatchai Chunchawan for approval, Director General Pracha Khunakasem said, adding that it will also keep in touch with the US Embassy in Bangkok on the consultations.

US Ambassador Daniel O'Donohue met with Commerce Minister Subin Pinkhayan for an hour yesterday, after which Mr Subin met with Mr Phong before both attended the IERP meet.

Washington recently asked Bangkok to resume talks on intellectual property rights.

"The US suggested four venues for us to choose from: Washington, Hawaii, Bangkok or Geneva," he said.

The IERP yesterday also worked on the strategy for the talks, he said, refusing to go into details.

The decision to resume the talks this month comes at a time when the Office of the US Trade Representative is working on a report to Congress on the estimated damage caused to US exports by trade barriers and intellectual property rights violations.

The talks will pay particular attention to stalemates over the protection of pharmaceutical patents and computer software.

The Food and Drug Administration and the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association have "agreed in principle" on interim measures that Thailand offered for drug patent protection, Mr Pracha said.

However, the period of protection remains to be agreed on—Thailand has offered 18 months but the US wants it for as long as the present patent law is not amended, he said.

The IERP meeting yesterday also touched on the US demand that Thailand open its market to foreign cigarettes.

"Although the (cigarette) issue is not on the agenda, Thai officials at the talks will be able to clarify Thailand's position when asked," he said.

Mr Pracha and Business Economics Department Director General Somphon Kiatphaibun are hopeful about the Geneva meeting.

Mr Pracha said US officials have shown "understanding of our problems in various rounds of informal talks that have been going on."

While there is hope for compromise with the Bush administration, the American private sector is putting strong pressure on Washington over the issue, he said.

"The IERP has assigned Thai Ambassador to the US Witthaya Wetchachin to monitor the situation and find ways to ease the pressure," Mr Pracha said.

Committee Discusses Trade Problems With U.S.
BK0704085389 Bangkok NAEON in Thai 3 Apr 89 pp 1, 20

[Text] According to a senior Government House official, the cabinet meeting the week before approved measures for solving problems in the economic relations with the United States as proposed by the International Economic Relations Policy Committee [IERPC] headed by Deputy Prime Minister Phong Sarasin. This follows a report that the United States will consider cuts in Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] benefits for more Thai products and retaliation in accordance with the Trade Act, Section 301.

The IERPC noted the following U.S. attitude, as indicated in the U.S. trade representative's recent memorandum to the commerce minister: 1. The United States emphasized its displeasure with protection of U.S. copyrights and patents in Thailand and will seek further negotiations on the issue; 2. the U.S. President's recent decision on GSP benefits for Thailand was based on the expectation that Thailand would honor its pledges given during previous bilateral negotiations; and, 3. the Thai and U.S. positions are significantly far apart; the United States's position remains unchanged and it will negotiate for compliance from the Thai side.

According to the source, the IERPC's assessment is that the United States will make another review of GSP benefits for Thailand in July. A national trade estimate report will be submitted to the Congress in April to decide Thailand's place in the priority list for retaliation by Section 301 of the Trade Act.

The source said there is good chance that more Thai exports will face cuts in GSP benefits if Thailand does not act on the U.S. demand for protection of U.S. copyrights or take administrative actions to protect U.S. copyrights by legislating special law to protect U.S. computer software. If Thailand does not amend the Patent Act by 31 December 1990 or undertake provisional measures to protect U.S. drug patents it could face U.S. actions under Section 301 of the trade act.

To protect Thai interests, the source said the IERPC suggested that pressure be applied on U.S. Embassy officials as well U.S. individuals or companies which benefit from their business with Thailand, such as U.S. aircraft manufacturers whose business with Thailand amounted to billions of baht. Complaints will also be lodged with GATT, as Brazil and the EC are doing.

The source said it also suggested that Thailand indicate to the United States that a new cut in GSP or retaliation under Section 301 will force Thailand to stop giving favorable consideration to U.S. business proposals. In any event, these suggestions will be considered thoroughly some time in the future.

Prayun Thaloengsi, the Board of Trade executive director, said he did not want to comment on the issue until after a negotiation and, moreover, the Council of Economic Ministers has just instructed the IERPC to negotiate a settlement with the United States. He said there is no need for premature anxiety.

On 20 March, the Council of Economic Ministers decided that package trade negotiations will be sought with the United States to include all trade problems, such as the rice problem, the Farm Act and so forth, not just the intellectual property protection issue. Deputy Prime Minister Phong Sarasin and the permanent secretary for health affairs will consult with the U.S. Pharmaceutical Association on the patent problem to lay down Thailand's stance.

Trade Dispute 'Crisis' With U.S. Claimed
BK0504021389 Bangkok THE NATION in English 5 Apr 89 p 8

[Commentary by Atthawibun Sisuworanan: "The Thai-US Trade Dispute; Neither Side Could Win"]

[Text] The Thai Foreign Ministry and the US State Department are caught in a crisis arising from trade disputes between Thailand and the US that neither side

could win. And if the disputes are not handled properly, this crisis could seriously damage the good Thai-U.S. friendship that both sides have been trying to nurture.

So far, five petitions have been filed by US business associations and firms accusing Thailand of unfair trade practices. The number of the petitions is likely to rise at the approach of the annual deadline for receiving such petitions. The deadline this year is on April 30.

The petitioners are asking the Bush administration to investigate the allegations that Thailand has denied them the rights of market-access. If the allegations are found to be valid, President George Bush will have to take retaliatory measures against Thailand under the now-famous Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.

Since the last round of bilateral trade negotiation failed in Washington last December and subsequently the then President Ronald Reagan symbolically revoked duty-free privilege given to eight items of Thai goods under the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), there have been attempts in Washington and Bangkok to push for a new round of bilateral talks on the outstanding issues. Now the focus is on the intellectual property rights, especially the protection of pharmaceutical patents.

The State Department has convinced other US agencies to narrow their divergent views of the Thai-US trade disputes to concentrate on pharmaceutical patents.

During the past weeks, according to informed sources familiar with the Thai-US trade disputes, inter-agency consultations were held between the US Trade Representative (USTR), the Commerce Department, the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Council. The USTR agreed to accept the status quo in the issue of computer software protection—the burning issue last year—and wait and see what form of protection the Thai courts will give to computer software in Thailand.

The US might not initiate any radical change in its position or wield the presidential power under Section 301 against Thailand if Thailand does not introduce a sui generis law to protect computer software by other form, other than copyrighting.

This temporary "truce" on the computer software issue has given both sides some new hopes to begin a new round of talks to tackle the main outstanding issue on pharmaceutical patents.

Unfortunately, new petitions against Thailand, charging impeded market access, are piling up in Washington and distract many US agencies.

Another obstacle is the US foreign policy approach of "compartmentalization," which prevents the State Department and any other individual agency from having a dominant say on international trade issues.

The informed sources say that the Bush Administration would like to adjust the approach, which was introduced by Congress, by making the Commerce Department share the leading role with the USTR.

"We will be lucky if this adjustment is put into effect under the Bush administration," one informed Thai source told THE NATION.

However, the adjustment may not be easy because it has to go through Congress, the source noted.

So far the US business associations and firms filing petitions against Thailand include the US Wine Industry, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, the National Confectioners Association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the International Intellectual Property Alliance, the Motion Pictures Association, Polaroid Corporation. The US cigarette and banking industries will soon follow suit.

Under the situation, the Thai side faces an extremely tough challenge.

The Thai-US Subcommittee of the International Economic Relations Policy Committee (IERPC) will meet today to discuss Thailand's stance and, perhaps, make a decision on how to respond to Washington's request for consultation.

Another well-informed source, who is involved in the Thai-US trade negotiation, says Thailand is anxious to find out whether the US will classify the allegations against Thailand as "unjustifiable" unfair trade practice, a violation of the Thai-US trade agreement. If so, President Bush will be obliged to retaliate under Section 301. On the other hand, if the allegations are found to be merely "unreasonable" trade practices, President Bush will have more room for discretion in making US response.

However, a political analyst here noted that the IERPC is still unable to shape the Thai public opinions, which are mostly hostile toward the US, which is seen as a economic giant bullying a weak and poor friend like Thailand. This strong negative public perception will hamper the IERPC from making any further compromise.

This is why it is still doubtful whether joint bureaucratic efforts of Bangkok and Washington will be able to cope with the current crisis, in which economic interests of powerful US industries are at stake.

The Omnibus Trade Act has no guidelines governing how and who can file a petition against unfair trade practices of a foreign country. Which means any man on the street in the US can file one. And the USTR has to act on each of the petitions.

The American industries may not care much about how their accusations against Thailand will hurt the Thai-US relations. And neither Washington nor Bangkok can do anything to stop them from filing more petitions year after year.

This is why the Bush Administration wants to regain some control over international trade issues and find some way to screen out the preposterous ones.

Thai officials who are in touch with their US counterparts in the Bush Administration appreciate the US concerns about the threat to the Thai-US relations that these numerous petitions can do and welcome their move to regain control over the international trade issues.

Thai officials have also been following the Bush Administration's review of problems in the Thai-US relations. They expect the Bush Administration to take into account the negative perception toward the US in Thailand and seriously examine points in Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's aide memoire, handed to President Bush in Tokyo in February, which called for the US to approach bilateral trade negotiation as a total comprehensive package and as part of the totality of Thai-US bilateral ties.

Reaction to SRV Withdrawal Proposal Reported

Chawalit Makes Statement

BK0704011789 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
7 Apr 89 p 4

[Excerpt] Acting Supreme Commander Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut said yesterday whether Vietnam will live up to its pledge Wednesday to pull out the last batch of troops from Kampuchea remains to be seen.

Gen Chawalit made the cautious statement in response to the latest peace initiative by Hanoi and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). He said, "in principle, I welcome the announcement but practice is something else."

He admitted that the military will follow concrete actions that Vietnam will take on the public commitment.

Chawalit said the complete pullout of Vietnamese troops has been a matter of principle for which Thailand has fought for 10 years.

Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan and Foreign Minister Sithi Sawetsila said Wednesday they welcome the announcement, released simultaneously in Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Vientiane by the three Indochinese regimes Wednesday [5 April] evening.

At the birthday party at his Soi Ratchakhru residence Wednesday night, the premier said he did not think Vietnam will go back on its words because it made the announcement to the world over.

Describing it as "good news" for his birthday, the premier said the world wants to see peace in Kampuchea. For the part of Thailand, he said, the fighting in Kampuchea should be all over because Thai villagers living on the common border had suffered from the spillovers of fighting inside Kampuchea.

He said hundreds of Thai villagers lost their lives or properties as a result of artillery shelling across the border.

The premier said once the fighting was over, Thai trade with an investment in Vietnam could boom in accordance with his policy to turn Indochina from a war zone into a trade zone.

Citing the case with Laos as an example, Chatchai said after the dispute at Ban Romklao on the Thai-Lao border has been resolved, the two countries have increased trade and economic cooperation substantially, he said. [passage omitted]

Premier's Adviser on Withdrawal

BK0704014589 Bangkok *BANGKOK POST* in English
7 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] The joint declaration by Vietnam, Laos and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) on Wednesday was a "very interesting proposal" but should be studied carefully, M.R. Sukhumphan Boriphat, a personal adviser to Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said here yesterday.

M.R. Sukhumphan, in the US for a conference on the Thai-US Bilateral Forum, said the task now remaining is to think of ways and means to achieve a just and durable Kampuchean political settlement as soon as possible, if not before September.

The premier's adviser said the date of the withdrawal had been moved up to September 1989 without the usual Vietnamese insistence for a political settlement.

He stressed, however, that the withdrawal as espoused in the declaration was not an unconditional withdrawal, pointing out that the two demands which have to be met for the withdrawal is the cessation of foreign interference and cessation of all foreign military aid to all Kampuchean parties.

M.R. Sukhumphan warned of clashes which might erupt after the withdrawal.

The Vietnamese withdrawal, said the adviser, did not automatically lead to a political settlement.

He noted that the declaration gave the United Nations a role in the International Control and Supervisory Commission for the troops withdrawal and cessation of foreign interference and military aid.

"It is the first time that Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea accept a role for the United Nations in this mechanism. Previously, they only talked about an international body," he said.

M.R. Sukhumphan said the declaration allowed the control commission to increase its staff and to carry certain types of weapons as needed for the "effective performance of its tasks" with due respect for the sovereignty of Kampuchea.

"This can be interpreted in so many ways. Normally, an armed international control commission would go against the principle of state sovereignty.

"If they (the PRK) are saying that they are the legitimate sovereign state, they cannot allow an armed international commission.

"If the proposed International Control and Supervisory Commission is allowed to carry weapons, it could mean the PRK allows an armed commission. There are many interpretations," said the adviser.

Despite these promising points, M.R. Sukhumphan cautioned of certain dangers and pitfalls.

"The most dangerous and worrisome thing is if fighting erupts after the withdrawal, the Vietnamese could re-enter Kampuchea.

"This time they could stay for a very, very long time while the international support for its withdrawal erodes.

"That's why we cannot sit still. ASEAN, especially Thailand, has got to start thinking about the matter in which the cessation of assistance to Kampuchean factions can be done," he said.

The premier's adviser added that the meeting between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Phnom Penh Premier Hun Sen should take place as soon as possible, preferably when Prince Sihanouk visits Southeast Asia in late April. Such a meeting could take place in Jakarta.

"The prime minister has stated clearly that it was Indonesia who acted as interlocutor between ASEAN and the Indochinese states during the previous informal meetings."

It makes sense for Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen to meet in Jakarta and possibly under the framework agreements reached during JIM I and JIM II, the adviser said, admitting however that there were few agreements reached during the two meetings.

M.R. Sukhumphan said one cannot afford to be complacent about the Vietnamese withdrawal.

"They can re-enter should the situation appear to warrant their return into Kampuchea," he said.

Stressing that the tripartite declaration was interesting and worth listening to and given due consideration, he added:

"But it has to be read carefully and more information and details need to be obtained. There are still many explosive points on the Kampuchean conflict," M.R. Sukhumphan said.

The premier's adviser also said that it is unlikely that there would be any concessions from China before the Sino-Soviet Summit in May. "It's a card that China wants to keep in their hand until then," he said. [passage omitted]

A Thai official here said the conditions set forth in the declaration would likely lead to a civil war.

"If there is no civil war, that means that the Vietnamese have won—they get what they want.

"Should there be a civil war, this proposal leaves open the possibility of the return of Vietnamese troops into Kampuchea. Either way, they get the benefits," the official said.

Dailies Comment on Pullout

BK0704112189

[Editorial Report] Two Thai-language dailies, SIAM RAT and MATICHON, on 7 April carry editorials and an article on Vietnam's announcement on unconditional troop pullout from Cambodia by September this year.

SIAM RAT's editorial on page 8, entitled: "Vietnam Announces Troop Pullout," welcomes the news saying: "Vietnam declared earlier that it would pull out troops from Cambodia by next year (1990). This change of mind to complete the withdrawal earlier is therefore a good news." In the wake of international trend of relaxation, Vietnam's decision came as no surprise.

Vietnam's troop pullout is only the first step in the settlement of the Cambodian problem. Agreement still has to be reached among the Khmer factions concerning the principles on forming a government after the elections. A key issue is the role of the Khmer Rouge which is rejected by all. The paper concludes: "We believe peace will not return to Cambodia easily. More time will be wasted

before a compromise can be reached. Yet, we hope that it would not be too long, so that the hundreds of thousands of Khmer refugees will be able to return to home."

MATICHON's editorial on page 8, entitled: "A Major Step for Peace in Cambodia," says that the decision, agreed upon by Vietnam and its Indochinese allies, constitutes another turning point in the search for peace in Cambodia. Vietnam has dropped the earlier condition—that a complete withdrawal would be made only if there was a political agreement among the four Khmer factions. This, the paper says, reflects Vietnam's sincerity to solve the problem. The move will certainly encourage the four Khmer factions to work for a political compromise.

"Concerning Thailand, it should not be carried away by this success of the policy implemented, but must follow the developments closely. Thailand must be watchful in order to make itself ready for any turn of the situation, without making any mistakes or suffering any losses from Vietnam's tactic of pulling back militarily just to make an advance politically."

MATICHON's "report" on page 7, entitled: "Vietnam's Agreement for a Troop Pullout; Cambodian Settlement Is Nearing," notes that, in exchange for the pullout, Vietnam appealed to other countries to stop giving military assistance to the opposing parties in Cambodia. The article notes positive reactions from diplomats and news agency correspondents. "A number of diplomats believe that the move will help Vietnam from being isolated by others. It will give Vietnam a better chance for economic revival and to improve relations with China," the report says.

Vietnam's move should also speed up the four Khmer factions to reach a compromise, especially on the issue of the Khmer Rouge. An AP correspondent views it as a first important step toward the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations. Both Vietnam and the United States will benefit from diplomatic relations. Vietnam can look forward to U.S. economic and technological assistance, whereas the United States would be given cooperation in the search for MIA's in Vietnam. Vietnam can also look forward to more U.S. investment in Vietnam. Finally the article notes that diplomats in Hanoi and Bangkok see this unconditional pullout announced by Vietnam as a move to pressure Sihanouk to compromise with Hun Sen.

Association Set Up To Boost Ties With SRV
BK0704094589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
7 Apr 89 p 28

[By Ratchaphon Laowanit]

[Text] A number of senior-ranking former military officers and ambassadors are to establish a Thai-Vietnamese Association to boost bilateral ties.

Former Ambassador to then-Saigon from 1971-72, Colonel Phatthana Phayakkhanithi, said the association would meet for the first time tomorrow and he would serve as its first president.

He said other co-founders of the association included former Defence Ministry Finance Department chief Kat Banditchotiyan, former Ambassador to Canada Banphot Phanitsukphon and Watthana Itsaraphakdi.

Col Phatthiana said 30 other senior government, military and business representatives were keen to trade with Vietnam and had expressed their interest in joining the association which is now seeking registration with the Interior Ministry.

He said the association had approached former Ambassador to Washington Anan Panyarachun (now Saha Union Group Chairman) to serve as its adviser.

Col Phatthana said the association's main objectives were to promote cultural, social, economic and trade ties between Thailand and Vietnam.

"We believe the two countries can develop good understanding and friendship, while supporting each other on various issues, particularly economic cooperation to further boost stability in the region," he said.

Col Phatthana said he had told the Foreign Ministry and National Security Council about the planned association and they did not have any objection to its activities.

He also said he had been informed that preparations were underway to set up a Vietnamese-Thai Association in Vietnam as a sister body to the Thai association.

The Thai association will hold its first official meeting tomorrow at the Ambassador Hotel where Vietnamese Ambassador to Thailand Le Mai is expected to talk on trade, investment and tourism between the two countries.

Col Phatthana said the association's first activity was to send a mission to Hanoi late this month to discuss economic cooperation. The mission is expected to call on Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.

Prior to this, Col Phatthana, who is also chairman and president of Assets International Corp, helped to establish an Asia-Pacific Centre.

BPP, Burma Guerrillas Said Poised for Battle
BK0704020789 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
7 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Mae Hong Son—Thai Border Patrol Police [BPP] and opium warlord Khun Sa have deployed forces confronting each other at the border here to fight for the body of a member of the drug kingpin's army, who was killed in a mine explosion.

Local border sources said that Khun Sa's force and the BPP troops were yesterday just a short distance away from each other and fighting could erupt at any time.

Khun Sa had moved about 100 men to an area opposite Ban Po Ka of Pang Ma Pa Sub-district earlier yesterday after one of his men was killed in a mine explosion.

Mines had been planted on a border road here by Thai border forces and the road was declared off-limits.

The armed guerrillas ignored a sign warning travellers to refrain from using the road and tripped one of the landmines while trying to cross it.

The Thai border security forces last year sent a team to demolish a section of the laterite road to prevent it from being used by Khun Sa's forces as their drug trafficking route.

The demolition was carried out amid the opium warlord's threats of retaliation.

Soon after the demolition, the drug gang sent its men to repair the road, which prompted Thai troops to plant landmines along its path.

The sources said that Khun Sa had sent his men to the spot in an apparent attempt to take the body out of the minefield.

The BPP force also wanted to take the body out for identification according to Thai law.

The situation was tense yesterday, the sources said, adding that major fighting could erupt if just a single gunshot was fired.

Article Views 'New Power Center' Members

*BK0404120289 Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai
15-21 Mar 89 pp 17-19*

[Article: "The New Power Center: Chatchai-Suchinda-Manun"]

[Text] On 28 February, it was reported that a former key Young Turk officer—Colonel P.—and a group of 10 officers called on General Chatchai Chunhawan at his Soi Ratchakhru residence to express their support for Gen P. to become the new army commander.

On 2 March, a high-ranking officer told KHAO PHISET that there is increasing uneasiness among senior officers, especially in the Army, over whether Gen Chawalit will resign or not.

On 5 March, the newspaper DAILY NEWS carried a banner "Big Chiu [Chawalit] to resign in April. Stop issuing orders/don't stop the resignation/6 persons are waiting to take up the post."

On 6 March, at a meeting of Army units, Gen Chawalit showed signs of fatigue and said that he may let his subordinates assume more of the command work. He also warned senior officers to be careful of being involved in "politics"

KHAO PHISET received a report on that same day that a group of officers tried to ask the Army to issue a statement denying the news report on Gen Chawalit's resignation. But, Gen Chawalit disapproved the request.

On 7 March, Gen Chatchai said in an interview that he would not approve Gen Chawalit's resignation because Gen Chawalit is still young and can continue to serve the country. He also said that he will eat the 184th roasted chicken together with Gen Chawalit in the next few days (previously, Gen Chawalit had told reporters that he and Gen Chatchai were on good terms and they had already eaten 183 roasted chickens together).

On 9 March, Gen Chatchai and Gen Chawalit met each other during the opening ceremony for a new education course at the National Defense College. They talked privately for about half an hour.

On 10 March, a highly-placed source in the Defense Ministry told KHAO PHISET that the ministry is considering a letter asking for the reinstatement of Col Manun Rupkhachon and there is likely to be no problem.

As of 11 March, while KHAO PHISET was preparing this article, there is still no conclusion of analysis on Gen Chawalit's resignation. However, most analysts believe that there will be no resignation in any event.

Regardless whether Gen Chawalit resigns this September or not, the news report by the newspaper DAILY NEWS is not unfounded. The DAILY NEWS' men who met Gen Chawalit confirmed to KHAO PHISET that they had discussed this issue in depth as they had reported.

The issue of Gen Chawalit's resignation was raised again despite a request 2 months ago by the Buddhist supreme patriarch not to talk about this issue. Some groups thought that the issue was probably raised because of mounting pressures on Gen Chawalit since he still had failed to solve some problems.

What are the pressures on Gen Chawalit? First, power allocation in the Army, especially at the high-ranking level. Four generals have not been promoted to other positions during the past 2 years. Gen Chawalit has to make a decision for a change this year, which will cause a clear change in the power equation.

Second, recently, Gen Chawalit seems not to be so successful in various projects carried out by the Army, such as the Green Northeast project. A group of members of Parliament have even criticized the failure of the project. In the case of the "New Hope" development project, or the Harapan Baru project, for five southern

provinces, Gen Chawalit was resisted silently after he had had a confrontation with the Interior Ministry over the transfer of the Provincial Police Bureau 4 Commissioner. This was clearly proven on 19 February when Gen Chawalit presided over a ceremony to launch the project in Pattani Province. No governors, except the Pattani governor, attended the ceremony.

In addition, if looking at it from the political point of view, the Harapan Baru project was eclipsed as soon as the mobile cabinet meeting was held in Hat Hai on 4 March and the 9-strategic development project was launched to develop the South.

While one group thinks that the issue of Gen Chawalit's resignation reflects Gen Chawalit's fatigue, the other side has a different opinion. They think that a person like Gen Chawalit, who is very clever, is not playing a game with only one move, but with two or three moves at least. Their reasons are:

- It is aimed at testing the reaction in the Armed Forces as well as external politicians who are watching Gen Chawalit's movement.
- It is aimed at testing the "importance" of Gen Chawalit himself.

The latter group's analysis seems to be more plausible. If Gen Chawalit assures that he will resign and really does, the political atmosphere for this government will not be bright. Gen Chawalit has always been considered a pillar supporting this government. His distancing himself from the government will affect the government's stability.

"Simply, if Gen Chawalit expresses clearly that he will not be involved in anything and lets the government handle matters by itself, politics will become gloomy and the government could be shaken easily by various sides," a political observer gave his opinion straightforwardly.

Looking at Gen Chawalit's latest moves in distancing himself from being a pillar of the government, Gen Chatchai would probably not feel easy. However, it does not mean that Gen Chatchai's way will be restricted. On the contrary, Gen Chatchai only stands to gain.

Gen Chatchai's remark that he will not approve Gen Chawalit's resignation or his previous remark that he is ready to give his defense portfolio to Gen Chawalit, but Gen Chawalit must run in an election first, will increase positive credibility for Gen Chatchai. If Gen Chawalit submits his resignation in the future and it is stopped, it will be Gen Chawalit, not Gen Chatchai, who has to answer why he does not resign. Regarding Gen Chawalit's political future, if Gen Chatchai is able to lead his government to survive its 4-year term until 1992 and Gen Chawalit is still in the service, it means that Gen Chawalit will have to continue his government service until his mandatory retirement.

"We believe that the government under Gen Chatchai's leadership, at least, will be able to survive by half of its term, or 2 years until August of 1990. And, if we interpret that Gen Chawalit will become the next prime minister, it shows that Gen Chawalit has to remain in his position for another year after this September," a source from Soi Ratchakhru gave up such an example.

It is very possible that Gen Chawalit may have to run against the trend—continuing to remain in the Army by submitting his resignation at the end of this year in order to get a disapproval. But, it means Chawalit will have to face mounting pressure in the Army because the six generals, who have a chance to become the next army commander as mentioned by Gen Chawalit in an interview, are all in line for the position of army commander.

A reliable source disclosed that after the military reshuffle in September, 1988, a high-ranking officer who is also a leader of the graduates of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class 5, had expressed disappointment with the vagueness concerning Gen Chawalit's resignation when he travelled to Germany. In addition, this high-ranking officer also felt confused by the transfer of some positions, especially those involving the Class 5 graduates.

Meanwhile, an officer who has been supporting Gen Chawalit said that he also felt uneasy because the issue of whether Gen Chawalit will resign may cause great confusion in the Army. It is time for the officers who once called on Gen Chawalit to give him moral support and to ask him to stay on until his retirement to look at the issue from a different angle.

Gen Chawalit is trying to make the military a pillar of the government, but from some problems he has faced, it sometimes turned out that Gen Chatchai had to help him to make him continue to support the government. However, if the situation turns a different way, Gen Chatchai has several cards to play.

While Gen Chawalit's future is still not clear, another trend is emerging and is worthy of watching.

A source told KHAO PHISSET that among the generals who have a chance to become the next army commander, Gen Suchinda Khrapayun, assistant army commander and a leader of the Class 5 graduates, has the best chance to be selected for the post if the situation makes Gen Chatchai select a new Army leader by himself. The source said that Gen Suchinda is due to retire in 1993. If considered according to seniority, the list of generals who have the best chance of becoming the next army commander will begin with Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Sunthon Khongsomphon, Deputy Army Commander Gen Wanchai Ruangtrakun, and Gen Phichit Kunlawanit, with Gen Suchinda ranking fourth.

"This does not include Gen Charuai because he is expected to resign if Gen Chawalit resigns from service. If Gen Chawalit continues his service for another year and retires in 1990, Gen Charuai will reach his mandatory retirement age in that year," the source added.

According to seniority and the year in which the generals will retire, the chance of Gen Suchinda, who has been tipped to the first of the Class 5 graduates to become the army commander, will be slim. Although his chances are slim, several leaders of Class 5 still think that "Gen Suchinda's chances depend on the political situation."

The "political situation" means that if there is a crisis facing the government and it involves military politics, and Gen Chatchai has to make a decision to find a pillar for himself, the chance for Big Su [Suchinda] will probably come.

At the new year of 1989, Gen Suchinda represented the Army officers to extend new year wishes to Gen Chawalit and asked Gen Chawalit to give up his intention of resigning. But, a highly-placed source in Government House said that we should not be serious about it. It also said that Big Su might also be one of the officers who are confused by Gen Chawalit's resignation.

A Soi Ratchakhru source told KHAO PHISET that the bond between Gen Chatchai and Gen Suchinda, plus Deputy Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin, a comrade-in-arms of Gen Suchinda, is excellent. As a result, it is another formula for Soi Ratchakhru to use Gen Suchinda and Gen Kaset as a power base in the Army and the Air Force.

As for Col Manun Rupkhachon, a key leader in the abortive coup on 1-3 April 1981 and in the 9 September 1985 coup, he has been reinstated in grade. He is now waiting for approval for reinstatement in service, which seems to be no problem. It is noted that the effort to reinstate Col Manun this time was primarily put through Gen Chatchai's line. It is believed that Gen Chatchai, who was once a cavalryman, can help cavalrymen of the generation of younger brothers, like Col Manun. This could also well indicate a close relationship.

The source also noted that although Col Manun had failed in two coups, several sides believed his charisma, image, and potential have not faded. If he is supported by Soi Ratchakhru, it will provide another important card for Gen Chatchai, which should not be overlooked.

However, classmates of Col Manun from Class 7 told KHAO PHISET that Col Manun's reinstatement is initially aimed at obtaining his right to receive his government pension. After his reinstatement, he may resign to enter politics if the situation is suitable. Or, he may have to continue to remain in the Army. However, no matter what the result, it is difficult to reject that there is a bond of "cavalryman's blood."

There is a question as to what is the gap between the Class 5 graduates and the "Young Turks" like Col Manun and Col Prachak Sawangchit? The answer for the current changing situation is that, like the political circle, there are no true friends and permanent enemies in the military circle.

Col Prachak Sawangchit, an advisor to the interior minister, was said to have a part in helping Crime Suppression Division Commander Police Lieutenant General Bunchu Wangkanon, a Class 5 graduate, not to be transferred last year. Gen Suchinda, the key of the Class 5 graduates, was seen smiling at a party of Class 7 graduates several months ago.

"The past is the past. The situation has changed already. There should be no problem if they share the same goals and attitudes," a graduate of Class 7 told KHAO PHISET.

Although Gen Chatchai will not openly get involved in military politics, it is difficult for this government to avoid such a thing in the future. At least the issue concerning Gen Chawalit's resignation will be a political question that relates to the government. It is not sure how this issue will end in the future.

Concerning Gen Suchinda and Col Manun, despite that it is still not clear that they will become a power base for Soi Ratchakhru, from what has been going on, that possibility can not be ruled out. This is what we have to follow.

Commentator Concerned With 'Corrupt' Democracy
BK0504024589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
5 Apr 89 p 4

[Commentary by Democratic Party Parliament Member Surin Phitsuwon under the rubric "Reflections" headline "There's More to Democracy Than Meets the Eye"]

[Text] The Prime Minister is riding high on the crest of popularity waves to the surprise of many observers, including his close associates. Industry Minister Banhan Sinlapa-acha, who is also secretary-general of the Chat Thai Party, said recently that the Prime Minister's performance is excellent and far beyond expectation. The National Statistics Office reported that Gen Chatchai Chunhawan's popularity rating is 90 percent. The popular mood around the country is that the country is heading for a period of high economic growth and political stability.

But there are always those who would caution against popular wisdom. One of the most respected monks in the South, Phutthathat Phikkhu, warned last weekend that the nation might have been overwhelmed by the apparent form of democracy without paying much attention to its real content and analysing its real performance. A popularly elected government could hide behind the shield of "democracy" and do more damage to the people who have been misled by a public relations

campaign and manipulated by effective management of news and information. Paraphrasing Aristotle, he said that a corrupt form of democracy is far worse than a benevolent dictatorship.

More people both inside and outside the political circles are beginning to feel the same way as the revered monk of Suan Mok. They are worried that the government is taking advantage of the public euphoria over the fact that they now have a fully democratic government, and is overlooking some of the most fundamental issues facing us today.

First of all, the task before the Government is not purely a personality contest among Cabinet ministers, although a certain degree of that should be expected in a democracy. The Prime Minister should not exercise too much influence over the ministries. Progressive MP Sutham Saengprathum of Nakhon Si Thammarat said that this is a good chance to improve the performance of the bureaucracy and not the opportunity to personalise all policies by any individuals. "In the end the people should be convinced that it is the system that delivers all the goods and services to them. Not individuals. They should be made to realise that all of us are dispensable, but the system must stay."

Another opinion is that the mass media and the academics are being so mesmerised by the democratic cabaret that they forget about their role as the watchdogs of the nation's interest. "People are feeling reassured by the fact that quick decisions are being made, new and impressive projects are being announced every passing day and all problems appear to be soluble no matter how heavy, how complicated," said a senior Member of Parliament of the Opposition camp.

The point of serious concern now is the impression that people are no longer worried about rampant corruption that seems to be going on at all levels of government. The Government is sharing the wealth by raising the salaries, improving minimum wages, redistributing industrial and development projects around the country. The prevalent attitude is that as long as the poor get some of the benefits, a little corruption is tolerable.

The Government, particularly the Prime Minister, is appealing directly to the people through the mass media. "He goes over the heads of the Opposition, the Parliament, even some coalition partners and gets the approval from the public for whatever policies or projects he wants," said an observer. When public relations gimmicks work, mechanism for supervision and control fails miserably.

Some are worried about the strong trend toward "money politics." If each coalition partner is filling up its coffer in preparation for the next general elections, each minister will be hard-pressed to dream up projects that

would be lucrative for himself, his political entourage and his party. They will use money to nurse their constituencies and they will use money to buy votes during the elections.

The challenge before us is not to succumb to this trend. We will have to make sure that it is the system that will work and deliver the benefits to the people. A fair, equal and accessible system is the best guarantee that the people's rights and interests would be promoted and protected. If we allow the individuals to pile up wealth and to compete in distributing it in their own names to the people, our democracy is indeed heading for a precarious future. Consider these contrary views as iconoclasm in the expansive sea of popularity in which the present ship of state is sailing. The storms may not be too apparent on the radar screen. But abrupt weather changes are quite normal in our political atmosphere. When the changes do come, we would not be caught totally unprepared.

Vietnam

Czechoslovakia's Jakes Arrives in Hanoi

BK0604161389 Hanoi VNA in English 0735 GMT
6 Apr 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, arrived here this morning to a redcarpet welcome reserved for a head of state at the Chi Linh Square.

Tran Xuan Bach, Politburo member and secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, was present at the Noi Bai International Airport to meet Milos Jakes and the other distinguished Czechoslovak guests.

Among the welcoming party were Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee [CPV CC]; Vo Chi Cong, Politburo member and president of the State Council; Do Muoi, Politburo member and chairman of the Council of Ministers; Le Quang Dao, member of the CPV CC and chairman of the National Assembly, and Nguyen Co Thach, Politburo member, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and foreign minister.

Lao Ambassador Bouasai Chaleunsouk and Kampuchean Ambassador Tep Hen were among the diplomats present.

Later, Milos Jakes and his party were warmly received at the Government Guest House by Nguyen Van Linh, Vo Chi Cong, Do Muoi, Le Quang Dao, and other leading officials.

In his welcoming speech, Nguyen Van Linh said he regarded the visit of General Secretary Milos Jakes as a further step in the friendship and allround cooperation between the two parties.

For his part, General Secretary Milos Jakes re-affirmed the Czechoslovak people's unswerving solidarity with the Vietnamese people and expressed his belief that the friendship and cooperation between the two countries would constantly consolidate and develop.

Nguyen Van Linh, Jakes Meet

*BK0604155089 Hanoi VNA in English 1505 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—Talks were held at the presidential palace this afternoon between Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee [CPV CC], and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Milos Jakes, who arrived here this morning for an official visit to Vietnam.

Also present at the talks on the Vietnamese side were Do Muoi, Politburo member of the CPV CC and chairman of the Council of Ministers; Nguyen Co Thach, Politburo member of the CPV CC, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister; Tran Xuan Bach, Politburo member and secretary of the CPV CC; Vu Oanh, secretary of the CPV CC and head of its economic commission; Tran Duc Luong, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and head of the Vietnamese Sub-committee of the Vietnam-Czechoslovakia inter-governmental commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation; Hoang Bich Son, member of the CPV CC and head of its international department; Dang Huu, head of the State Commission for Science and Technology; and Nguyen Phu Soai, Vietnam's ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

On the Czechoslovak side were Jozef Lenart, member of the Presidium and secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee [CPC CC]; Jaromir Obzina, member of the CPC CC and deputy prime minister; Michal Stefanak, member of the CPC CC and head of its international department; Karel Loebel, cabinet minister of the Czech Government and head of the Czechoslovak sub-committee of the intergovernmental commission; Jaromir Nehera, deputy foreign minister; Jiri Nemec, deputy minister of foreign trade; and Miroslav Kapoun, Czechoslovak ambassador to Vietnam.

During the talks the two sides informed each other of the activities of their respective parties and the socialist construction in their countries. They exchanged views on the relationship between the two parties and states, and on the international issues of mutual concern. The two sides had an identity of views on all issues raised for discussion.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of traditional friendship, comradeship and mutual understanding.

Czechoslovak Guests Visit Mausoleum

*BK0604153189 Hanoi VNA in English 1504 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and the other Czechoslovak party and state leaders on a current visit to Vietnam, today laid a wreath at the mausoleum of President Ho Chi Minh.

They were accompanied by Tran Xuan Bach, Nguyen Quang Tao and Nguyen Phu Soai.

Later, the distinguished Czechoslovak guests visited the late president's home and office under the guidance of Vu Ky, director of the Ho Chi Minh Museum.

Czechoslovak Delegation Feted

*BK0604155989 Hanoi VNA in English 1519 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the State Council and the Council of Ministers offered a state banquet here this evening in honour of Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his delegation.

Present at the banquet were Nguyen Van Linh, Vo Chi Cong, Do Muoi, Le Quang Dao, and other senior officials.

Nguyen Van Linh and Milos Jakes delivered speeches at the banquet.

An art performance was also given on this occasion.

Nguyen Van Linh Gives Speech

*BK0704072989 Hanoi VNA in English 0700 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 7—Following are excerpts from party General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh's speech at a banquet given here yesterday evening in honour of his Czechoslovak counterpart, Milos Jakes:

The Communist Party and the people of Vietnam follow with keen interest the on-going process of comprehensive restructuring in Czechoslovakia to consolidate and perfect socialism there, thus contributing to developing world socialism to a new qualitative level. The restructuring in Czechoslovakia and the renovation in Vietnam have opened up new prospects for our cooperation, and at the same time, required us to renew the structure of our cooperation by broadening the areas and forms of cooperation with a view to vigorously developing our mutually beneficial cooperation and raising its effectiveness. For our part, we will do all we can in that direction for the interests of our two peoples and for enhancing the common strength of socialism.

Uniting closely and cooperating allsidedly with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the other fraternal socialist countries is the corner-stone in the foreign policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Now as before, Vietnam has always striven to increase its coordination with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the other fraternal socialist countries on the international arena in contributing to the common struggle for a world of peace, security and cooperation. At the same time, Vietnam has strongly supported the struggle of other peoples for national independence and social progress.

We highly value the foreign policy of peace of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and fully support Comrade General Secretary Milos Jakes's Feb. 24, 1988 initiative on the establishment of a region of mutual trust, cooperation and good neighbourliness along the common borders between the countries members of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the NATO. Together with the efforts of the Soviet Union, the initiatives of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are important contributions to the cause of peace and cooperation in Europe and the rest of the world.

The April 5, 1989 declaration of the Governments of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer army from Kampuchea by the end of September 1989 shows their serious stance and good will in carrying out their commitments at JIM-2 [second Jakarta informal meeting]. This decision contributes to accelerating the settlement of the domestic aspect of the Kampuchea question with a view to achieving an overall solution to Kampuchea at an early date and setting up a zone of peace, friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia. We hope that the countries and parties concerned will implement their agreements and commitments on the cessation of all military aid and interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, and respect the principle that the internal affairs of Kampuchea must be solved by the Kampuchean parties.

Soon, we will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. That is a political event of great historic significance in the relations between our two parties and states. We firmly believe that the current visit of Comrade General Secretary Milos Jakes and the other party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia to our country will be an important milestone in the development of the friendship and comprehensive co-operation between the parties and peoples of Vietnam and Czechoslovakia in the new period.

Jakes Addresses Banquet

*BK0704080489 Hanoi VNA in English 0712 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 7—Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central

Committee, made a reply speech at the banquet here yesterday evening hosted by the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, the State Council and the Council of Ministers. Main excerpts follow:

"The development and atmosphere of our talks have demonstrated our two Marxist-Leninist parties' unity in ideal and objectives as well as the fraternal relationship between our two nations and countries. Our talks once again bear witness to the traditional friendship between the peoples of Vietnam and Czechoslovakia.

"Nine years ago our two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. That's not a long period compared to the objectives of the treaty, but thanks to the common efforts made by the two peoples many things have been done to enhance our coordination and develop the cooperation in all aspects of our political, economic and social life. Part of those efforts is the improvement of skills for Vietnamese labourers and their contributions to the realisation of our country's tasks. We have the right to say that our relations are comradely and firm ones.

"We may take pleasure at the positive results obtained within the framework of cooperation programmes in light industry, agriculture and electronics. A joint Czechoslovak-Vietnamese enterprise, the first of its kind, has been set up, and the foundation of their such enterprises is being discussed. The intergovernmental commission for economic, scientific and technological cooperation has contributed to this development. A freshly signed memorandum on coordination in planning the national economy for the years 1991-95 is also opening up new possibilities. We have correctly emphasized the establishment of direct contacts between specific economic organisations of the two countries, not only between state-owned factories, but between production and marketing cooperatives as well. We consider this to be the start of a basic turning-point in the structure of our economic ties at present and in the raising of its purposefulness and effectiveness.

"In this relationship, we highly regard Vietnam's constructive policy of peace which aims to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, friendship and cooperation, as well as your contributions to the activity of the Nonaligned Movement. We highly value the efforts of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam toward an equitable solution to the Kampuchea question and a rapid settlement of other problems in Southeast Asia. Just before this visit, we had been informed of the joint declaration of the Governments of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. We hold that the proposals in that declaration reflect a constructive and realistic attitude conducive to the elimination of tensions in this part of the world".

Nguyen Van Linh, Jakes Hold Meeting

*LD0704075589 Prague CTK in English 0622 GMT
7 Apr 89*

[By CTK correspondent]

[Text] Hanoi April 7—Talks between visiting Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes and his Vietnamese colleague Nguyen Van Linh continued here today, focusing on the two countries economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The two party officials stressed that new forms of direct relations between enterprises must be introduced, and cooperation in production in the textile, shoe and electrical engineering industries must be developed, including the founding of joint ventures.

China's Reaction to Troop Pullout Pledge Noted

*BK0704111189 Hanoi International Service in English
1000 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Excerpts] The joint Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea declaration on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea by the end of September 1989 has been hailed by public opinion. [passage omitted]

For its part, the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared on Thursday that China will stop sending aid to Kampuchean opposing factions when Vietnam completely withdraws its troops from Kampuchea.

Chatchai Statement on Troop Pullout Cited

*BK0704063389 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Text] According to the BANGKOK POST, during a talk with newsmen on the evening of 5 April, Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan warmly welcomed the decision to withdraw volunteer Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and said this action would bring peace to Cambodia. He expressed his belief that Vietnam would implement its decision, and that once peace was restored, trade would begin just like in the Thai-Lao case after the fighting stopped along the border.

He stressed: Today, 5 April, is my birthday. This is clearly good news.

Also on the evening of 5 April, Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila released a press statement saying: I consider Vietnam's decision to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia in September this year and its acceptance of supervision by an international control commission an action worthy of praise and more reasonable than in previous times. We welcome this action of Vietnam and hope that it will lead to totally resolving the Cambodian problem.

In a following talk with newsmen, Minister Sitthi Sawetsila specified: This troop pullout will promote negotiations among the Cambodian parties and will bring about a complete solution to the Cambodian issue.

On the afternoon of 5 April, Thai Government spokesman Suwit Yotmani said: The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam joint statement clearly manifests an aspiration for peace. He stressed: This truly supports Prime Minister Chatchai's policy of turning Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace.

Thai Foreign Minister Welcomes Troop Pullout

*BK0604160489 Hanoi VNA in English 1514 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila has acclaimed the Indochinese countries' joint declaration on Vietnamese troops withdrawal from Kampuchea as a positive move helping to accelerate the process of peaceful solution to the Kampuchea question.

He made the assessment in Bangkok on April 5 while receiving Vietnamese Ambassador Le Mai who had come to inform him of the new decision of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam. Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila expressed his approval of the proposals for setting up an international control commission, for stopping all foreign military aid to the Kampuchean factions, ending outside interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, and promoting the talks between Chairman Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk as well as the negotiations among the Kampuchean parties with a view to solving the internal affairs of Kampuchea by the end of September 1989.

Ambassador Le Mai suggested that the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand use its prestige and influence in contributing to preventing the restoration of the genocidal regime and the outbreak of a civil war in Kampuchea, and in accelerating the negotiations for an overall solution to the Kampuchea question.

Soviet, Thai, U.S. Officials Hail Withdrawal

*BK0704083189 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2300 GMT 6 Apr 89*

[Text] Many foreign news agencies, radio stations, and newspapers have promptly reported on the important statement jointly made by the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], Laos, and Vietnam on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer forces from Cambodia by September 1989. Many personalities in the world have voiced their welcome for this statement.

Asked to give his assessment on the above statement, Comrade (Remmiskiy), deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Department, said at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Center that the process of settling the Cambodian issue involves many measures and steps. Obviously, the decision to continue the troop

withdrawal and complete the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops by September 1989 will spur efforts to reach a political solution. Those parties adopting this decision were inspired by the belief that there has been a gradual advance to a political solution to the Cambodian issue.

On 5 April, Vietnamese Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand Le Mai informed Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila of the substance of the joint statement of the PRK, the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR], and the SRV on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Cambodia before the end of September 1989. Minister Sitthi Sawetsila warmly welcomed this decision by the Indochinese countries, regarding it as a positive move to spur the process of peacefully settling the Cambodian issue. The minister also expressed his sympathy with those proposals for setting up an international control commission, for cessation of foreign military aid to all Cambodian sides, for cessation of interference into Cambodia's internal affairs, and for pressing for negotiations between Chairman Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk as well as between the Cambodian parties concerned to solve the internal affairs of Cambodia before September 1989.

Ambassador Le Mai proposed that the government of the Kingdom of Thailand use its prestige and influence to contribute to blocking the return of the genocidal regime and preventing a civil war in Cambodia, and spurring negotiations in order to arrive at a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian issue.

On 5 April, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Baker said the U.S. Government welcomes the joint statement of the three countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in which it was made clear that Vietnam would withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia by September 1989.

Baker said: Although not yet looking at all the details of the statement, we believe that if the troop withdrawal is undertaken, it will be a positive development.

Army Paper Hails Troop Withdrawal

*BK0604140189 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2330 GMT 5 Apr 89*

[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 6 April editorial: "A Good-willed Action That Opens a Turning Point for Solving the Cambodian Issue"]

[Text] On 5 April, Governments of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV], the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], and the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] issued a joint statement on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese army volunteers from Cambodia in September 1989 and a proposal to reestablish the international control and supervision commission for the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina with the participation of the chairman of JIM 2 [Jakarta informal meeting] and the UN secretary general [as heard].

This is a very important decision which is in conformity with the SRV-PRK Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, reflecting the current fine situation in and around the land of Angkor, and correctly responding the trend of dialogue and peace in the region and the world. The decision once again testifies to the brilliant goodwill of the SRV, PRK, and LPDR to resolve the Cambodian issue through political means and to build Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, friendship, and cooperation.

The 5 April joint statement of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos has reverberated throughout our planet, marking a new developmental stage of the Cambodian history. After liberating their country, the Cambodian people would have been living in peace and happiness had the genocidal Pol Pot clique not committed serious crimes and pushed the Cambodian people into the genocidal scourge. During their 4 years in power—April 1975-January 1979—they killed three million Cambodian people, launched aggressive attacks against the southern part of Vietnam and barbarously killed tens of thousands of Vietnamese at the border areas. With a view to help themselves and the fraternal Cambodian people and in response to the request of the Cambodian United Front for National Salvation, the Vietnamese Army volunteers came to Cambodia to fight side by side with the Cambodian people to smash the cruel Pol Pot regime. They liberated the Cambodian people from the genocidal scourge and eliminated a hotbed of dangerous war in the Southeast Asian region. In the eyes of freedom- and justice-loving people in the world, this is a most lofty and humanitarian act. Now that the Vietnamese army volunteers have fulfilled their glorious historic mission, they are to leave for their beloved fatherland. This is an eloquent fact manifesting Vietnam's consistent policy of respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. It also affirms the PRK's growth. After more than a decade of courageous fighting, the PRK has matured in all aspects, the people's daily life has been stabilized and increasingly developed. The PRK firmly stands by itself, the PRK Government controls the whole Cambodian territory; the Cambodian people have ample strength to determine their own destiny, uphold the banner of peace and national reconciliation, eliminate the genocidal regime for good, and build an independent, neutral and nonaligned Cambodia.

The total withdrawal of Vietnamese army volunteers from Cambodia has ushered in a turning point for resolving the Cambodian issue in conformity with announcements of Southeast Asian nations and Cambodian parties at the first and second Jakarta informal meetings [JIM]. It is obvious now that agreements reached at JIM 1 and JIM 2 can be implemented immediately, that commitments by countries concerned that the total withdrawal of Vietnamese Army volunteers will be linked with the prevention of a reestablishment of the genocidal Pol Pot regime must be honored, that military aid to all Cambodian parties as well as outside interference must be stopped. Full implementation of these agreements and commitments will end the civil

war and hasten the Cambodian parties to resolve the internal aspect of the Cambodian issue before September 1989. Public opinion hopes that the meetings between Prince Sihanouk and Chairman Hun Sen and other Cambodian parties to discuss to resolve the internal aspect of the Cambodian issue will be held within the next 4 months or sooner in accordance with the principle of resolving the internal aspect by the Cambodian parties without any interference from the outside.

Heretofore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have always wished for a comprehensive solution meeting the interests of the Cambodian people as well as the legitimate interests of countries concerned in conformity with the aspirations of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. However, during the past several years, various forces have sought to block a rational, just solution to the Cambodian issue. On the one hand, they attempted to encourage the Pol Pot clique and other Khmer reactionary forces to oppose and undermine the Cambodian revolution, while on the other hand, they strove to demand an early and total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. In essence, they intended to prolong the settlement of the internal aspect of the Cambodian issue to serve their selfish interests. Now the Cambodian issue has developed to a new progressive stage. The Cambodian issue will be settled when all Vietnamese Army volunteers withdraw completely from Cambodia, while parties concerned must honor their commitments of stopping outside interference to the internal affairs of Cambodia, ceasing military aid to Cambodian parties, and preventing the Pol Pot clique from returning to cause disaster to the Cambodian people. Those who do not honor their commitments would be deliberately undermining a political solution to the Cambodia issue, opposing the Cambodian people's interests, and sabotaging peace in Southeast Asia. They must bear responsibility before history and conscience of progressive mankind.

Over the past 10 years, the Vietnamese Army volunteers have fulfilled their glorious international obligation. They have selflessly sacrificed to help the Cambodian people reviving vigorously, making great effort to protect their country, and building a new life. From now to the day of repatriation, officers and combatants of the Vietnamese volunteer army will continue to hold the special friendship and solidarity with the Cambodian people, strive to help our friends build their forces firm and strong in all aspects, thereby positively contributing to leading the Cambodian revolution firmly advance in the new stage and strengthening the intimate, close relationship between the two peoples.

Our people and armed forces throughout the country would like to convey to you comrades our warmest and most affectionate sentiment. We wish you comrades success in developing the fine tradition so that when you leave the fraternal Cambodian nation, your lofty image of "Uncle Ho's Soldiers" will still be imprinted in the hearts of the Cambodian people.

'Public Opinion' Surveyed on Marketplace Policy
BK0504144389 Hanoi International Service in Thai
1130 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Station commentary: "The Time Is Right for Thai-Vietnamese Trade Relations"]

[Text] The Bangkok Bank recently conducted a random survey of public opinion on Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan's policy to turn the Indochinese battlefield into a marketplace. The results of the survey showed that the policy has been widely accepted by people from all walks of life, particularly the business and trade sector. However, it will take some time to turn the idea into practice. It needs a great deal of effort to push ahead the idea. In Thailand, there are two lines of thinking concerning Thailand's relations with Vietnam. The first group favors waiting until Vietnam has completely pulled out its troops from Cambodia before starting business. The second group believes that it is more important to grasp the opportunity in trade or business immediately whenever available. Sometimes, trade has to be separated from political obsession.

For the first viewpoint, there is still some obstacle because there exists an unfounded suspicion over Vietnam's pledge to pull out all its troops from Cambodia by September this year if a political settlement for the Cambodian problem is achieved, otherwise the complete troop withdrawal will be made before the end of 1990. In fact, Vietnam has made seven unilateral pullouts of its army volunteers from Cambodia totalling three fourths of the number of its troops in Cambodia. Only one-fourth remains. Vietnam is willing to withdraw all its troop when the Cambodian people are able to protect their country and develop their economy by themselves. Vietnam's intention is well known the world over.

The second viewpoint belongs to realistic people and is gaining more and more support. Sunai Chulaphongsa-thon, an attorney, businessman, and politician, who was also in the delegation of Thai members of parliament visiting Vietnam recently, remarked that we should not let time pass by without doing anything useful. He said that there is a good opportunity for Thailand and Vietnam right now. Economists of both countries should promote bilateral cooperation. Economic cooperation without political barriers is vital for the world economy today. Let us think about it.

The European Economic Community or EEC, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or CEMA have officially promoted relations. Despite political conflicts or tension, many groups of neighboring countries have engaged in economic exchanges in various forms for the benefit of them all. Unofficial border trade between the peoples at the Vietnamese-Chinese border has been actively carried out; Thai-Vietnamese trade relations are similar. Thailand and Vietnam have been trading with each other unofficially through third countries and the trade value has been expanding.

Those with farsightedness in the Thai business sector are now making preparations instead of remaining idle as that would cost an opportunity they should not lose.

Philippine Airlines Opens Ho Chi Minh City Office
*BK0604082089 Hanoi VNA in English 0709 GMT
6 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 6—An office of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) was recently opened in Ho Chi Minh City following an agreement on aviation signed between the Vietnam Airlines and the Philippine Airlines in late 1988.

Present at the inauguration ceremony on the Philippine side were Dante Santos, chairman of PAL, Benigno Zialcita, representative of the Philippine Ministry of Tourism; and Cipriano Leron, Philippine Ambassador to Vietnam. On the Vietnamese side were Hong Ngoc Dieu, director general of the Civil Aviation [Department], and Nguyen Quyen Sinh, director of the General Department of Tourism.

There is now one flight a week from Vietnam to the Philippines and vice versa on Wednesday and Friday respectively.

Hoang Lien Son Meets To Discuss Border Management
*BK0704101489 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 5 Apr 89*

[Text] Recently at the border township of Muong Khuong, the Hoang Lien Son Provincial Party Committee and People's Committee met with various organs, sectors, mass organizations, border security units, and representatives from all districts, cities, and villages along the border to draw experiences on border management.

In general, since late 1988, Hoang Lien Son has satisfactorily administered border management, thus enabling it to maintain security both in the front and rear areas.

Along with arranging for the people in the border areas to study and firmly grasp the situation, all border defense posts in the province have created favorable conditions for people on either side of the border to travel back and forth for the exchange of goods. They have also issued warnings to or dealt with a number of cases involving violation of border regulations, and furnished assistance to those families forced to evacuate their native villages along the border 2 years ago to return home.

From the experience acquired in recent months, Hoang Lien Son has instructed its border security forces and all sectors, mass organizations, and establishments along the border to remain alert and sensitive to firmly grasp the situation and provide guidance for those traveling back and forth in the border areas to ensure that they correctly conform to intelligence regulations, pay border crossing fees, cross the border at the right points, do not trade in

contraband goods, and cement friendly relations. This is aimed at helping each other to satisfactorily manage the border areas and stabilize the people's livelihood.

Agricultural Tax Department Head Interviewed
*BK0504133789 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1100 GMT 4 Apr 89*

[Interview with Pham Duc Phong, head of the Agricultural Tax Department, on 1988 agricultural tax collection by unidentified station correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Dear Comrade: We know that in 1988 all localities complied with state policies on agricultural taxes and accelerated the collection of taxes from all objectives. Could you tell us the overall results?

[Pham Duc Phong] In 1988, under the close guidance of the Council of Ministers and the administration at all levels, our agricultural tax sector concentrated on collecting taxes from the very beginning of the winter-spring crop season to create favorable conditions for fulfilling the entire 1988 agricultural tax collection task. As of 28 February 1989, 84 percent of the tax collection plan had been completed countrywide and 85 percent completed in terms of grain alone.

[Correspondent] Do you think that these results are realistic enough and what problems are still outstanding?

[Pham Duc Phong] According to our assessment, these tax collection results are not yet commensurate with the results of agricultural production, especially grain production, in 1988 and the tax collection results are not well balanced among localities. Some provinces have not yet achieved half of their tax collection plans such as Minh Hai, Hau Giang, Cuu Long and Song Be provinces, and Ho Chi Minh city. Taxes levied on perennial crops have quadrupled those collected in 1987. Some provinces have achieved high results in the collection of this tax. However, compared to their potentials, these results show that not all sources have been tapped because the present area subject to agricultural tax has not caught up with the expanded area of production and the taxed portions of crop production volume are not commensurate with harvest yields. The 1988 taxes still to be collected countrywide amount to 200,000 tonnes of which the Mekong Delta provinces owe 160,000 tonnes. The 1988 tax collection results are still low and unbalanced among localities, mainly because some local authorities have not provided close guidance for tax collection, have not organized tax collection promptly enough in keeping with the renovation of state management mechanism concerning prices of rice, procurement funds of agencies receiving the taxed rice, and finally have failed to improve the agricultural tax collection machinery both qualitatively and quantitatively and to satisfactorily remunerate taxation cadres, especially village taxation cadres.

[Correspondent] With the outstanding problems in the 1988 agricultural tax collection task you just pointed out, could you tell us what are this year's guidelines from the Finance Ministry for completing the tax collection plan?

[Pham Duc Phong] In 1989, our agricultural tax sector countrywide must strive to tap all sources on the strength of current agricultural tax policies in order to ensure the source of revenues for the state budget and to help the state secure an amount of grain to supply the armed forces and to store in national reserve. To implement the 1989 agricultural tax collection task, the national agricultural taxation sector must concentrate on the following duties:

—Regarding those localities that have not completed their agricultural tax collection task for 1988, including tax debts from 1986-87, continued effort must be made to immediately collect them in the 1989 winter-spring season. Under the guidance of the administration at all levels, the taxation sector must reexamine the taxable area of tax paying units. Those localities where land survey has been made in accordance with Directive No 299 and ownership crediting teams have been established must use the basis of the surveyed areas and agricultural tax policies to reexamine areas being currently computed for taxation.

—Those localities where land survey has not been completed, must go on the basis of the area of land under contracts and so on to control taxation accurately.

[Correspondent] As you know our state has recently issued decrees to amend and supplement some items in the regulation on agricultural tax. How has the agricultural tax sector acted and planned to implement the regulation on the strength of these documents.

[Pham Duc Phong] To act upon and implement the regulation of the Council of State on amending agricultural taxes, our finance ministry has performed the following tasks:

—We have asked the Council of Ministers to review and promulgate its decree that stipulates details on the implementation of the regulation. We will issue a circular guiding the implementation of the regulation and the Council of Ministers' decree on agricultural taxes and some other documents on agricultural tax duty and we will prepare lessons for agricultural tax cadres to learn about agricultural policies and tasks. Our finance ministry has also formulated a plan to implement the regulation on agricultural tax as guidance for localities.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Comrade.

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